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Fear is part of life. The objects of fear may have changed during
centuries. Some contemporary researchers think that we have
entered a new era concerning dangers (e.g Beck et al., 1994; Erik-
son, 1991). Nuclear power is certainly one of the dangers our
forfathers did not fear. Not everybody is afraid of it nowadays
either. Nuclear power is a controversial issue in the society. At
the moment there is a public debate going on about the suggest-
ed construction of a fifth nuclear power plant in Finland. The
main issue of disagreement is: is nuclear power safe? Can we as
a society accept the risks it includes? Is it naive to be afraid of
risks, that are so small? The subject of this research is nuclear
power as a threat, especially as an object of human fear in case
something goes wrong.
As  a research subject threat of a nuclear accident is very so-
cial psychological: it deals with the interaction of a person and
his physical and social environment and with the meaning of
social interaction in case of a nuclear threat. Theoretically the
subject is studied from several viewpoints before presenting the
empirical results of a survey study. This study is part of the re-
search tradition of disaster studies started by Morton Prince in
1921 and followed by Fritz and Quarantelli in 1950’s and later on
by several social psychologists. However, it also connects to the
trauma psychological research area started by Freud and Janet
in the end of 19th century and later developed further by many
important researchers since the 1960’s. This dissertation is struc-
tured in eight chapters.
2In the first chapter threat is studied as a stressor and from the
framework of stress theory (Lazarus, 1966; Selye, 1956) . The ba-
sis of feeling of security and basic assumptions about life are pre-
sented from a schema theoretical framework. (Janoff-Bulman,
1985; Epstein, 1991.) Then studies on risk perception and the sev-
eral heuristics connected to it are reviewed specially in relation
to nuclear power (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982; Slovic, 1991).
Risk has been studied also as a social construction, as something
that is created and modulated culturally in social interaction. The
possibility for different social constructions creates opportunity
for disagreements and social problems. These have been studied
by Nigg and Cuthbertson (1987) who have shown the impor-
tance and the consequential lack of social support that is so dif-
ferent from the altruistic community, typical of the aftermath of
natural disasters. Finally the concept of risk society is briefly pre-
sented.
The second chapter compares psychological effects of nucle-
ar accidents with those of other man-made or natural disasters.
Nuclear power as a threat differs from more traditional and more
familiar accidents and the importance of these differences is dis-
cussed here. (Quarantelli, 1991.) The history of reactions and at-
titudes to radiation and nuclear power is presented to see how
the roots of attitudes to nuclear power are to be found in history.
These attitudes may represent a more general tendency in the
development of human beliefs (Weart, 1988).
Warning situation or an impending danger have been stud-
ied as situations demanding decision making from the subject.
Different decision making theories are presented in chapter three.
The concepts of rationality and irrationality are central in con-
nection with decision making theories, where the central ques-
tion is if man is a rational being or not. The applicability of deci-
sion making theories to nuclear threat is assessed beginning from
subjective expected utility theory (Simon, 1955) to later develop-
ments of naturalistic decision making and situation awareness
(Klein, 1995; Endsley, 1997). Perception is studied as information
processing where new information is interpreted according to
existing schemas (Wyer and Srull, 1989). The importance of af-
3fective factors in information processing is discussed, to avoid a
purely cognitive perspective (Etzioni, 1992).
Chapter four combines the current topic with more general
trauma psychology as the psychological consequences of a nu-
clear threat are studied from the viewpoint of being a potential
traumatic event. The development and the most important theo-
retical models of traumatic stress are presented. The main inter-
est here is in the information processing model (Horowitz, 1986,
1997) and in the psychosocial model (Green, Lindy and Wilson,
1985; Herman, 1992). The psychological consequences of nuclear
accidents are reviewed mainly on the basis of studies of three
cases:  accidents that took place in Three Mile Island in 1979 (Baum
et al. 1983; Prince-Embury and Rooney, 1988), in Chernobyl in
1986 (van den Bout, 1995; Torubarov, 1991) and in Goiania in 1987
(Brandao-Mello et al. 1991).
In chapter five the basic facts of the incident, that took place
at the nuclear power plant in Sosnovyi Bor, Russia in 1992, are
presented. Chapter six defines the research questions and de-
scribes the design and main hypotheses of the current study fol-
lowed by a description of the data sample.
In chapter seven results of the statistical analyses conducted
on the data sample are presented and structured around the main
areas of interest: interpretation of the situation, protective activ-
ities and perceptions of information delivery. Results concern-
ing psychological consequences of the incident at the Sosnovyi
Bor nuclear power plant are presented, followed by results of
comparisons between groups named “healthy” and “sick” based
on the amount of symptoms on different scales used in the study.
In chapter eight the results of the study are discussed in light
of earlier research results and interpreted within the different
frameworks presented in the theoretical part of the dissertation.
The main results are also discussed from the viewpoint of emer-
gency preparedness.
4
51 Reactions to threat
On a very general level threat can be defined to be a harm of
some kind that is anticipated on the basis of present cues. The
most general concept used in research on reactions to threaten-
ing situations is stress. Three basic types of stress are usually
delineated: physiological, psychological and social. Physiologi-
cal or systemic stress is primarily concerned with the disturbance
of the tissue systems. Psychological stress relates to the cognitive
factors leading to the evaluation of threat and social stress fol-
lows from disruption of a  social unit or system. However, it is
not totally clear if with the concept of stress is meant a stimulus,
a response or an interaction of them, as the concept has been
used in all of these meanings. Because of this inconsistency in
the use of the basic concept, Lazarus (1966) wanted to define the
concept rather as a collective term for an area of study. Stress
refers to any event in which environmental demands, internal
demands, or both, exceed the adaptive resources of an individu-
al, social system or tissue system. (Selye, 1976, Monat & Lazarus,
1991; Barton, 1969.) In comparison to other factors that may cause
stress, namely frustration and conflict, threat is different in that
it refers to something that has not yet happened and thus is pos-
sible to be prevented. A threat provides a warning that invites
the person to take preventive steps to mitigate the impending
harm (Selye, 1991). Stress can be seen as a product of the interac-
tion between an individual’s psychological make-up and the
appraisal of a threat.
6The appraisal process has gained a lot of research interest. It
is usually understood to consist of two phases: primary apprais-
al involves the assessment of threat cues to estimate the amount
of danger present in a given situation. Secondary appraisal in-
volves assessment of the resources available for dealing with the
stressor. The level of an individual’s arousal state is dependent
on the degree of threat believed to be present, and on the coping
resources believed to be available (Paterson & Neufeld, 1987; Janis
& Mann, 1977.) Appraisal is an evaluation of what one’s rela-
tionship to the environment implies for personal well-being.
Cognitive evaluations of noxious stimuli determine the nature
of emotional and physiological responses. A positive emotion is
produced by an appraised benefit and  a negative emotion by an
appraised harm. (Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Tomaka et al., 1997.)
Recent research has also shown that threat response relates to
aspects of personality, such as belief in a just world (Tomaka et
al., 1997). In recent studies, Smith and Lazarus (1993) have delin-
eated appraisal components, two of primary appraisal, four of
secondary appraisal. The components of primary appraisal are
motivational relevance and motivational congruence. Motivation-
al relevance is an evaluation of the extent to which the encounter
touches upon personal commitments that the person cares about.
Motivational congruence refers to the extent to which the encoun-
ter is consistent with the person’s goals. The components of sec-
ondary appraisal are accountability, problem-focused coping
potential, emotion-focused coping potential and future expect-
ancy. Accountability determines who is to receive the credit or
the blame for the outcome of the encounter and therefore who
should be the target of coping efforts. The components of coping
potential refer to the main means of reducing discrepancies be-
tween one’s circumstances and one’s desires and motivations.
Problem-focused coping potential reflects evaluations of the per-
son’s ability to act upon the situation and emotion-focused cop-
ing potential refers to the perceived prospects of adjusting psy-
chologically to the encounter by altering one’s interpretations and
beliefs. Future expectancy refers to the possibility of there being
changes in the situation which could make the encounter seem
7more motivationally congruent. Smith and Lazarus also deline-
ate the core relational themes for different emotions. The emo-
tion relevant here is fear/anxiety, the core relational theme for
which is danger or threat: the perception that one will not be
able to psychologically adjust to a harm in case it should occur.
(Smith and Lazarus, 1993.)
Stress and its damaging effects have gained a lot of  research
interest, but recently interest has been directed also to the ways
in which humans respond to stress positively through coping
and adaptation. Coping refers to an individual’s efforts to mas-
ter demands caused by the threat (or harm or challenge) that is
appraised exceeding his or her resources. (Monat and Lazarus,
1991.) Two major categories of coping strategies are usually
agreed upon: problem-focused coping that refers to efforts to
improve the troubled person-environment relationship by chang-
ing things, for example, by seeking information about what to
do or confronting the person responsible for the harm. Emotion-
focused coping refers to thoughts or actions whose goal is to re-
lieve the emotional impact of stress. These strategies are mainly
palliative in that they do not actually change the threatening sit-
uation but make the person feel better, through for example de-
nying that anything is wrong, avoiding thinking of the threat,
distancing oneself  by joking about the threat, or attempting to
relax. (Monat and Lazarus, 1991.)
The comparative effectiveness of different coping strategies
has been under discussion. Traditionally, emotion-focused modes
of coping, particularly defense mechanisms such as denial, have
been viewed as pathological or at least maladaptive. This view is
often supported by research studies where defensive behavior
(like denying a suspicious lump in breast) have actually endan-
gered an individual’s life. But denial may be effective for parents
of terminally ill child prior to the child’s death. Behaviour that
might be effective from physiological perspective might have
devastating consequences for the psychological or sociological
domains. Within any domain, an optimal response in one situa-
tion at a particular point in time may be damaging in some other
situation or at a different point in time. Also, what is considered
8to be optimal response is highly dependent upon one’s perspec-
tive and judgements. Emotion-focused modes of coping may be
harmful if they prevent direct actions, but may be helpful in
maintaining a person’s sense of well-being or hope under condi-
tions otherwise likely to encourage disintegration. (Monat and
Lazarus, 1991.)
1.1 Basic assumptions and feeling of invulnerability
While the effectiveness and harmfulness of denial and other
emotion-focused modes of coping are under discussion in pro-
fessional journals, the role of illusions and self-deception for
mental health has lately been agreed upon (Monat and Lazarus,
1991; Lazarus, 1983; Taylor, 1989). Seymour Epstein (1991) like
many others expect that a person develops over time a concep-
tual system that provides him/her with expectations about the
world and himself. This conceptual system is represented by a
set of assumptions or internal representations that reflect and
guide our interactions in the world and enable us to function
effectively. Different terms have been used to refer to a single
underlying phenomenon, called assumptive world (Parkes, 1975),
working model (Bowlby, 1973), implicit theory (Kelly, 1955) etc.
This implicit theory is hierarchically organized with the most
fundamental assumptions being most abstract and general. They
are also those we are least aware of and least likely to challenge.
At a general level, the core assumptions are beliefs about our-
selves, about the external world and the relationship between
these two. According to Janoff-Bulman (1985; 1992) the three most
fundamental assumptions are: the world is benevolent, the world
is meaningful and the self is worthy. What Antonovsky (1979)
calls sense of coherence comes close to this, too. A sense of coher-
ence is, according to him,  a long-lasting way of seeing the world
and one’s life in it as meaningful, controllable and having a high
probability that things will work out well.
Coping with reality entails attempting to fulfill the basic func-
tions of a personal theory of reality, which are to maintain a bal-
9ance between pleasure and pain, to assimilate data of reality into
a cohesive conceptual system and to maintain a favorable level
of self-esteem. A personal theory of reality develops through the
interaction of conceptualization and exposure to experience. This
happens through the processes of accommodation and assimila-
tion that Piaget (1972) described. The conceptual system becomes
increasingly differentiated and integrated and is able to fulfill its
functions with increasing efficiency. However, things may not
go well and the theory may be unable to fulfill any of its func-
tions because of an incompatibility between the environment and
the individual. The structure of the conceptual system will be
placed under stress, which subjectively is experienced as anxie-
ty. If cognitive coping cannot reduce stress enough, disorganiza-
tion will occur. Disorganization provides an opportunity for a
new organization that can better fulfill the basic functions of  a
theory of reality. (Epstein, 1991.) In the realm of everyday life
one’s basic assumptions change when they can no longer account
for the data of one’s life experiences. This is what happens to a
victim of a disaster or other life-endangering threat. The basic
assumption that seems to be most dramatically challenged by an
experience of victimization is the assumption of invulnerability
(Wolfenstein, 1957; Horowitz, 1997; Janoff-Bulman, 1991.)
The assumption of invulnerability probably is one of the most
basic assumptions we hold, as it is the first to develop. The im-
portance of early experiences have been discussed, especially the
early development of trust and feelings of basic security in a child.
Erikson (1950) nominated a sense of basic trust to the first com-
ponent of a healthy personality. According to him, basic trust is
an attitude toward oneself and the world derived from the expe-
riences of the first year of life. Because of this basic trust we be-
lieve at an emotional level that “it cannot happen to me”, even
though we intellectually know that crimes and accidents are com-
mon. We usually act on the basis of an illusion of invulnerability.
Both male and female subjects underestimated the probability of
negative things happening to them compared to the likelihood
of these things happening to other persons of their age in a study
by Janoff-Bulman et al. (1980). A sense of invulnerability devel-
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ops early in childhood through responsible, predictable interac-
tions with caregivers. By receiving appropriate, dependable care
we learn to trust our environment and simultanously we learn
to feel good about ourselves by believing that we are worthy of
such care. Janoff-Bulman believes that there is a strong preverbal
assumption of security that derives from the earliest experienc-
es. Over time cognitive assumptions develop from the interac-
tion of the child’s experiences and his preverbal expectations: a
rich cognitive network of beliefs make up an adult assumption
of invulnerability. There are three primary categories of assump-
tions: benevolence/malvolence of the world, which consists of
two sub-categories, the benevolence of the impersonal world and
the benevolence of people. To what extent do good and bad events
happen in the world? Do good events outnumber bad events?
Are people basically good, kind and helpful? The more a person
believes in the benevolence of the world, the more he believes
that the world is a good place and misfortune is relatively un-
common. Good fortune is perceived as more likely than misfor-
tune. (Janoff-Bulman, 1991.)
The second category of assumptions involves the distribution
of outcomes. When an individual has an understanding of the
extent of good and bad events occurring in the world, the ques-
tion of how these are distributed among people then arises. At
least in western world there seems to be three possible distribu-
tional principles. People may believe that outcomes are distrib-
uted in accordance with the principle of justice. Then personal
deservingness determines which events affect which people.
According to Lerner (1980), people have a need to believe in a
just world where people get what they deserve. This belief may
lead to victim blaming, for example, as a negative consequence.
The assumption of controllability maintains that people can
control very much the events in their surrounding. Own vulner-
ability can be minimized by taking proper protective behavior.
There is evidence showing that people usually overestimate the
amount of control they have over outcomes. Even in games
known to be uncontrollable, people take certain behaviour be-
lieving that they can in that way control the outcome. (Langer,
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1975.) Together the two beliefs, justice and controllability, com-
prise a sense of meaning. An event is meaningful when it is con-
sistent with social laws, and the most important social laws in
western world are justice and controllability. (Janoff-Bulman,
1991.)
The self-relevant dimensions of the assumptions are needed,
to know a person’s level of feeling of vulnerability. Some people
may believe that the world is very malevolent and the primary
principle of distribution is justice. In that case we still need to
know if that person considers himself to be a moral, decent per-
son deserving good outcomes. Even if the world is seen benevo-
lent, someone may feel vulnerable if he  has low self-worth caus-
ing him to believe in deserving bad outcomes. (Janoff-Bulman,
1991.)
An increased feeling of vulnerability is a common response
of victims of accident, crime or disease. The victim feels unsafe
and unprotected and the victim’s psychological state is often char-
acterized by anxiety, fear and depression. (Wolfenstein, 1957; Lift-
on & Olson, 1976; Janoff-Bulman, 1991.) Several writers have
claimed that an important part of the post-traumatic stress reac-
tion lies in the shattering of the fundamental beliefs (Janoff-Bul-
man, 1985; Epstein, 1991; Horowitz, 1997.)
1.2 Risk perception
In addition to the more or less emotional component consisting
of the feeling of invulnerability and self-worth, there is the mainly
cognitive component of risk perception that has an effect on re-
sponses in face of an impending danger. People respond to risks
and threats that they perceive. Their perception of riskyness of
some activity is based on several factors: on some hazards there
is statistical data on which to base the judgement, but after all
human judgement is always needed to interpret the statistics and
findings.
Many decisions are based on beliefs concerning the likelihood
of uncertain events. Fear of nuclear accidents is partly based on
12
a belief about the likelihood of a serious nuclear accident. These
beliefs are based on subjective assessments of probability: but
how do people assess the probability of an uncertain event? Ac-
cording to Tversky and Kahneman (1982) people rely on a limit-
ed number of heuristic principles which reduce the  complex tasks
of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judge-
mental operations. These heuristics are often quite useful, but
sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors. Some of
these heuristics are briefly presented below.
When thinking of nuclear accidents, one of the typical heuris-
tics belongs to the following type: What is the probability that
process B will originate event A? In answering this kind of ques-
tions people usually rely on representativeness heuristic, in which
probability is estimated by the degree to which A resembles B.
For example if A is similar to B, the probability that A originates
from B is high. On the other hand, if A is not representative of  B,
the probability of A originating from B is low.
A misconception of chance leads people to expect that a se-
quence of events generated by random process will represent the
essential characteristics of that process even when the sequence
is short. People expect that the essential characteristics of the
process will be represented, not only globally, but also locally in
each of its parts. A locally representative sequence, however, de-
viates systematically from chance expectations, it contains too
many alternations and too few runs. Chance is commonly viewed
as a self-correcting process in which a deviation in one direction
induces a deviation in the opposite direction to restore the equi-
librium. Deviations are not in fact corrected as a chance process
unfolds, they are merely diluted. The gambler’s fallacy is well-
known: after observing a long run of red on the roulette wheel
people expect that black is now due because a black would re-
sult in a more representative sequence. But deviations are not
corrected as a chance process unfolds, they are only diluted. (Tver-
sky and Kahneman, 1982, 5-7.)
Sometimes people are asked to make predictions of some fu-
ture events. Often the predictions are based on representative-
ness. This mode of judgement violates the statistical theory in
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which extremeness of the range of predictions are controlled by
considerations of predictability. This means that if predictability
is nil, the same prediction should be made in all cases. If predict-
ability is perfect, the predicted values should match the actual
values. In some situations people assess the frequency of a class
or the probability of an event by the ease with which they can
bring this kind of instances into their mind. One may assess the
risk of heart attack among middle-aged people by recalling their
occurrences among their acquintances. This is called availabili-
ty. It is a useful clue for assessing frequency or probability,
because instances of large classes are usually better recalled than
instances of small classes. However, availability is affected by
other factors than frequency and probability, and thus leads to
biases. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982.)
Third common heuristic is called anchoring. People often
make estimates by starting from an initial value that is adjusted
to fit the final answer. The initial value may be a value given in
the problem or it may be a result of a partial calculation. In both
cases the adjustment made is usually insufficient. In a demon-
stration of anchoring individuals were asked to estimate various
percentages. For each percentage a number between 0 and 100
was given by spinning a wheel of fortune in the presence of the
individual. The individual was then asked to evaluate if the ac-
tual number was higher or lower than the number given by the
wheel. Then he/she was expected to estimate the percentage by
moving upward or downward of the given number. Different
groups were given different numbers, but in all groups these ar-
bitrary numbers had a strong effect on the estimate the individu-
als gave. (Tversky and Kahneman, 1982.)
The heuristics of representativeness, availability and anchor-
ing are not attributable to motivational effects like wishful think-
ing. The errors of judgement may occur even in cases where peo-
ple are encouraged to be accurate. Although everyone is exposed
to examples from which rules could been induced, very few peo-
ple discover the principles of sampling and regression on their
own. Statistical principles are not learned from everyday life.
(Ibid.)
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According to Slovic (1991) the most important generalisation
from studies in risk perception concerning nuclear accidents is
that there is no uniform perception of radiation risks. Public per-
ception and acceptance is determined by the context in which
radiation is used. Results from psychometric studies show that
perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable. They have also
shown that the concept of risk means different things to different
people. When experts judge risk, their responses correlate high-
ly with technical estimates of annual fatalities. Lay people’s esti-
mates, however, incorporate other factors as well and because of
that differ from experts’ estimates.
Many of the risk characteristics are highly correlated with each
other across a wide range of hazards: hazards rated as voluntary
are usually also rated as controllable and well-known. Hazards
that appear to have catastrophic potential also tend to be seen as
having fatal consequences. For lay people’s risk estimates one
factor seems to be especially important: dread risk. The higher a
hazard’s score on this factor, the higher its perceived risk and the
more people want to see its risks reduced.
In several research studies it has been found that nuclear-re-
action accidents, radioactive waste and fallout from nuclear-
weapons testing are seen by people uncontrollable, dread, cata-
strophic, lethal and inequitable in their distribution of risks and
benefits. Diagnostic x-rays are seen much more favorably. In some
areas known to be characterised by high radon levels, residents
have been found to be indifferent to the risk. Most believed that
radon might be a problem for their neighbors, but not for them-
selves, thus showing a strong feeling of invulnerability. The per-
ceived risk of radiation from different sources seems to be very
different. The acceptance of x-rays suggests that acceptance of
risk is conditioned by perceived benefits and by trust in the man-
agers of the technology, in this case the medical profession. The
managers of nuclear power and other chemical technologies are
less trusted and the benefits of these technologies are not so highly
appreciated. The apathetic response to radon appears to result
from the fact that it is of natural origin, occurring in familiar set-
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ting, with no one to blame. And it can never be totally eliminat-
ed. (Slovic, 1991.)
Kasperson et. al. (1988, ref. Slovic, 1991) describe how psy-
chological, social and cultural factors interact to amplify risk and
produce ripple effects. An important element of this theory is the
assumption that the perceived seriousness of an accident or oth-
er unfortunate event, the media coverage it gets and the long-
range costs are in part determined by what the event signals.
Signal value reflects the perception that the event provides new
information about the likelihood of similar or more destructive
future mishaps.
1.3 Social construction of risk
In the cultural tradition of risk theories risk is seen as a social
construction mediated by cultural and social beliefs and defini-
tions. Fitchen et al. conclude that ”risk perception is a complex
and dynamic process that is influenced by the local context in
which the risk is embedded and by the manner in which the risk
is addressed” (Fitchen, Heath and Fessenden-Raden, 1987, 31).
There is considerable evidence that the media are selective
and biased in their reporting emphasizing drama, wrongdoing
and conflict. Some studies suggest that the amount and content
of media coverage  affects public risk perception and level of con-
cern. Other studies have failed to confirm this and an explana-
tion for this discrepancy is that public knowledge, attitudes and
behavior are significantly influenced by media coverage only
when the media are the exclusive source of information on the
risk. (Johnson & Covello, 1987, 179.) This is usually the case with
unfamiliar and invisible threats like nuclear power or environ-
mental pollution. A difficult question is, however, why in some
communities very little concern is expressed about health risks
from contaminated ground water e.g. when in others the con-
cern expressed is strong. On the basis of several case studies con-
ducted in small communities Fitchen et al. (1987, 41-43) suggest
16
that when the cause or agent of the contamination or the risk is
inside of the community, less fear is felt than when the cause or
agent is perceived as coming from outside of the community. This
finding is consistent with observations by anthropologists from
an American cultural tendency to perceive harm as coming from
outside. A similar finding is reported by Lahti from Finland in a
community where ground water was contaminated. Very little
concern was expressed by inhabitants and no strong activism
emerged in the village (Lahti, 1996). Level of trust felt in officials
and companies investigating the situation is affected by their fa-
miliarity, too. It seems that the local people feel outside agencies
distant and their trust seems to diminish with geographic dis-
tance. As a consequence of  this distrust public attention has
turned away from health risk and focused instead on the investi-
gation process itself. (Fitchen et al. 1987, 44-45.) A similar reac-
tion took place after the Chernobyl accident in Nordic countries
where the information delivery and authorities’ activities received
most of the public attention (Sjöberg et al. 1998).
The tendency to feel distrust to outside agencies is compara-
ble to the phenomenon of ”disaster identity” (Eränen & Lieb-
kind, 1993; Paton, 1996) or trauma membrane (Lindy et. al. 1985)
as it is also called. In an emergency the internal solidarity and
common identity are strengthened by the common fate and at
the same time distrust towards those that are seen as outsiders,
not sharing the emotional experience of the disaster. As compared
to natural disasters where victimization is clear and  common
fate serves as reason to return to “mechanic solidarity” (Turner,
1967), Fowlkes & Miller (1987) report a lack of common identity
in Love Canal neighbourhood where toxic contamination from a
landfill was found.
A major difference between natural and man-made disasters
is the perceived difference of government officials. Victims of
natural disasters often perceive government officials negatively
because of their inability to act quickly and efficiently in resolv-
ing the disaster. Victims of man-made disasters, however, per-
ceive government as being at least partly responsible for the dis-
aster by allowing it to happen. The perceived responsibility may
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result in polarization and distrust. The development of so called
therapeutic community in  natural disasters has been confirmed
by several researchers. However, it seems that in man-made dis-
asters the social processes taking place are different. In disasters
involving toxic substances or radioactivity a first disagreement
emerging may be the question whether a disaster  has occurred
or not and is there a danger for health or not. Often these ques-
tions are difficult to answer. In cases where it is known that a
certain substance is bad for the health, it may be difficult to de-
fine exact limits for the health risks. Also, it is often very difficult
to prove that certain health consequences are caused by expo-
sure to a substance, especially as the  health consequences may
take years to develop (e.g. cancer). Even the experts may disa-
gree on these issues. (Berren et al., 1989, 49-51; Cuthbertson and
Nigg, 1987.)
As risk is socially constructed it implies that any risk can be
perceived and constructed in different ways and there is always
a possibility for conflicts. Especially when we are discussing in-
visible risks like nuclear power, the old social psychological prin-
ciple is applicable: ”when a situation is defined as real, it is real
insofar as consequences are concerned” (Thomas, 1923.) The risk
does not have to be real, the crucial issue is the perception of the
risk as real. This kind of relativism, however, opens door for end-
less list of imagined harms. It is clear that some culturallly creat-
ed concepts may refer to phenomena that exist independently of
those concepts. Much knowledge is acquired through empirical
experience. (Rayner, 1987, 6-7; Quarantelli, 1985, 47-48.)
Douglas and Wildavsky hypothesize that people in individu-
alist, bureacratic and small-group organisations focus on differ-
ent kinds of risk: technical, environmental or social depending
on what they perceive as most threatening to their institutional
order. Each form of social life has its own typical risks: common
values lead to common fears. (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982.)
Cuthbertson and Nigg have described the emergence of con-
flicts in a community after a technological or environmental dis-
aster. In a natural disaster the damage is highly visible and the
victims’ needs clear-cut which support the emergency of con-
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sensus and so called altruistic community1 (Cuthbertson & Nigg,
1987; Wolfenstein 1957; Barton, 1969.) Concerning risks of tech-
nological and environmental nature it is difficult to establish
”safe” levels  of exposure. There is no definitive scientific evi-
dence available. In the climate of controversy within the scientif-
ic community experts frequently disagree about the nature of the
exposure and the amount of risk to public health. Ordinary citi-
zens rely on experts in formulating their own definitions of risk
in situations involving technological or toxic agents. Ambiguous
messages from experts leave open the realm of decision concern-
ing the riskiness, thus allowing disagreement to emerge. Indi-
vidual decisions concerning the riskiness of the situation are then
made after discussions within own social network. (Cuthbert-
son & Nigg, 1987.)
Basically, two different perspectives emerge: on the one hand,
belief that a technological hazard exists and it could be harmful
to the health of those exposed to it and on the other, the belief
that a substance is not harmful to those exposed to it. A similar
result was found by Fowlkes and Miller (1987) at Love Canal
community where they named these groups as minimalists and
maximalists. At Love Canal demographic factors like age and
household composition were strongly associated with the for-
mation of the groups: young families with small children tended
to be maximalists and retired couples with no children at home
tended to be minimalists. Own experience and information did
not automatically lead to a certain definition, but the life situa-
tion and perspective from which people evaluated information
affected their definition of risk. An important remark by them is
that as compared to sudden impact events, the problem at Love
Canal and comparable situations is not the problem of response
1 It has to be remembered that nowadays it is often difficult to separate between
natural and man-made disasters. A natural disaster may be caused by human
activities like construction of dams that interfere the natural processes. A natu-
ral disaster may cause as a consequence technological accidents, like explosions.
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to what happened but the problem of constructing and respond-
ing to the meaning of what happened. (Fowlkes and Miller, 1987,
73.)
Natural disasters are indiscriminate and becoming a victim is
a matter of fate. However, exposure to toxic substances or other
environmental hazards may be situated in a special location. As
a consequence many residents may feel singled out as victims.
Also, they can attribute their victimization to human intention
or neglect and focus blame onto certain institutions. If the occur-
rence of the hazardous substance resulted from arrangements or
uses that provided benefits to certain interest groups, e.g. agri-
cultural community, officials that allowed the condition to occur
when it could have been prevented, may become defined as hav-
ing been injust and arouse anger among victims. (Cuthbertson &
Nigg, 1987.)
The consequences of hazardous chemical may be invisible or
have a long latency period. If the harmful effects are seen as in-
significant, emotional distress will be inauthentic or consequence
of tactics of the media.
In the context of ambiguity over the level of risk or necessity
of remedial action the existence of victims and the question of
true victimization become crucial. If there is no threat, can there
be a victim? And who are the ”true victims”? Are they entitled to
some remedial action? There seem to emerge four groups with
different definitions of the situation.
Hazard-endangered victims believe that they have been ex-
posed to harmful health effects from a hazard and they may suf-
fer from explicit health problems. They are often not only vic-
tims of the agent but also victims of uncaring community: they
believe that officials and industry have been in advance aware of
the harmful consequences but have tried to cover them.
Hazard-disclaimer victims were exposed to the substance but
believed that it is safe and did not suffer from any health effects.
These victims often feel that their lives have been disrupted as a
result of publicity. Two conflicts emerged from this disagreement:
was the agent hazardous enough to warrant community concern
and whether resources should be given to remedial activities.
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These two victim groups found themselves in a situation where
their different perspectives disrupted neighbourly cohesiveness.
Perpetrator victims were those individuals that were labeled
as unethical by the hazard-endangered victims. They are usually
big business representatives, those who had ”committed the
crime”. They reported emotional distress over being defined as
villains. They could not believe that a beneficial chemical could
be as hazardous as it was claimed. Perpetrator victims saw them-
selves as victims of overzealous officials, misinformed citizens
and certain media. They saw hazared-endangered victims as vic-
tims of fear and panic created by media.
Bystander victims were those community members who lived
outside the exposed area. Their victimization arouse from con-
nection to the issue: they saw themselves and their community’s
economic welfare endangered by publicity of the hazardous sit-
uation. They personally suffered from outsiders’ remarks or fears
about the danger in the community.
In this kind of controversial situation the emotional climate
that emerges is one of anger, frustration, resentment and anxiety.
Feelings of helplessness and lack of control  over the environ-
ment develop within victims and create a reluctance to support
the members of other victim groups. (Cuthbertson & Nigg, 1987.)
Although Cuthbertson and Nigg found this kind of commu-
nity conflict in communities exposed to toxix hazards, many of
the features found here can be found in a nuclear accident situa-
tion as well thus creating a situation possibly giving rise to com-
munity conflict.
1.4 Risk society
History describes development from traditional society to indus-
trial society to modern or post-industrial society. Information
society also refers to modern society. This historical narrative is a
story of  positive development: industrialization has meant more
freedom for people. Only in late 1980’s and in 90’s some oppo-
nents for this idea emerged. One of the first of them is Ulrich
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Beck. When theories of modern see environmental risks as side
effects of modernisation and impossible to totally avoid, Beck
asked if modernisation really is development towards a better
society. Beck, Giddens and Lash (1994) have suggested that we
have moved from modern society to reflexive society. For Gid-
dens reflexivity involves a move in trust relations, so that trust is
no longer a question of face-to-face involvement, but is a matter
of trust in expert-systems. For Beck, reflexivity in modernity
means a growing freedom from and critique of expert-systems.
Reflexivity is not based in trust but in distrust. For both of them,
reflexivity aims to minimize insecurity. For Beck reflexivity is to
bring social change through the minimization of environmental
hazards when for Giddens the question is not how to cope with
environmental but with psychic and social hazards and main-
tain reasonable levels of order and stability both in our personal-
ities and in society. But both see modern society as including large
risks and being actually risk society (Beck, Giddens and Lash,
1994.)
According to Beck, during modernity dangers of man-made
technology have increased and still increase which changes clas-
sical industrial society into risk society:  distribution of risks and
controlling them have replaced the logic of distributing proper-
ty. A conflict of distributive responsibility emerges. The most
important question nowadays is how to prevent, mitigate and
control the risks and threats caused by the modernity itself. The
problem with risks is that they are characterised by uncertainty:
they have no unambiguous solutions: risks can tell us what should
not be done but not what should be done. Avoidance is the dom-
inating imperative. However, the optimistic tone in Beck emerg-
es from the possibility that admitting the inherent uncertainty of
risk society also gives rise to self-criticism. (Beck, 1994, 1-8.)
In many ways, this discussion seems to culminate in nuclear
power and nuclear power accidents that are very representative
of the threats of risk society.
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2 Nuclear power as a threat
All disasters have much in common. Radiation disasters are more
similar than they are different from disasters produced by other
agents. Instead, some disasters have characteristics that they do
not share with others. Some dimensions are of special interest in
connection of nuclear accidents, even though they are not unique
to nuclear disasters. (Quarantelli, 1991.)
Unfamiliarity with a threat is psychologically disturbing. Peo-
ple have different images of various kinds of threats, but they
are clearly most afraid of those that are most unfamiliar to them.
Such are threats associated with nuclear power plants or hazard-
ous chemicals. Their threat is quite unknown to people as com-
pared to other threats with which most people have knowledge
or experience. Of course this depends on the sociocultural set-
ting: what is familiar to one population could be very unfamiliar
to another. Familiarity is a matter of learning and experiences.
(Quarantelli, 1991.)
In some cases exposure to a threat can be predicted, in other
cases the disasters are totally unexpected. The evidence indicates
that the unexpected is much more psychologically disturbing than
the expected, because then people are not able to quickly use the
coping mechanisms they have for dealing with unexpected
threats. Also, if predictability is high, people are more sensitive
to danger cues and have more willingness to act upon the cues.
Radiation accidents in general lack predictability to time, place
and magnitude. (Quarantelli, 1991.)
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According to Quarantelli, studies suggest an almost sure re-
lationship between length of threat and psychological effect. The
relationship is not, however, linear. The longer people are sub-
jected to a threat, the more they will adjust to it. This adjustment
can also include a desensitization process. But on the other hand,
the longer the threat lasts the more negative effects can cumu-
late. (Quarantelli, 1991) Nuclear accidents are not confined to a
certain time and space like more traditional disasters, there is no
“low point”. Their effects on health may continue long into the
future. (Berren & al.,1989.)
In some disasters victims become slowly involved in the situ-
ation and in these cases they adjust better and a crisis might not
even develop. With very rapid involvement in a disaster, adjust-
ment seems to be much more difficult. Rapidity of involvement
refers to what happens in the response pattern as viewed from
the perspective of those involved. It may correspond to what oth-
ers deem as the actual time available for action, but psychologi-
cal effects do not stem from how long people have to react, but
rather from whether they perceive themselves as having to hur-
ry to save threatened things and themselves. It seems that most
people don’t see radiation threats as requiring rapid response.
(Quarantelli, 1991.)
Nuclear accidents also have greater catastrophic potential than
other dangers, i.e. fires, that are thought to be more controllable.
Nuclear accidents differ from others in that their danger is im-
possible to perceive. (Perry, 1985; Slovic, 1982.) Loss of control in
itself is a cause of stress. (Baum & al. 1983a,b.) It can be conclud-
ed that technological disasters may have more serious psycho-
logical consequences than do natural disasters as a technological
disaster always involves an unexpected loss of control.
In nuclear power plant accidents two quite independent proc-
esses are going on at the same time. On the one hand there is the
accident, which causes the threat of radiation. That is, however,
only possible to perceive with the aid of special equipment. So-
cially and psychologically the accident becomes real only through
information delivery. In nuclear accidents people are much more
dependent on information delivery than in other accidents,
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because of the lack of possibility of their own perceptions and
experiences. (Tessarin, 1986; Lombardi, 1986.) The only real im-
age of the accident is that created by the mass media. The mass
media can not be only outside observers who report on the situ-
ation. They are central in creating the psychological reality to
which people react. They can not give up this involvement even
though they would like to do so.
Because of this dependence on information delivery trust on
authorities and trustworthiness of the information given becomes
a major issue in nuclear accidents. There easily happens a divi-
sion into in- and outgroups where “ordinary citizens” see au-
thorities as unreliable and as trying to hide information from
them. It is very difficult - if not impossible- to confirm that the
authorities have told the truth about the level of radiation and
the size of the threat caused by it. It is well known that informa-
tion delivered seldom is received in exactly the planned mode.
The channel through which the information is delivered may
cause disturbances and the message may not be understood. Es-
pecially when discussing the threat caused by radiation the prob-
lems caused by technical and difficult language are not minor.
The terminology used to express level of radiation varies and is
unfamiliar to most people who are not experts in this field.
Quarantelli (1991) emphasizes that the major sources of prob-
lems in radiation disasters are social not technical. After Three
Mile Island disaster the President’s Commission concluded that
the major factors involved in the accident were “people prob-
lems”. These were not only what the crew did in the control room,
but originated from how the personnel were trained, how con-
struction decision was made and how emergency planning was
developed. These problems were the source of a potential catas-
trophe. The same seems to apply to the Chernobyl nuclear plant
disaster, too. The technology functioned reasonably well and safe-
ty devices operations were acceptable. But human errors, bad
judgements, knowledge gaps, inadequate training procedures
and confusion over responsibilities turned an initially minor
mishap into a major disaster.
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2.1 Images of nuclear power and their history
Radioactivity was first discovered at the end of the 19th century,
and it only aroused little interest. Marie Curie presented a new
metal, radium, in 1900 at a physicists’ meeting in Paris. Radium
was so active that even very small pieces of it gave a bright light
and newspapers became interested in radioactivity. Soon after
that two physicists suggested radioactivity might have the prop-
erty of transmutation, the ability to change one type of matter to
another. This aroused strong public feelings even though the
meaning  was not fully understood. Several more years passed
before it was discovered that uranium could release great
amounts of energy. The enthusiasm aroused by this invention
was further increased due to the typical optimism of the time:
the scientists especially believed in development and that it would
lead to wisdom. The utopia of a “white city” seemed possible.
Scientists were willing to tell the audience about their discovery
partly because they were proud of it, partly because research
would get funding only if the usefulness of it was believed. Jour-
nalists were immediately eager to report the possibilities of nu-
clear energy. (Weart, 1988.)
Already in the beginning of the last century doomsday proph-
ecies were expressed in connection of nuclear energy, but the
dream of the “white city” clean of coal dust and its side effects
was much more powerful. An important reason for journalists’
readiness to write about radioactivity and nuclear energy were
the great opportunities it offered to make sensations, stories that
fascinated readers. In the 1930’s the saying “alchemists’ famous
problem has been solved” became a cliché, although this was
not the case, as the transmutation invented with radioactivity
was totally different. For centuries people had tried to manufac-
ture gold by mixing chemicals, which was thought to be quite
important. In the late middle ages wise men understood that they
were working more with their minds than with matter. Manu-
facturing of gold was believed to be more of a spiritual symbol
than important as an actual fact. Reaching transmutation meant
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perfecting soul. According to alchemists, transmutation also in-
cluded death. This was a metaphor of a process where people
have to descend to darkness and chaos to be purified in Godly
fire, before reaching spiritual rebirth. Also in Christian religion
preachers have expounded on the belief that before humanity
can enjoy golden age, there must come the Armageddon. Con-
sciously these thoughts came together briefly in 17th century
before the beginning of scientific revolution. Shortly these
thoughts divorced and continued their separate paths. In the 19th
century the idea of a “white city” ceased to remind people of the
alchemists. The transformation of the soul and doomsday pre-
dictions  also moved into separate directions.
Thoughts of doomsday departed from their original religious
and mythical connection and instead became connected to sci-
ence. The few facts known about atomic energy at the beginning
of the 20th century were only a white sheet on to which scientists
and their admirers projected ideas. By the end of 20th century
the idea of doomsday has become inseparable from nuclear en-
ergy. (ibid.) According to Weart the idea of massive destruction
and human suffering was thus connected to nuclear energy dec-
ades before the invention of nuclear weapons. Later, in the 1960’s
and 1970’s death has been associated with radiation exposure
(Perry, 1985).
It seems that people do not see a difference between conse-
quences of high dose radiation from nuclear weapons and the
low dose exposure during nuclear accidents. This was also found
in a Finnish sample (N=247) collected in 1986 seven months after
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident. In this sample the
threat felt from nuclear power was highly correlated with the
threat of nuclear war, conventional warfare and competitive ar-
mament. Radiation, however, was correlated with threat from
increased violence, demoralization, dangerous wastes and food
additives. (Eränen, 1988.) After the Chernobyl accident in Belorus-
sia most illnesses have been attributed to the radiation by both
lay people and medical professionals, even in cases were radia-
tion clearly cannot have anything to do with the illness. (van den
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Bout et al. 1995.) It seems probable that some of the fear felt in
regards to nuclear accidents comes from these potent images and
historical associations with death and destruction.
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3 Reactions to danger and to warnings
3.1 Decision making in danger
The classical decision theory is designed to describe the choices
of an ideal hypothetical decision maker: omniscient, computa-
tionally omnipotent economic man. In its normative role the the-
ory is an internally logical system that reflects its origins as an
attempt to rationalize observed decision behavior. Since the pub-
lication of the theory of games by von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1947), followed by Edwards’ (1954) introduction of classi-
cal decision theory to psychology, it has become common to at-
tribute a prescriptive role to classical decision theory. By prescrip-
tive it is meant that the way the economic man would make de-
cisions is assumed to be the only rational way. The optimality of
humans’ decisions usually is judged by whether the decisions
conform to the prescriptions of the theory. There is also an im-
plicit assumption that if decision makers behaved as they
“should” the theory would also be descriptive of human deci-
sion behavior. (Beach & Lipshitz, 1995, 21-22.)
There has been several attempts to deal with the lack of con-
formity of human behavior to the classical theory. One response
is merely to reject the behavior as irrational and save the theory.
There are people who prize the theory and are also interested in
the behavior. They strive to reduce the gap between theory and
behavior by changing the behavior. The third response has been
to retain the general logic and structure of the classical theory
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but make some modifications of some of the theory’s compo-
nents and operations in light of the research findings. The fourth
response is represented by the attempts to describe more accu-
rately the process involved in real-life decision making. Research
in the area of the fourth response was started by Herbert Simon
(1955.) (Beach & Lipshitz, 1995, 21-23.)
The theory of subjective expected utility (SEU) has been cen-
tral in much of  the existing knowledge about decision making
and problem solving. The theory of choice has its roots mainly in
economics, statistics and operations research and only later re-
ceived attention from psychologists. The theory of problem solv-
ing, however, has a different history and has been initially stud-
ied principally by psychologists. (Simon, 1992.)
Subjective expected utility theory defines the conditions of
perfect utility-maximizing rationality in a world of certainty.
However, subjective expected utility theory only deals with de-
cision making, but says nothing about how to frame problems or
set goals. SEU expects that decision maker possesses a utility
function, an ordering of preference among all possible outcomes
of choice, that all alternative choices are known to him and that
the consequences of each alternative can be ascertained. The as-
sumptions of the subjective expected utility theory are strong.
The assumptions cannot be satisfied for most complex situations
in real world, but they may be satisfied approximately in some
problem situations that can be isolated from the world’s com-
plexity and dealt with independently. Linear programming and
related operations research techniques are used to make deci-
sions in situations that can be carved out of its complex surround.
What is common to all these techniques is that they assume that
what is desired is to maximize the achievement of some goal,
assuming that all alternatives and consequences are known. (Si-
mon, 1992, 33-35.) Some of the problems of SEU theory are com-
putational complexity and the enormous demands on informa-
tion. The range of available alternatives and the consequences
following from each of the alternatives must all be known. In-
creasingly, research is nowadays directed at decision making that
takes realistic account of the compromises and approximations
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that must be made in order to fit real-world problems. Incom-
pleteness and asymmetry of information have been shown to be
essential for explaining how individuals and business firms de-
cide when to face uncertainty by insuring, when by hedging, and
when by assuming the risk. (Simon, 1992, 35-37.) Empirical find-
ings also show that decision makers often overreact to new in-
formation. When people are given information about the proba-
bilities of certain events, and then are given some additional in-
formation as to which of the events has occurred, they tend to
ignore the prior probabilities in favor of incomplete or even quite
irrelevant information about the individual event.
Human problem solving is usually studied in laboratory set-
tings. The laboratory study of problem solving has been supple-
mented by  field studies of professionals solving real-world prob-
lems, like physicians making diagnoses. Problem solving usual-
ly proceeds by selective search through large sets of possibilities,
using rules of thumbs, heuristics, to guide the search. Because
the possibilities are numerous, trial-and –error search would not
work and the search must be highly selective. A common proce-
dure used is means-ends-analysis where the problem solver com-
pares the present situation with the goal, detects a difference be-
tween them and then searches memory for actions that are likely
to reduce the difference. (Simon, 1992, 42-43.)
Rational choice models use an economic metaphor, they are
theoretically generalized to explain not only economic behavior
but also the behavior studied by nearly all social sciences. Evi-
dence  that the rationality of decisions is blocked by emotions, as
found in several studies (e.g Holsti, 1979) showing that one’s
capacity for rational decision making may seriously decline in
situations of high stress, is negated by rational choice theorists.
Students of social organizations and complex organizations have
begun to challenge the neoclassical model. Rational choice mod-
els in their pure form hold that individuals have one stable rank-
ing of preferences, full information about alternatives, and be-
have independently of each other, and behave independently of
other alternatives in maximizíng outcomes. Zey (1992, 10) clear-
ly differentiates rational choice theory from decision making as
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a process of reasoned choice. Reasoned choice models assume
that decision-making theories deal exclusively with the process
of decision making and not with goals (Zey, 1992, 10; Janis and
Mann, 1977, 11). Janis and Mann list seven steps that are descrip-
tive of how decision makers arrive at reasoned choices out of
alternative options. Janis and Mann have applied their model in
warning situations, like others after them (e.g. Perry, 1985).
Social scientists agree that humans have reasons for what they
do: rationality is not in question, but what constitutes rationality
is in question. The neoclassical model defines choice as rational
if the outcome is rational. All behavior that does not produce
rational outcome is irrational. In other social sciences, the con-
ceptualization of decision making is rational because of the proc-
ess it employs. The rational choice models rest on substantive
rationality, while the other social sciences concentrate on proce-
dural rationality. (Zey, 1992, 15).
3.1.1 Naturalistic decision making
In the 1980´s and 1990´s researchers realised that decision mak-
ing in real-life contexts did not follow the stages of rational deci-
sion making. Much of the research on decision making concen-
trated on showing the limitations of decision makers. Emerging
from the discrepancy between real-life decision making and lab-
oratory studies, a new branch of decision making reseach start-
ed in 1990’s, the study of naturalistic decision making. The aim
of naturalistic decision making research is to study decision mak-
ing in real-life situations that may differ from laboratory settings
in several respects. One difference they found is that in the labo-
ratory settings decision makers are usually novices when in real-
ity decision makers are often experts with experience and  knowl-
edge from their field. Some researchers even found out that train-
ing principles derived from formal models produced counter-
productive behaviors in some contexts. (Klein, 1998,1-3; Zsam-
bok, 1997, 4-5.)
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The key contextual factors that affect decision making in real
world in contrast to laboratory settings are:
1. Ill-structured problems instead of artificial, well-structured
problems.
2. Uncertain, dynamic environments  instead of  static,
simulated situations.
3. Shifting, ill-defined or competing goals instead of clear and
stable goals.
4. Action/feedback loops instead of one time decision.
5. Time stress as opposed to ample time for tasks.
6. High stakes as opposed to situations devoid of true
consequences for the decision maker.
7. Multiple players as opposed to individual decision
maker.
8. Organizational goals and norms as opposed to decision
making without any stated values.
(Zsambok, 1997; Klein, 1998.)
Orasanu and Connolly (1995, 5) conclude that the basic cause
of the mismatch is that the traditional decision making research
has invested most of its energy in only one part of decision mak-
ing, the decision event. In this view the crucial part of decision
making occurs when the actor surveys a known and fixed set of
alternatives. Several empirical studies on the contrary show that
often most of the efforts focus on defining the situation. Much
effort is devoted to situation assessment or figuring out the na-
ture of the problem. Single options are evaluated sequentially
through mental simulation of outcomes and options are accept-
ed if they are satisfactory. The decision event approach empha-
sizes concurrent evaluation of multiple options and relies on an-
alytical methods for integrating values and probabilities associ-
ated with each option and finally seeks an optimal solution. The
fundamental difference between these models is that in every-
day situations decisions are embedded in larger tasks. In the lab-
oratory decision making tends to happen apart from any mean-
ingful context. (Orasanu & Connolly, 1995, 5-6.)
In naturalistic decision making research a need for clarifica-
tion soon emerged: a comprehensive definition of naturalistic
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decision making emphasizes complex, uncertain and unstable
situations where routine action or thinking is not enough. But in
real life a great deal of decision making happens in activities
which are quite routine. A model of  Recognition-Primed Deci-
sion  developed by Klein (1998) describes simple, routine natu-
ralistic decision making as different from complex or nonroutine
naturalistic decision making. Before the development of this
model Klein  et al. believed that novices would impulsively jump
at the first option they could think of, whereas experts would
carefully deliberate about the merits of different courses of ac-
tion. However, they found out that it was the experts who gener-
ated a single course of action while novices needed to compare
different actions. There are times when deliberating about op-
tions is needed: it is usually when experience is inadequate and
logical thinking is needed as a substitute for recognizing a situa-
tion as typical. (Klein, 1998, 19-23.)
What Klein et al. discovered in their studies of expert deci-
sion makers like fire commanders was that they made not deci-
sions in the classical meaning of the concept. Instead of compar-
ing different options the decision maker evaluated the options
one at a time, rejected it and turned to the next. They used a sin-
gular evaluation approach instead of a comparative approach.
(Klein, 1998, 19-20.) Simon identified a decision strategy he calls
satisficing, selecting the first option that works. Satisficing is more
efficient than optimizing that takes a long time. (Simon, 1957,
ref. Klein, 1998.)
Cue learning refers to the need to perceive patterns and make
distinctions. An experienced decision maker is able to judge the
situation to see if  it is prototypical and to know what to do. If his
first choice does not work out, he might consider others. The
suitability of the first option will be tested through mental simu-
lation (Klein, 1998, 5, 20, 57.) Part of the decisions people make
based on what they call intuition seem to be based on pattern
recognition. Intuition has a strange reputation as skilled deci-
sion makers know that they can depend on their intuition, but at
the same time feel uncomfortable trusting a source of power that
seems so accidental.  Intuition seems to be activated before a per-
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son is consciously aware that he has made a decision. Intuition
seems to depend on the use of experience to recognize key pat-
terns that indicate the dynamics of the situation. Because pat-
terns can be subtle a person may not be able to describe what he
has noticed or how he has judged a situation as typical. One ba-
sis for intuition is recognizing things without knowing how we
do the recognizing. Klein claims that intuition grows out of ex-
perience. One reason for not knowing how we use  our experi-
ence is in cases where we are reacting to things that were not
happening. A simple version of the Recognition Primed Deci-
sion model is a model of intuition. A basic aspect of recognition-
al decision making is that people with experience can size up the
situation and judge it as familiar or typical. (Klein, 1998, 31, 89.)
Some research has shown that people may do worse at some
decision tasks if they are asked to perform analyses of the rea-
sons of their preferences or to evaluate all the attributes of their
choices. (Wilson & Schooler, 1991.) If skilled decision makers are
able to generate reasonable courses of action as the first ones to
consider then the advice to generate large option sets (cf. Janis &
Mann, 1977) is less valuable. Time pressure does not need to de-
crease the quality of performance of decision makers who have
experience, because they are able to use pattern matching. In
analytical processes time pressure would interfere with decision
making. (Klein, 1997, 290-291.) A growing body of research shows
that under realistic conditions experts make decisions using a
holistic process involving situation recognition and pattern
matching to memory structures to make rapid decisions (Ends-
ley, 1997, 267.) In a study Klein et al. contrasted experienced and
new commanders and tested the toughest decision points in the
nonroutine incidents. They found that 60 % of decisions were
made on Recognition Primed Decision model, but the number
was lower for the novices than for the expert commanders. As a
conclusion, Klein states that the rigorous, analytical approach
cannot be used in most natural settings, but they may be useful
for people who lack experience. Also it was found that experts
placed a greater emphasis on situation assessment while the nov-
ices emphasized deciding on the course of action. (Klein, 1998,
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101.) However,  research studies testing the generality of the heu-
ristics and biases described in decision making research (e.g.
Tversky and Kahneman, 1982) have obtained findings in the real
world that parallel those found in original laboratory research.
Based on these findings Wickens et al. (1998, 197)  conclude that
the traditional work on decision making and the naturalistic
approach should be considered to be complementary models
rather than mutually exclusive.  Some researchers have suggest-
ed that decision making processes occur somewhere along a cog-
nitive continuum ranging from intuition to analysis. They also
expect that processing could rapidly oscillate between intuition
and analysis. Intuitive processes are characterized by low con-
trol and low conscious awareness, rapid processing and high
confidence in the answer. Analytical processes are characterized
by higher levels of cognitive control, slow processing and lower
confidence in the answer. The use of intuitive versus analytical
processing is determined by two factors 1) certain tasks induce
either intuitive or analytical processing and 2) failure in the use
of one type of processing causes switching to the other type of
processing. Tasks that induce intuitive processing have large
number of cues, provide simoultaneous and brief display of cues,
large relationships between cues and short  period for decision
making. Analytical processing will occur with fewer  cues, high
confidence in the task and  long sequential availability of cues.
(Wickens et al.,1998, 197-200.)
Rasmussen  (1995, ref. Wickens et al., 1998) has described three
different levels of cognitive control that might potentially be used
by a person during task performance. People operate at one of
the levels depending on the nature of the task and on their de-
gree of experience with the task or situation. If a person is ex-
tremely experienced with the task, he will process the informa-
tion at the skill-based level of performance, reacting to the per-
ceptual elements at an automatic, subconscious level. Perform-
ance is governed by pure stimulus-response associations devel-
oped at a neurological level. Because the behavior is automatic
only a minimum of attention is needed. When people are famil-
iar with the task but do not have extensive experience, they will
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process the information at the rule-based level. The cues are rec-
ognized as meaning certain things and these signs then trigger
rules accumulated from past experience. The rules are if-then
associations between cue sets and the appropriate actions. (Wick-
ens et al., 1998, 198-199.)
When the situation is novel, decision makers will have no rules
stored from previous experience. They will therefore have to
operate at the knowledge-based level, which is analytical process-
ing using conceptual information. The person assigns meaning
to the cues and integrates them into an identification of what is
happening and then begins to process the information with re-
spect to goals in working memory. Mental models are often used
to run cognitive simulations in evaluating an action plan. Some
authors describe knowledge-based behavior as problem solving
rather than decision making. According to this model, a person
might operate at different levels and switch between them de-
pending on task familiarity. The levels can also be used to char-
acterize people with differing amounts of experience. When a
novice can only work at knowledge-based level, at an intermedi-
ate level a person also has some rules in their repertoire from
training or experience. The expert has a different knowledge base,
a greatly expanded rule base and a skill base as well. The expert
moves between the different levels depending on the task. When
a novel situation rises, lack of experience with the situation moves
the expert back to the analytical knowledge-based level. (Wick-
ens et al., 1998, 198-199.)
3.1.2 Situation awareness
Naturalistic decision making research provides a descriptive view
of how people make decisions in actual settings that often fea-
ture unstructured problems in complex systems. Within this
framework a person’s situation awareness, an internal concep-
tualization of the current situation, becomes an important factor
in the decision making process. (Endsley, 1997, 267.) Several stud-
ies have found that accidents attributed to human errors often
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involved situation awareness as a major causal factor. Many hu-
man errors in decision making actually involve problems in the
situation awareness portion of the decision making process as
opposed to the choice of action portion of the process. Situation
awareness is formally defined as “the perception of  the elements
in the environment within a volume of space and time, the com-
prehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in
the near future” (Endsley, 1988, 97, ref. Endsley, 1997.) Situation
awareness involves perceiving critical factors in the environment,
understanding what those factors mean and an understanding
of what will happen in the near future. (Endsley, 1997, 270.)  Sit-
uation awareness can be formed rapidly, through intuitive match-
ing of features or delibarately through mental simulation. (Klein,
1997.)
Level 1 Situation Awareness. The first step in achieving Situ-
ation Awareness is to perceive the status and dynamics of rele-
vant elements in the environment. A pilot needs to perceive im-
portant elements such as other aircraft, mountains or warning
lights. An automobile driver needs to know where other vehi-
cles and obstacles are and the status and dynamics of own vehi-
cle. (Endsley, 1997, 270-271.)
Level 2 Situation Awareness. Comprehension of the situation
is based on a synthesis of level 1 elements. Level 2 goes beyond
being aware of the elements that are present. It includes an un-
derstanding of the significance of those elements in light of one’s
goals. For example, a military pilot needs to understand that the
appearance of enemy aircraft in a particular location indicates
certain things about their objectives. A novice decision maker
may achieve the same level 1 Situation Awareness as more expe-
rienced decision makers, but may fall short of being able to inte-
grate various elements along with important goals in order to
comprehend the situation as well. (Endsley, 1997, 270-271.)
Level 3 Situation Awareness. The third and highest level of
situation awareness consists of the ability to project  the future
actions of the elements in the environment. This is achieved
through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the elements
and a comprehension of the situation. For example, an air traffic
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controller needs to put together various traffic patterns to deter-
mine which runways will be free. (Endsley, 1997, 270-272.)
Situation awareness therefore involves more than simply per-
ceiving information in the environment. It includes comprehend-
ing the meaning of that information in an integrated form com-
pared to one’s goals. These higher levels of Situation Awareness
are particularly critical for effective decision making.
In dynamic systems the development of situation awareness
and the decision process are restricted by the limited attention
and working memory capacity for novices and for novel situa-
tions. Direct attention is needed for perceiving and processing
the environment to form situation awareness, for selecting ac-
tions and executing responses. In complex and dynamic envi-
ronments, information overload, task complexity and multiple
tasks can quickly exceed a person’s limited attention capacity.
(Endsley, 1997, 270-272.)
3.2 The importance of personal scripts
Social cognition is the study of how individuals form  mental
representations of persons and social events. Social cognition
draws on a general information-processing framework borrowed
from cognitive psychology where information processing is the
sequence of cognitive activities whereby information from the
social world is combined with the person’s knowledge to pro-
duce an interpretation or mental representation. Different theo-
rists describe information processing sequence in somewhat dif-
ferent ways, the basic stages include the following:
· Attention and encoding: initial selection and identification
of information units to be processed.
· Elaboration: interpretation of the new information in terms
of existing knowledge and concepts.
· Organization: formation of a coherent mental
representation of the information as interpreted.
· Storage of the representation in memory.
· Retrieval from memory when relevant to a decision.
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The central feature of social cognition perspective is the idea
that perception of new persons or events is largely a product of
the mental representations we have developed during our past
experience. As individuals  gain experience with different social
situations they develop rules for how to behave in social situa-
tions. The set of rules developed become structured knowledge
for use in processing new information. These knowledge struc-
tures are called schemas. Schemas are set of rules that represent
what we know about certain categories. (Wickens, 1998, 163-164;
Wyer & Srull, 1989.)
The information we have in long-term memory tends to be
organised around central topics. The entire knowledge structure
about a particular topic is often termed a schema. People have
schemas about all aspects of their world. Examples of common
schemas are semantic networks associated with “college cours-
es” or “vacations”. Schemas that describe a typical sequence of
activities, like going on a date, getting up in the morning or deal-
ing with a crisis at work, are called scripts. (Wickens, 1998, 163-
164.) People also have schemas about equipment or systems. The
fact that systems are dynamic in nature make them unique and
schemas of them are called mental models. Mental models typi-
cally include our understanding of system components, how the
system works and how to use it. Mental models create a set of
expectancies about how the system will behave.
Declarative knowledge includes what we know about con-
cepts, facts, principles, rules, procedures, steps for doing various
tasks, schemas, mental models etc. Procedural knowledge on the
contrary is implicit and skill based. It is knowledge that results
in our ability to do tasks, but it is difficult to verbalise directly.
One example is our ability to speak languages. We can do it, but
cannot articulate how we do it or the rules we use to combine
words. There is body of research showing that we learn in both
declarative and procedural modes simultanously. Declarative
knowledge is gained quickly and used by a relative novise at a
task, while procedural knowledge is acquired much more slow-
ly and is characteristic of experts. We acquire declarative knowl-
edge more quickly, but it also decays more quickly. Procedural
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knowledge takes time to acquire but appears to have a slower
decay function. (ibid., 170.) An example of the different memory
functions, a man recounted his training for what to do if an earth-
quake hits in the middle of the night. He learned that he should
keep his shoes by the bed and put them on to leave the room if
an earthquake occurs. He experienced an earthquake one night,
and while his shoes were by the bed, he walked out barefoot. He
knew the information in declarative form but not in procedural
form, as he had never practiced it. (171.)
Both procedural and declarative knowledge is embodied in
schemas, scripts or skills and acquired from multiple experienc-
es. Personal knowledge or memory of a specific event or episode
is acquired from a single experience. This may be the first en-
counter with an employer, a particular accident or incident at
home, or eyewitness view of a crime. Such memories are based
on visual imagery, but the memories themselves are not always
faithful video replays of the events, having a number of biases as
Elisabeth Loftus has shown in her empirical studies. (Belli and
Loftus, 1994, 420; Wickens, 1998, 171.)
In the same way as perception may be affected by expectan-
cies of how perceptual world is usually constructed, so episodic
memories may be biased by plausible scenarios (or scripts) of
how the episode in question might have been expected to un-
fold. For example, an eyewitness to a plane crash may report
seeing a ball of flame or smoke or hearing an explosion even if
there was none because these are plausible associations with a
plane crash. Usually people tend not to be aware of these biases
and the confidence with which they assert the accuracy of their
episodic recall appears to be only poorly related to the actual
accuracy of the recall.  (Wickens, 1998,  171.) In the empirical part
of this study the subjects were asked to tell what they did when
they first heard of the incident at a nuclear power plant. It is
possible that their answers reflect not only what they did in real-
ity, but also what they thought would have been the right thing
to do.
Failures of episodic memory refer to inaccurate recollection
of things that happened in the past, failures of prospective mem-
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ory represent forgetting to do something in the future.
The schema for actions and events associated with particular
social situations is called a script. Scripts are generalised repre-
sentations of common events that tell us what to expect in a situ-
ation and how to expect people to behave in a situation. Scripts
include role schemas, rules for the parts various persons are ex-
pected to play in a particular setting. The role of a customer is
quite different from the role of a shop assistant. Customers are
expected to stay in certain areas of the shop whereas shop assist-
ants can move around and go to areas forbidden from custom-
ers. We have many expectations on how a shop assistant and a
customer should behave in a shopping situation. If the shop as-
sistant were unpolite and insulted the customer, she would vio-
late the “shopping script” most people have. Scripts help us to
organize behaviour in new situations and they also influence our
memory for these situations. In a new situation a person uses the
cues available to identify which scripts and role schemas to ap-
ply. But the choice of schemas is partly determined by schema
accessibility, which is determined by both environmental factors
and internal factors. When situations are uncertain or ambigu-
ous the person’s own expectations, needs and values determine
which schemas are most accessible. Recent experience has been
shown to affect the selection of schemas for interpreting new in-
formation. Priming effects haven been demonstrated for identi-
fying symbols like letters or numbers but for social schema as
well. Priming affects the accessibility of stored schemas. Srull and
Wyer (1980, ref. Wyer and Srull, 1989, 150-151) found that primed
concepts could influence impressions formed within 24 hours of
the priming task but not after a week had passed between the
priming  and  impression. Some schemas are more accessible to
particular individuals than others: those concepts that are most
central and important to individuals’ perceptions of themselves
are called self-schemas. Self-schemas are used for organising and
interpreting information about others as well. (Higgins et al.,
1982.)
Perception is a process of connecting new information with
existing categories. Schema accessibility is a critical part of this
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process as the schema activated then affects all steps in the infor-
mation processing: what a person attends to, how he interprets
and organizes the information and what he will remember about
it. Persons systematically attend to certain aspects of informa-
tion and ignore the rest. Only information that is attended to are
encoded and available for later recall. What a person  attends to
depends on what he expects to find and his expectancies are de-
termined by schemas activated at the time. The activated sche-
mas also determine what is unexpected. Information that does
not fit with our active schemas can be unexpected or irrelevant.
An event may not fit in with a schema, but as long as it does not
violate against it, it can be ignored. Under certain circumstances
schema-inconsistent information is remembered better than sche-
ma-consistent information. Schema-inconsistent information at-
tracts attention but it also generates extended processing of in-
formation. As a consequence an associative network is established
that makes the information easy to remember. As schema-based
processing is usually biased in the direction of  confirming prior
expectations, the activation of existing schemas to process new
information helps to reinforce the original schema.
Kantowitz (1989) suggests three stages : 1. Perceptual stage in
which we bring information in through the senses and compare
it with knowledge from memory to give it meaning 2. Cognitive
stage which is a central processing or thought stage where we
compare the new information with current goals and memories,
transform the information, make inferences, solve problems, and
consider responses, 3. Action stage in which the brain selects a
response and then sends motor signals for action. (Wickens & al.
1998, 146.) The information processing approach assumes that
we receive information from the environment, cognitively act on
it on various ways and then emit some response back to the en-
vironment. There are many theories and models that fall under
this category, but all portray human information processing as a
flow of information between various information stores and trans-
formational processes. Perception adds meaning to visual infor-
mation by comparing it with relatively permanent information
brought from long-term memory. When meaning is added to
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sensory information a person either reacts to the perceptions with
a response or sends the information on  to working memory for
further processing. Only a limited amount of information can be
brought from sensory register to working memory. Under cer-
tain circumstances information is encoded into long-term mem-
ory for later use. Most cognitive processes require some alloca-
tion of attentional resources to proceed efficiently. The two ex-
ceptions are the sensory register and the maintenance of materi-
al in long-term memory.  (Wickens & al.  1998, 146-148.)
3.3 Affective factors in decision making
Habits, values and emotions are bases for selection of ends but
also means in economic, political and social decision making.
Decisions that are made out of passion, fervor or rage are not
rational, means-ends related decisions in the classical economic
sense. Parents work to feed children out of love and affection,
responsibility and commitment, not out of maximization of profit.
Parents work even for salaries that are less than what is rational
in order to provide for their children. If carried to its extreme, the
rational choice models define competition as the core human
value, meaning that competition is the essential pleasure of life.
(Zey, 1992,  16, 23-27.) In real life most choices are made on the
basis of emotional involvement and value commitment. Com-
mitment, solidarity, altruism and trust are relational concepts and
do not exist in nonrelationships.  Rational choice models do not
consider the meaning of this kind of  values and relationships.
(Zey, 1992,  16-17.) According to Etzioni most choices people make
are largely or completely based on normative or affective con-
siderations, not only with regard of goals but also of means. What
is even more important in connection of crises, is that normative
affective factors determine to a considerable extent on which
sources of information people draw, how they interpret what they
see and what they believe they ought to infer from what they
believe. According to Etzioni, in many areas choice is made only
on normative-affective basis, in some areas logical-empirical con-
siderations play a minor or secondary role.
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The bases of choices can be divivided in normative-affective
exclusion, infusion and indifference zones of decision making,
describing the relative importance of these factors. However, these
segments are not of equal size, but for most individuals in most
societies the indifference zones are much smaller than the other
two, as hardly any knowledge lacks affective connotations. (Etz-
ioni, 1992, 89-93)
One major way exclusion of  logical-empirical considerations
take place, is by fusion of particular means to particular ends.
All other means that logically might be considered are treated as
morally or emotionally unthinkable. In many cases the excluded
options are not even considered; they are blocked out of con-
sciousness because even the consideration of them is tabooed.
Durkheim referred to this as sacred realm (1954, ref. Etzioni, 1992.)
Normative affective factors exclude logical empirical considera-
tions because it is the right way to do it, because it feels right.
When a house is in fire and children inside, their mother runs
into the house without considering alternatives. The moral val-
ues and emotional investments in the children rule out other al-
ternatives. College, career and job choice may also be made on
normative affective basis.
Normative affective infusion usually takes two main forms,
loading and intrusions. Normative affective factors may load or
color various facts and the way they are interpreted. Unlike ex-
clusion, loading only provides differential normative affective
weights that rank options in different ways from logical empiri-
cal factors. Intrusion occurs when  normative affective factors
prevent the completion of a specific logical empirical considera-
tion. Normative affective factors may cut short logical empirical
considerations by skipping some steps or completing them in-
adequately. Abelson (1976, ref. Etzioni, 1992, 95) distinguishes
between two kinds of intrusions: one in which the picture of re-
ality is distorted and the other where the reasoning used to deal
with current picture is distorted. Both are distorted by norma-
tive affective factors and often both intrusions are present simul-
taneously. According to some studies (Etzioni, 1992) high stress
has been shown to increase error rate, random behavior and gen-
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erate regression to lower responses. Stress is also said to reduce
attention and tolerance for ambiguity and diminish the ability to
separate dangerous events from trivial ones. These factors are
especially salient in connection of critical incidents. It is also
claimed that stress may cut the ability to think abstractly which
would directly affect the ability to understand complicated, tech-
nical information that is often delivered in connection of nuclear
incidents. Once a decision has been made, people tend to stick to
their decisions. The more a person is emotionally involved in his
beliefs, the harder it is to challenge his decision by argument or
propaganda.
Some personality theories see raw emotions as forces that dis-
rupt reason. Also implicit in the arguments of logical empirical
considerations is the prescription that they are the correct ones:
it is already mentioned that neoclassical theories are much more
prescriptive than descriptive. Janis and Mann (1977) make an
exception from main stream research in that they deal with the
role of affect in the whole decision making process. According to
them, it is very difficult to judge the efficiency of a decision mak-
er by outcomes as the outcomes may be numerous and difficult
to measure. They call their model of decision making as vigilant,
but claim that most decision making is not vigilant, because all
significant decision making evokes anxiety. In the tradition of
humanistic psychology (for example, Abraham Maslow) people
are seen as motivated by the desire to satisfy basic human needs
such as affection, self-esteem or security. Etzioni concludes that
raw emotions do limit and interrupt reason, but emotions often
play significant positive roles, too. Emotions can help ensure that
considerations of other than instrumental rationality will be tak-
en into account, including primacy of ends over means, selec-
tion of ethical means over others etc. However, it is shown that
great emotional intensity makes one’s focus narrower. In an ex-
treme state of fear an individual may only notice the feared ob-
ject. This narrowing can be beneficial or detrimental depending
on the task involved. Pieters and van Raaij (1987, ref. Etzioni,
1992, 101) distinguish four major functions of affect. 1) Interpre-
tation and organization of information about oneself and the
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environment is affected e.g. by pain and fatigue or fear and anx-
iety. 2) Mobilization and allocation of resources is influenced by
affects. In strong emotional states somatic energy resources are
mobilized (fight or flight) or inhibited (freeze). 3) Sensation seek-
ing and avoiding may occur in order to reach an optimal level of
arousal. When stimulation level is too low, it causes low level of
arousal that is experienced as boredom. When stimulation level
is too high, it causes high level of arousal that is usually experi-
enced as stress. 4) Affect is also a way to communicate with other
people. Etzioni concludes that affect can have both positive and
negative influences on decision making. (Etzioni, 1992, 101) In
dangerous situations reflective fear is necessary as a motivating
force (Janis & Mann, 1977.)
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4 Psychological consequences of disasters
Disasters and trauma have been known to us through centuries.
They create suffering, losses, death, insecurity etc. Science and
technology has helped us to fight some of the perils of nature,
but at the same time created new ones. There has emerged what
Erikson calls ”a new species of trouble”. (Erikson, 1991.)
Social and psychological consequences of disasters have been
studied since the beginning of 20th century. Before World War II
there were some individual research studies and historical ac-
counts, but a growing body of research started to accumulate
only after the WW II. The social and psychological effects of dis-
asters have, naturally, been reported from ancient times. Com-
munity reactions have been reported to be  mostly negative, so-
cial disorganization, chaos and suffering. Some positive reactions
have also been found: the altruistic community and unanimity
on most important values and tasks being the most central of
these. There can be found two more or less distinct research
branches:  the psychologically and clinically oriented branch stud-
ies individual trauma. The sociologically and social psychologi-
cally oriented research studies human behavior and community
reactions in collective stress or crises situations. (Quarantelli,
1985,175-179; Wolfenstein, 1957; Trimble, 1985, 10;  Herman, 1992.)
These differentially oriented research branches have also used
different methods and had different results concerning the
amount and severity of psychological problems after disasters.
However, these research results should not be considered to be
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contradictory, but rather describing different aspects and levels
of the same phenomena.
The psychological responses of individuals to trauma vary
greatly. The meaning of a traumatic event is a complex interac-
tion of the characteristics of the event itself and the individual’s
past, present and expected future as well as the social context
(Ursano et al. 1994, 4-5). Traumatic events include natural disas-
ters  (floods, vulcanoes, earthquakes), technological disasters (car
accidensts, plane crashes, large fires) and deliberately caused
events (bombings, torture, violent crimes). Breslau et al. estimat-
ed the lifetime prevalence of exposure to traumatic events as
40 % in a random sample of 1007 young adults in a US sample.
(Breslau et al., 1991.) In another study Norris (1992) found in a
community sample of residents in Southeastern cities of United
States a life time rate of exposure to at least one traumatic event
of 69 %. In a community sample of women in US 75 % reported
having at least one crime victimization and a majority of them
having several (Kilpatrick and Resnick, 1993). Several popula-
tion studies of trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder indi-
cate that on the average, about 15 - 25 % of individuals exposed
to a traumatic event will develop post-traumatic stress syndrome.
In disaster studies PTSD rates have varied  a great deal, but may
be up to 50 % in severely exposed populations and much lower
in less visible disasters (like toxic or nuclear accidents) (Green,
1994, 346-347).
4.1 Trauma, stress and post-traumatic stress
Symptoms resembling those that nowadays form the criteria of
the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)2  were first
2 Post-traumatic stress reactions are considered to be a normal reaction to an
abnormal situation. The criteria of the diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Disor-
der as described in the DSM IV expect that the reactions continue more than a
period of 4-6 weeks and there are a certain number of the symptoms for them to
be considered a “disorder”.
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recognized in medicine in the end of 19th century. In the first
scientific articles they were discussed as an organic syndrome:
railroad spine caused by the trembling of a train, shell shock
caused by the pressure of the explosion of a shell etc. After some
time doctors started to wonder and think if the symptoms might
be caused by psychological factors. In America William James
and Morton Prince were interested in the psychology of trauma,
in Europe it was studied at the hospital of Salpêtrière where Char-
cot was conducting research on hysteria. Both Janet and Freud
were among his students and were among the first to study psy-
choneurosis as it then was called. (Herman, 1992, 10-12; Trimble,
1985, 5-14; Peterson et al., 1991, 3-8.)
For two decades hysteria became a major focus of  scientific
inquiry. Until that time hysteria had been considered a strange
disease with incomprehensible symptoms. It was a suitable dis-
ease for women, and some believe that it was a metaphor  for
everything that men found mysterious in women. (Herman, 1992,
10.) Both Freud and Janet concluded based on their case studies
that hysteria was in most cases caused by psychological trauma.
They also realized that by listening to the patient it was possible
to reconstruct her past and uncover the traumas. Freud finally
concluded that a sexual neurosis was the basis of hysteria. In his
report he made a dramatic claim saying that at the bottom of
hysteria there are one or more occurences of premature sexual
experience that belong to the early years of childhood. However,
”The Aetiology of Hysteria” marked the end of this line of in-
quiry. Hysteria was then so common among women that if his
theory was true, he would be forced to conclude that ”perverted
acts against children” were very common, not only among pro-
letariat of Paris, but also among the respectable bourgois of Vi-
enna. This idea was unacceptable, beyond credibility. Because of
the social atmosphere of the society, Freud had to reject this,
known as his first trauma theory or seduction theory. Instead he
developed his second trauma theory where he expected that in-
stead of being facts, the stories of his patients’ experiences of sex-
ual abuse were fantasies. Psychoanalysis was founded on the
basis of his theory of Oedipal conflict. After some time the dis-
50
ease of hysteria was said to have disappeared. (Herman, 1992,
12-15.)
The shell shock and combat neurosis gained scientific inter-
est again during the WW I, where number of psychiatric casual-
ties was great. There were still two very different views on the
causes and proper treatment of this state. The traditional view
believed that psychiatric casualties were best to be treated badly,
so that it would be easier for them to go back to combat than to
stay at the hospital. Progressive medical authorities, on the con-
trary, believed that they should be treated in a humane way, en-
couraged to talk about their experiences. The use of  ”talk cures”
was in the end found to be the succesful treatment. Just before
the beginning of WW II Kardiner published his book on The trau-
matic neuroses of war where he found the war neuroses to be
very similar to hysteria. (Herman, 1992, 20-22.)
Theoretically, in the early 1900’s trauma-related disorders were
seen to be psychoneuroses of individuals and their drives. Inner
conflicts were seen to activate the trauma. Later the emphasis
was moved to the ego that was seen to be unable to master the
trauma. The problem was failed adaptation to environmental
changes. The etiology of traumatic neurosis was clearly within
the individual. Even in the DSM I and DSM II that recognised
that stress could contribute to psychiatric symptoms, the model
primarily viewed enduring symptoms as being caused by pre-
morbid vulnerability (Yehuda & McFarlane, 1999, 42).
It was only after the Vietnam war in the 1970’s when war trau-
ma gained attention again. During the same time feminist move-
ment made the society to pay attention to rape trauma and bat-
tered woman’s syndromes. Meanwhile new theories in psychol-
ogy had developed and the emphasis now was on the stressors
instead of the individuals psyche. The new orientation is visible
in the new diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder that was
established in 1980. The issue that was raised by the proponents
of PTSD was not whether extreme stress could cause psycholog-
ical damage. Rather the question was how should people suffer-
ing from trauma be viewed and treated in the mental health field.
The formulation of PTSD as a normative or adaptive response to
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trauma was a social and political issue as well and made the state-
ment of traumatic stress as ”normal reaction to abnormal situa-
tion” a well-known slogan. (Yehuda & McFarlane, 1999, 43.) In
addition to the emphasis on the stressor, also the importance of
the environment increased when lack of social support was iden-
tified as a risk for exacerbating symptom development. Even
basically analytic writers like Horowitz (1986) gave increased
importance to the role of the stressor. Learning theory, classical
conditioning and stimulus generalisation explained the learned
fear responses to traumas. Avoidance response typical for PTSD
was explained by instrumental learning. Attribution theory is
used in explaining the dynamics of PTSD where the meaning
given by the individual to his experience has a strong influence
on his adaptation. Constructivism and  the persons internal struc-
ture of reality has explained many of the adaptational processes
to be seen in PTSD. (Peterson et al. 1991, 4-6; Herman, 1992, 20-
22.)
There is some confusion related to the label of  PTSD concern-
ing the specificity of traumatic stress as opposed to nontraumat-
ic stress. Traumatic stress has been associated with events such
as war, captivity, torture, disasters. However, no one has succes-
fully distinguished traumatic from stressful events. Interesting-
ly, the field of traumatic stress has evolved independently from
the preexisting domain of stress and coping. Despite some at-
tempts to form theoretical links between stress and traumatic
stress there has been very little interaction between the two fields.
(Shalev, 1996, 92.)
Stress theory is one of the central paradigms of 20th century
psychology (see chapter 1). Stress researchers have shown that
excessive demands on the organism produce a typical sequence
of physiological responses involving sympathetic activation.
These responses buffer the effects of external demands defend-
ing vital functions (e.g. central temperature, supply of oxygen to
the brain) at the expense of secondary functions (like digestion,
peripheral temperature). Stress responses follow a triphasic pat-
tern: an acute response, a phase of resistance and either recovery
or exhaustion. In psychological stress, the effects of controllabil-
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ity and predictability of the stressor and  the modulating effects
of coping and appraisal are important as regulatory mechanisms
to keep the mental responses within manageable boundaries. (Se-
lye, 1956; Shalev, 1996, 92.)
The core of stress theory consists of homeostatic model of self-
conservation and resource allocation in response to excessive
demands. These responses usually occur under stress or in the
immediate proximity of the stressor. However, the intermediate
and long-term consequences are beyond the scope of the model.
Selye’s model focuses on immediate coping responses: in an ex-
ample of massive bleeding the body adaptively attempts to re-
duce the effects of bleeding on vital functions of the organism. It
does not address the healing of the wound that has caused the
bleeding. Stress, however, becomes traumatic at the point when
psychological damage analogous to this type of physical dam-
age occurs and  the hypothetical stimulus barrier is broken. (Se-
lye, 1956; Shalev, 1996, 92-93.) This makes understandable that
Lazarus and Folkman do not mention PTSD as a possible conse-
quence in their monograph Stress, Appraisal and Coping which
was published four years after the DSM III definition of PTSD.
They suggest impaired social functioning or somatic complaints
as typical examples of negative outcome from stress. They are
studying the effects of mild stressors, not traumatic stressors.
(Shalev, 1996, 92.)
Horowitz’s  (1986) stress response syndrome has been cited
as an extension of classical stress theory. His theory, however,
includes a prolonged recovery phase which consists of a strug-
gle with the results of exposure to the trauma. (Shalev, 1996.)
Baum (1990 ref. Shalev, 1996) has defined stress as a negative
emotional experience accompanied  by biochemical, physiologi-
cal and behavioral changes. Chronic stress is not limited to situ-
ations in which the stressor persists for long periods of time. Re-
sponses may habituate before a stressor disappears and on the
contrary may persist beyond the physical presence of the stres-
sor. Theoretically, the use of the term stress for both acute and
chronic responses may be problematic. Recent studies show re-
duced cortisol levels in PTSD as opposed to elevated cortisol
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during acute stress. This supports the distinction between acute
stress and prolonged states of posttraumatic morbidity. Some
authors (e.g.Hobfoll, ref. Shalev) have suggested that massive
stressors may lead to a qualitatively different type of stress reac-
tion. At the moment, it is not quite clear theoretically, how stress
and traumatic stress relate to each other. (Shalev, 1996, 93.)
Post-traumatic stress reaction is usually described as a proc-
ess consisting of different phases with their typical reactions. The
stressor is defined in the DSM III (1980) and later in the DSM IV
(1994) together with other criteria for the diagnosis. Although
there has been concern about stigmatizing people with psychiat-
ric labels in general, trauma victims have usually received the
diagnosis as a validation of their psychic distress. (van der Kolk
& McFarlane, 1996, 4-5.)
The most crucial aspect of the PTSD diagnosis is establishing
the nature of the stressor. The diagnosis has been criticized for
lack of refinement, but there are general accepted guidelines for
the stressor.  First, the stressor must be psychologically distress-
ing and such that it would be distressing to almost anyone. Sec-
ondly, the stressor is something that is ”outside the range of usu-
al human experience”. A traumatic event includes: a serious threat
to one’s life; a serious threat or possible harm to one’s spouse,
children, close relatives or friends; a sudden destruction of one’s
home or community; seeing another person who has been seri-
ously injured or killed; physical violence; and learning about se-
rious threat or harm to a relative or to one’s family. Sometimes
the traumatic event includes a physical element, e.g. direct dam-
age to the central nervous system like head injuries and malnu-
trition. The stressor is usually experienced with intense fear, ter-
ror and helplessness (Peterson et al., 1991, 15; March, 1993, 38.)
Trauma differs from other psychiatric disorders in that in trau-
ma the core issue is reality, not e.g.  displacement of meaning
(van der Kolk, 1996, 6). The other criteria for post-traumatic stress
disorder are classified in three categories: symptoms of intrusion,
avoidance and arousal.
During the early days and weeks following the impact phase
of trauma, symptoms resembling those of PTSD are frequently
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observed. Intrusive symptoms seem to appear within 48 hours
after the event in the majority of survivors. Survivors differ, how-
ever, in the amount of discomfort, arousal and dissociation that
accompany early intrusive recall. For some survivors these re-
peated memories are intolerable. Many survivors are judging
themselves and reevaluating their actions with particular inten-
sity during that time period. (Shalev, 1996, 90.) Persons suffering
from PTSD have an impairement in the capacity to integrate trau-
matic experiences with other life events. The traumatic memo-
ries often consist of  intense emotions or somatosensory impres-
sions which occur when the victims are aroused or exposed to
reminders of the trauma. The experience of persistent intrusions
of memories related to trauma interfere with attending to other
incoming information. These intrusions can take many different
forms: flashbacks, intense emotions, such as panic or rage, so-
matic sensations, nightmares, interpersonal reenactments. Years
after the original trauma victims claim that their reliving experi-
ences are as vivid as when the trauma first occurred. Because of
this timeless and unintegrated nature of traumatic memories, vic-
tims remain embedded in the trauma as a contemporary experi-
ence. (Van der Kolk & McFarlane, 1996, 8.)
Traumatized individuals become haunted by intrusive reex-
periences of  their trauma and because of that they start organiz-
ing their lives around avoiding having these emotions that the
intrusions evoke. Avoidance may take different forms, such as
keeping away from reminders, ingesting drugs or alcohol in or-
der to numb awareness of distressing emotional states. The avoid-
ance of specific triggers is aggravated by a generalised numbing
of responsiveness to emotional aspects of life. In DSM IV numb-
ing and avoidance are lumped together, but van der Kolk and
McFarlane (ibid.) suppose that they probably have different un-
derlying pathophysiology. Several authors studying different
victim populations describe a gradual withdrawal and detach-
ment from everyday activities. Some call this reaction ”dead to
the world”. To feel nothing seems to be better than feeling irrita-
ble and upset. (ibid. 8-12.)
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People with PTSD try to deal with their environment through
emotional constriction, but their bodies continue to react to cer-
tain physical and emotional stimuli as if there were a continuing
threat of annihilation. They suffer from hypervigilance, exagger-
ated startle reaction and restlessness. It has been shown that they
suffer from conditioned autonomic arousal to trauma-related
stimuli. Often they seem to move immediately from stimulus to
response without realizing what makes them so upset. They seem
to experience intense negative emotions in response to even mi-
nor stimuli. As a result, they either overreact and threaten others
or shut down and freeze. The hyperarousal phenomena seem to
represent complex psychological and biological processes in
which the continued anticipation of overwhelming threat seems
to cause difficulties with attention and concentration. These dif-
ficulties in turn give rise to distortions in information process-
ing. People suffering from arousal symptoms tend to experience
sleep problems as well because they are unable to quiet them-
selves sufficiently to go to sleep and because they wake them-
selves up in order to avoid having nightmares. The most dis-
tressing aspect of hyperarousal is the generalisation of threat. The
world has become an unsafe place. (ibid.)
The most influential theoretical model for PTSD is the infor-
mation processing model proposed by Horowitz (1986, 1997). This
model was also the cornerstone for the diagnostic criteria for
PTSD. Horowitz’s model of  PTSD builds upon classical and con-
temporary theories of trauma, but places a major emphasis on
information processing and cognitive theories of emotion. (Pe-
terson et al. 1991, 70.)
Horowitz contends that traumatic events involve massive
amounts of internal and external information. Most of the infor-
mation does not match with a person’s cognitive schemas due to
the fact that it lies outside the realm of normal experience. The
result is information overload, where the person experiences ide-
as, affects and images that cannot be integrated with the self.
Because the person cannot process the information, it is shunted
out of awareness and it remains in an unprocessed, active form.
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Denial and numbing are used as defenses to keep traumatic in-
formation unconscious. Due to the completion tendency the trau-
matic information keeps coming conscious at times as part of the
process of information processing. Such intrusive material con-
tinues entering conscioussness until the traumatic information
is fully processed. Prior to full integration of traumatic material
there is oscillation between intrusion and denial-numbing.
Horowitz sees intrusions as potentially facilitating information
processing and defensive operations as promoting gradual as-
similation of traumatic experience. (Horowitz, 1986, 1997; Peter-
son & al. 1991,69-71.)
The psychosocial model of  traumatic stress developed by
Green, Lindy and Wilson (Figure 1) (1985) describes the different
factors that affect the process of an individuals information
processing and the end result of it. It includes the idea of com-
pletion tendency and information processing presented by
Horowitz, but emphasises the importance of individual experi-
ence and recovery environment. When a traumatic event occurs
Figure 1. The psychosocial model of cognitive processing of a traumatic event.
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an individual has his own experience of it with certain details
that he appraises in his own way, depending on his personality
traits, earlier experiences etc. Several characteristics of the trau-
matic event have been found to influence the adaptation and re-
covery. The degree of warning an individual has is important,
because that defines if he can prepare for the event both materi-
ally and psychologically. Traumatic events usually cause losses
that vary in their amount and importance to the victim. The de-
gree of bereavement is an important characteristic of the experi-
ence. The amount of life threat an individual experiences during
an event, varies from zero to a total certainty of annihilation.
Depending on the nature of the traumatic event victims may be
exposed to grotesque and traumatic details. The role of an indi-
vidual in the event may be that of a passive victim or of an active
participant in the event. These roles create very different experi-
ences. Afterwards, if the society or a person’s home has been
destroyed, relocation may be necessary. (Green, Wilson & Lindy,
1985.)
Individual characteristics of victims have been found to af-
fect the cognitive processing of the trauma and the level of adap-
tation. Individuals have different personality traits, they use dif-
ferent coping  strategies, they have different defensive styles etc.
Some research results suggest that biological vulnerability may
explain some amount of  arousal symptoms whereas the quality
of the experience of trauma was a major determinant of reexpe-
riencing phenomena. (McFarlane & Yehuda, 1996, 161; Krystal et
al. 1999, 275-277.) There are characteristics called vulnerability
factors that may make a person more prone to psychiatric disor-
ders in general, e.g. earlier psychological disorder. Temperament
differences have also been suggested to affect the consequences
of stress (Strelau, 1995, 66-67.) Other factors can be called resil-
iency factors that help to buffer and to recover from the diseases.
Rape trauma victims with high self-esteem were found to be less
distressed after three months of  the event than those with low
self-esteem. (Kilpatrick et al., 1985, 137-138.)
Green, Wilson and Lindy (1985) note that the quality of the
environment where the individual tries to recover from his trau-
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matic experience will affect his recovery. Social support has been
found in several studies to be important for recovery. Lindy et al.
found that often family and friends of survivors form a sort of
membrane around the survivors to protect them from people and
circumstances that might be further traumatic. They compared
this phenomenon to the cell membrane in biology and called it
”trauma membrane” (Lindy et al. 1981, Green et al. 1985, 60-61).
The psychological process behind it can be explained by the sali-
ency of the common fate and the increased importance of social
identity as a trauma victim (Eränen & Liebkind, 1993). Attitudes
of the society concerning the event vary as well as intactness of
community and cultural characteristics. For example, with Viet-
nam veterans or rape trauma victims, the environment has often
been less supportive than it is for disaster or accident victims.
The outcome of a traumatic experience can vary greately. The
worst possibility is chronic PTSD or character change, the best
one being personal growth and positive change in life values.
Positive outcome presupposes that the working through of the
trauma has been succesfully completed and the experience inte-
grated, even though some symptoms may occasionally be man-
ifest. (Green et al. 1985; Peterson et al. 1991, 75.)
The current tendency to study only post-traumatic stress dis-
order may prevent the adequate assessment of other psychiatric
disorders after trauma. Such comorbid disorders are e.g. depres-
sion and substance abuse, but also general anxiety. In communi-
ty sample studies a majority of  PTSD cases are accompanied by
another disorder. Some victims do not develop PTSD but devel-
op other disorders, such as depression. Some authors have sug-
gested that the comorbid disorders in relation to PTSD, particu-
larly panic disorder, major depression and phobias are autono-
mous in their pattern. (McFarlane & Yehuda, 1996, 163.)
The concepts of cognitive appraisal, schemas and basic as-
sumptions were already discussed in chapter 1. Post-traumatic
stress can be explained by a threatening event invalidating, at a
deep experiential level, the three most basic beliefs in the per-
sonal theory of reality: the assumption of invulnerability, the
world as meaningful and the self as worthy. People who have
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been victimized can no longer think that ”it cannot happen to
me”. Instead, there is a marked sense of vulnerability and a fear
that if it could happen once, it can happen another time, too. The
victimization also shatters the assumption of the world as mean-
ingful and forces the individual to search for new meanings and
assumptions about the world and himself. The central question
for a victim is not ”why do these terrible things happen?”, but
”why did this happen to me?”. Usually, there is no good, logical
answer to this question. The result is that until a new equilibri-
um is reestablished the world for the victim is not meaningful,
controllable or predictable. (Janoff-Bulman 1985; Peterson et al.
1991, 79-80.)
The sense of coherence, as defined by Antonovsky (see ch. 1),
includes elements very similar to the basic assumptions described
by Janoff-Bulman and Epstein. The sense of coherence is defined
to be a ”generalized, long-lasting way of seeing the world and
one’s life in it”. The sense of coherence is dynamic, it is shaped
and modified in childhood but also throughout the life. A central
element of it is a person’s perception of his inner and outer envi-
ronment as predictable and comprehensible. If one understands
what is going on and if the world is seen as predictable, the out-
comes may still not fulfill his needs. The third element of the
sense of coherence is the faith that things will work out as well as
can reasonably be expected. (Antonovsky, 1979, 123-125.) For a
person with a strong sense of coherence a disaster is against his
basic beliefs and may cause more pressure towards changing his
beliefs than for a person with weaker sense of coherence. How-
ever, a strong sense of coherence is seen as a general resistance
resource buffering stress. A strong stressor like war or disaster
inevitably results in a weakening of one’s sense of coherence,
but the weakening may not be permanent. By contrast to sudden
disruption caused by a disaster or trauma to the sense of coher-
ence, a slow modification may take place within the context of
one’s previous level of sense of coherence and depend on the
experiences a person will later have or choose to have. Move-
ment towards the strong end of the continuum requires hard
work. Usually, people tend to seek out environments and experi-
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ences that reinforce their level of sense of coherence. (Antonovsky,
1979, 187-189.)
4.2 Psychological consequences of nuclear accidents
Nuclear accidents belong to human-induced acts of omission that
will be described below. Psychological consequences of disas-
ters have been seen to differ depending on whether they are nat-
ural or human-induced. Frederick (1980)  compared the conse-
quences to victims and concluded that they differ in terms of 1)
the emotional stages the victims pass through, 2) the psycholog-
ical symptoms the victims suffer and  3) the social processes they
encounter.  One reason for the differences is the perceived in-
volvement of the victims. Victims of natural disasters are per-
ceived as innocent victims of events beoynd their control. Vic-
tims of man-made disasters can be perceived partially responsi-
ble for their fate.  Man-made disasters can be further subdivided
into acts of omission and acts of commission. (Berren et al. 1989,
47-49.)
Acts of commission include terrorism, mass kidnappings and
other purposeful violence. Acts of omission are more seldom
reported in the literature, but are likely to occur more often in
the future. They do not usually result from malevolent intent,
but because of poor planning or attempts to save money, resources
or time. Negligence is a concept often associated with acts of
omission. With many acts of omission the initial  impact follows
a public report of the precipitating events as opposed to the events
themselves. Victims of acts of omission often do not know they
are victims until they have been so informed. Often there is also
conflicting evidence as to whether a disaster has occurred or not.
Two phases have been reported in the reactions of victims: 1)
learning to live with the risk and 2) coping with the anger for
allowing the situation to develop. As technological disasters are,
in principle, avoidable they tend to produce aggression rather
than acceptance (Weisaeth, 1994, 76). Victims of acts of omission
tend to develop generalized mistrust compared to the specific
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mistrust to the perpetrator seen in acts of commission. (Berren et
al., 1989, 49-51.) Manmade disasters frequently cause withdraw-
al and social isolation which is more detrimental to mental health
than the limited phobias typical of natural disasters (Weisaeth,
1994, 76).
Both natural and technological disasters are relatively uncon-
trollable, but perceptions of their controllability differ. Natural
forces are perceived as uncontrollable ”acts of God” suggesting
that they cannot be foreseen or prevented. Technology is sup-
posed to be regulated and managed: as man created technology,
man should also be able to control it. Failures in technology rep-
resent a loss of control over systems we have created when natu-
ral disasters only highlight the lack of control. Research shows
that stressfulness of an event is affected by the perceived con-
trollability. (Baum et al., 1991, 33-35.) Technological crises com-
prise four categories: those derived from large system failures
(e.g. nuclear power plant accident), structural failures (e.g. bridge
collapse), low level delayed effect crises (e.g. pollution) and chem-
ical hazards (e.g. oil spills, leaking toxic waste). System and struc-
tural failures are sudden and affect large number of people.
(Baum, 1987, 31-33.) The sudden loss of control might cause a
decrease in sense of coherence of the victims.
An important difference between natural and technological
disasters is their different time sequence. In a natural disaster a
community moves from order to chaos to the reconstitution of
order. With the reconstitution of order the disaster enters the col-
lective memory. In a technological hazard there may be no low
point when the danger could be cleared to be over. Rather, there
is an unending period of threat. The chronic uncertainty is more
likely to be experienced as a greater stressor than the certainty of
even bad news. (Kroll-Smith and Couch, 1991, 299-301; Berren et
al. 1989, 47-49.)
Research on the psychological consequences of nuclear acci-
dents consist mainly of studies done on Three Miles Island (TMI)
nuclear power plant accident that took place in March 1979. Cher-
nobyl accident in April 1986 has been studied, but not in the
amount and scientific rigour than the Three Miles Island acci-
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dent. A clearly different kind of accident that has gained some
research interest was the radiation accident in Goiania, Brasil in
September 1987. It was smaller in scope than the other two, but
had serious health consequences to the persons affected by radi-
ation.
4.2.1 Three Mile Island accident
The accident at  the TMI nuclear power plant caused a two week
emergency period  that had both acute and long-term consequenc-
es to the residents. The neighbors of the power plant had gener-
ally a positive attitude toward the power plant and  the few who
believed it to be a threat to the community felt that a serious
accident was a very unlikely possibility. The accident at the plant
surprised the local people and first they believed it to be an inci-
dent similar to earlier ones. (Goldsteen et al. 1989.) The informa-
tion released was in the beginning contradictory, but after a cou-
ple of days an evacuation was recommended to pre-school chil-
dren and pregnant women inside an area of 30 kilometers from
the plant. Ten days later the evacuation was canceled and people
returned to their homes. In 1985 the TMI power plant was re-
started after being closed down for six years. Two thirds of the
residents opposed the restart of the power plant on an election
three years earlier. (Trunk and Trunk, 1981; Goldsteen et al. 1989;
Prince-Embury and Rooney, 1988.)
No instructions on the beginning, ways or the goal of evacu-
ation were given. The governor’s advice to evacuate only ap-
plied to pregnant women and pre-school children. Evacuation
was left on the residents own decision making. It is evaluated
that 90 % of pregnant women evacuated. The total amount of
evacuated persons vary from 80 000 persons (Paakkola, 1988) to
144 000 persons (Bromet, 1989). Dohrenwend et al. estimated that
at least one family member evacuated from every second family
inside the 30 kilometers radius and over 60 % of families living
inside the 10 kilometers radius. Only one quarter of families with
pre-school children did not evacuate. Of those who did not evac-
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uate one third prepared for that and two thirds considered evac-
uation. (Flynn, 1981, ref. Haukkala and Eränen, 1994.)
The most common reason for evacuation was the threat felt
when the most common reasons for not evacuating were 1) wait-
ing for exact instructions for evacuation 2) a belief that the situa-
tion was in God’s hands 3) not feeling the situation was threat-
ening or 4) being afraid of looting (Barlett et al., 1983). Every
tenth of the subjects reported having had serious arguments about
evacuation in the family (Flynn, 1979, ref. Haukkala and Eränen,
1994). More educated subjects were more willing for evacuation
than others. Most of the subjects that evacuated went to their
friends or relatives in the same state. Avarage distance to the goal
of evacuation was 150 kilometers from home. In an official evac-
uation shelter there were at largest only 180 persons and the sit-
uation was calm. Most of the evacuated persons returned home
on the 4th of April even though the governor’s advice to evacu-
ate was canceled only on the 9th of April. (Flynn, 1981, ref.
Haukkala and Eränen, 1994.)
The psychological consequences of the accident were studied
by several research groups. First interviews were started two
weeks after the accident and follow-up time of some of  the stud-
ies has been several years. (Dohrenwend et al. 1981; Houts and
Goldhaber, 1981; Baum et al. 1983; Bromet, 1980; Bromet, 1990.)
In the first telephone interviews of persons living inside a 10
kilometers radius nearly all subjects reported to be worried be-
cause of the accident. Women were more anxious than men, es-
pecially women with pre-school children. Mothers living near
the power plant (10 kilometers) reported more worry than moth-
ers living farther away (70-90 kilometers) from the power plant.
A quarter of the subjects reported a decrease in trust of authori-
ties. After two months the amount of symptoms, like depression,
were decreased. (Dohrenwend et al. 1981.)
Clients of local mental health centers showed increased de-
pression compared to clients in other mental health centers in
the country. The level of their depression decreased during the
following months, but was still higher compared to clients in other
parts of the country. Clients living near the power plant were
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more depressed than those living farther away. (Dohrenwend et
al. 1981.)
Cleary and Houts (1984) reported a study on persons living
at ten kilometers distance from the power plant and those living
at 80 kilometers distance from it. Persons living close to the pow-
er plant felt more threat, were more upset and showed more psy-
chological symptoms. Women had more symptoms than men,
but single persons and older persons had lower levels of symp-
toms than other subjects. In October 1980 the differences had dis-
appeared.
Baum et al. studied a smaller sample where they found the
residents living near the power plant to be worried and uncer-
tain of the consequences of the accident. They had more unspe-
cific symptoms and somatic complaints than residents in other
areas. They felt more alienation and anxiety, too. The group liv-
ing near TMI had poorer results in problem solving tasks than
the other group and their level of adrenalin was higher than in
the other group. No statistically significant differences were
found. Conclusions of the results were that some residents were
suffering long-term stress caused by the accident. They were not
on clinical levels, but higher than in the average population.
(Baum, Fleming and Singer, 1983.)
Bromet et al. (1980) found the greatest psychological conse-
quences in mothers of pre-school children that were more de-
pressed and more anxious than others one year after the acci-
dent. More symptoms were found in mothers, who lived in the
area evacuated, who had little social support and who had prior
psychiatric history.
All research groups found acute negative psychological con-
sequences increasing anxiety or anger but the long-term results
found by research groups differ from each other.
Goldsteen and Schorr (1982) found that subjects living closer
than 15 kilometers from the power plant were still one year after
the accident more worried than before the accident. Mothers of
small children and persons with prior psychiatric history showed
more symptoms of depression, anxiety and anger than subjects
65
in the control areas 42 months after the accident and especially
after the restart of the second reactor. (Bromet et al. 1990.)
There were great individual differences in the perceived threat
of the accident. Cleary and Houts (1984) studied the coping strat-
egies used by the residents and their effect on psychological con-
sequences. It has been suggested that problem-focused coping
would be more succesful than emotion-focused coping. Here the
subjects using active problem-focused coping were 9 months af-
ter the accident still more anxious than those subjects who de-
nied the problem or the threat.
Collins et al. (1983) studied coping strategies and stress two
years after the accident. Here emotional management was shown
to be more succesful in reducing stress than  denial or problem-
focused coping. Here the Ways of  Coping Inventory was used to
compare different coping strategies instead of questions asking
about behavioral responses used by Cleary and Houts (1984).
The difference in their results originates from different concepts.
In chronic stress emotion-focused coping strategies used to man-
age negative feelings, but that have no effect on the threat, seem
to be succesful. Denial of the problem may be difficult in a situa-
tion where the person may be faced with the problem daily. Prob-
lem-focused coping strategies used to affect the problem have
here no succes as the accident already happened cannot be af-
fected. Bromet (1988) found that subjects living near the power
plant had more symptoms than subjects living farther away.
However, subjects living farther report more worry because of
the closeness of the power plant than those living closer to it.
This may be explained by denial of the threat in subjects living
near the plant.
Davidson et al. (1982) found weaker sense of control in sub-
jects living close to the plant than in control subjects. Subjects in
TMI showing less sense of control had also more symptoms and
poorer ability in problem solving. Subjects using emotion-focused
coping had greater sense of control. (Baum et al. 1983.)
Fleming et al. (1983) studied the mediating effects of social
support on stress caused by the accident. Social support is de-
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fined as emotional support received from significant others like
talking about the problem and instrumental support like finan-
cial aid. Lack of social support affects negatively the welfare even
when the person is not in a stressful situation. On the other hand,
social support has a buffering role so that the consequences of
the accident are smaller in persons who have social support. In
TMI accident the role of social support was seen in less symp-
toms, less depression and less alienation in residents having more
social support. Subjects having less social support also showed
poorer performance in problem solving tasks. In Bromet et al.
(1989) mothers and children having more social support had few-
er symptoms. In Cleary and Houts (1984) social support was not
related to the level of anxiety caused by the accident, but the fewer
friends a subject had, the more anxiety he reported.
Goldsteen et al. (1989) found that mistrust of authorities and
closeness to the power plant increased perceived danger from
the accident. Perceived danger and mistrust of authorities in-
creased perceived harm to health, which was not affected by close-
Figure 2. Proposed path model representing the relationship between
mistrust of authorities, distance from TMI, perceived harm to health and
distress. (Goldsteen et al 1989)
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ness of the power plant. General mistrust of people was not con-
nected to mistrust of authorities. Three years later level of anxie-
ty was affected by threat to health at the first measuring time,
that was affected by perceived danger from the accident. Anxie-
ty was mainly affected by the appraisal of the situation.
Bromet et al. (1990) showed that mothers of pre-school chil-
dren who perceived the accident as dangerous had more symp-
toms of depression, anxiety and anger than mothers not perceiv-
ing the accident as dangerous still 42 months after the accident
and especially after the restart of the second reactor. In the first
follow-up 9 months after the accident the perceived risk and dan-
ger were not connected to the level of stress caused by the acci-
dent. (Bromet and Dunn, 1981.) The perception of threat of the
accident has long-term effects especially in groups feeling to be
involved in the accident, like mothers living in the area that was
evacuated. On the other hand, symptoms caused by the accident
in power plant employees decreased soon after the accident.
(Bromet et al. 1990.)
Prince-Embury and Rooney (1988) studied consequences of
the restart of the second reactor at TMI. The sample consisted of
108 subjects from their 1987 study sample. No significant differ-
ences from results found a year before the restart of the power
plant were found, except anxiety that decreased from 1984. Com-
pared to 1981 study more symptoms of depression and anger
were found after the restart. However, the subjects studied were
different at different measuring times, so caution is needed when
evaluating the results.
Dew et al. (1987) studied the effects of restart of the reactor on
mothers of pre-school children. After the restart the mothers had
more symptoms than on any other time  since the accident. For
the first time attitudes towards nuclear power, as measured be-
fore the restart, predicted symptoms after the restart. Symptom
levels increased especially in those mothers who had symptoms
of depression and anxiety after the accident and perceived their
personal risk to be high.
 Davidson et al. (1991) found more symptoms of chronic stress
in TMI area residents than in control subjects. They reported more
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somatic complaints and poorer performance on problem solving
tasks. Stress-related arousal measured by catecholamine and
blood pressure levels was higher in TMI residents than in con-
trol subjects. TMI residents reported the restart to be bothersome,
but no evidence of restart-related lasting effects were found. There
was a tendency for the levels of stress to decrease among  TMI
area residents. This result was found consistent with the antici-
patory stress reduction interpretation of the venting procedures
(Gatchel et al. 1985). If the venting procedures were associated
with anticipatory stress and the succesful completion of it allevi-
ated these fears and stress levels the pattern would look as if
there were no changes at all from pre- to post-venting. Chronic
stress persisted in TMI residents six years after the accident as
measured by arousal but not in reported emotional distress. (Dav-
idson et al. 1991.)
Prince-Embury and Rooney (1995) studied cognitive adapta-
tion in subjects who stayed in vicinity of TMI between 1983 and
1985 compared to those who left the area. According to them,
those who remained in TMI area appeared more likely to discon-
nect perceived threat of TMI from their sense of personal con-
trol. They suggest that early adaptation response may involve
disconnection of perceived threat from other cognitions and rel-
evant affect. Lazarus (1989) defines disconnection as a cognitive
coping process comparable to defensive processes described by
others such as dissociation (Janet, 1965; van der Kolk, 1985). Cross-
sectional comparisons of initial responses between those who
stayed in TMI and those who moved from TMI between 1985
and 1989 yeilded findings that were consistent with their pro-
posed disconnection hypothesis. TMI related worry tended to be
more related to psychological symptoms among those who
moved than among those who stayed. However, symptoms were
also significantly related to loss of faith in experts among those
who remained in the area. This aroused suggestion that those
who stayed possibly displaced symptoms to concern about ex-
perts. This is consistent with the suggestion that TMI residents
have been sensitized to the responsibility that experts have for
their continued safety. The loss of faith in experts was a salient
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cognition for TMI residents in 1985. Prince-Embury and Rooney
find the persistence of this finding as consistent with the ”shat-
tered assumption” formulation by Janoff-Bulman (1985, 1992) and
”loss of innocence” reported by Titchener and Kapp (1976).
Longitudinal analysis of the data indicated a decrease in symp-
tom levels from the pre-restart elevation of symptoms that had
persisted in the community since the accident. This finding is
significant as the pre-restart symptom level had been significantly
elevated compared to normative samples. The symptom level
measured in 1989 represented a return to a normal level. This
decrease in symptoms occurred in spite of increase in perceived
lack of control, loss of faith in experts and greater fears of devel-
oping cancer. Working through an experience could mean that
related cognitions would reflect more realistically the experience
of the individual and the negative cognitions would be more
appropriately associated with psychological symptoms. Healing,
working  through or functional coping of the event has been de-
fined as the introduction or reassessment of additional poten-
tially modulating elements into the preexisting internal model
of the individual. (Horowitz, 1997.) In this study Prince-Embury
and Rooney believe that ”awareness of what to do in the event of
an emergency”, a cognition of emergency preparedness,  was such
an element.
4.2.2 Chernobyl accident
In April 1986 one of the four blocks of Ukrainian (then part of
former Soviet Union)  nuclear power plant at Chernobyl explod-
ed as a result of human error. The fatal accident sequence was
initiated  by the decision of the plant’s management to shut down
all safety mechanisms in the reactor in an overnight experiment
to test the generator under extreme conditions. The management
did not understand the danger of the situation before it was too
late. The explosion left a gaping hole in the roof, exposing  the
reactor core to the outside air. The fire continued for ten days
and hundreds of tons of radioactive dust was released and dis-
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persed over Europe. The release of radioactive dust was over only
after the fire in reactor core was extinguished by covering it. (van
den Bout et al. 1995, 213-215; Hänninen et al. 1988.) The extin-
guishing of the fire and rescue operation after that involved even
400 000 civil workers and an unknown number of men enlisted
in the army (Romanenko, 1990 ref. Ginzburg et Reis, 1991).  Of
the workers involved in the rescue operation 30 died from inju-
ries caused by the radiation and 200  got seriously ill. The number
of casualties might have been smaller if proper protective equipe-
ment had been used. (Paakkola, 1988.) Present estimates of deaths
vary from 250 persons (Romanenko, 1990 ref. Ginzburg et Reis,
1991) to 321 persons (Collins, 1992). The Chernobyl accident was
the most serious radiation accident in the world (class 7).
Approximately 135 000 people were evacuated and dislocat-
ed from the distance of 30 kilometers from the power plant in
Ukraina, Belarussia and Russia. (Paakkola, 1988.) Evacuation was
started only 36 hours after the accident. Close to the power plant
located town Pripayat  with 45 000 inhabitants was evacuated
only after the wind had turned towards it. The residents were
allowed to take with them only things they were able to carry
themselves. (Ginzburg et Reis, 1991.)
Torubarov (1991) and Chinkina (1991) have reported psycho-
logical consequences of the accident and psychological charac-
teristics of those suffering from radiation disease. According to
them 145 persons developed symptoms of radiation disease. 115
persons of them were sent to Moscow for special treatment.
Patients were grouped according to the seriousness of the dis-
ease into four classes where the amount of symptoms and levels
of radiation dose varied from low to high. Patients in the fourth
group had so large doses that only one from twenty patients sur-
vived. Because of that only patients from the three groups are
included in the study. Different phases of the patients suffering
from radiation disease were described as  consisting of four phas-
es lasting together several years. It was not possible to differenti-
ate between the different phases in patients most seriously ill.
(Torubarov, 1991.)
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Psychological consequences of the accident were studied ac-
cording to the phase of the disease and treatment. Seriously ill
patients belonging to class three were physically so ill in the be-
ginning with large burns that no psychological symptoms could
be identified when the focus was in survival. In the recovery phase
and after that started psychological symptoms to emerge when
there was certainty of survival. This caused confusion and un-
certainty about the future with all social problems. This was vis-
ible especially as a symptom that was called ”weak nerves”.
Patients belonging to the second class on the other hand were
suffering from serious psychological symptoms from the begin-
ning as they were aware of their own state and of the dying of
those more seriously ill. Concern over own survival was great.
Also patients suffering from milder radiation disease had psy-
chological symptoms like depression, suspiciousness and weak
nerves that got worse during the follow-up time. (Torubarov,
1991.)
The central and most important stressor for the inhabitants of
the contaminated areas is the threat of having been exposed to
dangerous levels of radiation. Evacuation of the contaminated
areas caused severe psychosocial stress as government policy was
to evacuate families and individuals rather than whole commu-
nities. The result was a severe loss of structure and social ties.
People also lost contact with relatives and the source of social
support. Psychological reactions varied, but there was found
symptoms of psychological tension, anxiety and depression that
later might develop to somatic symptoms. (Aleksandrovskij, 1989;
van den Bout et al., 1995, 216-222.)
In the acute phase the authorities reacted by keeping silent.
During the first three years the authorities withheld a great deal
of information. As a consequence of that all official information
was distrusted even when it was in accordance with Western re-
ports. In the former USSR people actually trusted rumors more
than official reports. Van den Bout et al. (1995, 222) write :”It looks
as though people are constantly seeking for reliable information
but, at the same time, disqualify every piece of information that
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is presented. Reassuring information only triggers the search for
more reassuring information.” Loss of trust is a general charac-
teristic of the inhabitants.  In the first years anxiety was the core
negative emotion of the residents, but in later years Russian in-
vestigators have reported a gradual shift toward depression. (van
den Bout et al., 1995, 222-223.)
Experts disagree to some extent about the health consequenc-
es of exposure to the doses of radioactivity that took place in
Chernobyl. However, there is an absolute consensus that radia-
tion causes a limited number of discrete medical problems and is
not related to any kind of medical problems. Cancer is clearly
related to high doses of radioactivity. Thyroid cases in Gomel
region has rosen from 1 or 2 cases in 1986-1989 to 39 cases in
1992.The results of an international study on the medical effects
of Chernobyl accident are in agreement that the accident had not
resulted in any measurable radiological effects on the health of
local population. (van den Bout et al., 1995, 227.) According to
the research results of the International Atomic Energy Associa-
tion the largest health consequences caused by the accident were
psychological. (IAEA, 1991.)
In comparison to ”classical” or natural disasters a nuclear ac-
cident is invisible, there is no high point and no low point. Dur-
ing the Chernobyl accident only a few outward signs were visi-
ble. The absence of a high impact phase probably explains also
the absence of intrusive reactions related to the accident that are
typical to other kinds of traumatic experiences. The accident left
hardly any psychological impression on the majority of the pop-
ulation as nothing concrete seemed to have happened. Psycho-
logically nuclear accidents are more comparable to other acci-
dents consisting of leaking of  toxic substances than to natural
disasters. (van den Bout et al., 1995, 224.)
The most typical characteristic of the inhabitants in the con-
taminated area is the preoccupation with their health. They ex-
perience many kinds of health problems (like headaches, gas-
trointestinal complaints,  common infections) which seem to be
of psychosomatic nature. The complaints are to a large extent
attributed to radiation.  The preoccupation with health problems
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and attribution to radiation is understandable and similar to that
observed in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However, the physical
arousal state caused by chronic stress may be interpreted as symp-
toms. The symptom constellations may be interpreted as radia-
tion-related. This interpretation leads further to anxiety and de-
pressive reactions. This view is, however, so contrary to the be-
liefs of inhabitants, including medical doctors, in the contami-
nated areas that it can be hardly expressed in public. The people
themselves appraised the situation as real death threat. (van den
Bout et al., 1995, 230-231.) There are clear differences between
inhabitants in the contaminated areas and in control areas: in
contaminated areas 40 % of people e.g. don’t believe that the ra-
dioactivity is decreasing in their environment, when only 25 %
of persons in control areas believe so. (Ginzburg, 1993.)
4.2.3 Goiania accident
In September 1987 a serious radiaton accident occurred in Goi-
ania, Brazil. Approximately 20 grams of 137Cs, a  radioactive Ce-
sium isotope was stolen from an old radiotherapy machine in an
abandoned medical clinic. The protective container that covered
the 137Cs was opened in the backyard of a local junk dealer. The
curious sandy grains of the isotope, which glowed in the dark,
were distributed to friends and family in the immediate vicinity.
Many people living near the epicenter were contaminated by ei-
ther ingesting the 137Cs or by being directly exposed to it. Four
people died from acute radiation syndrome and 22 got seriously
ill. (Collins et al., 1993.)
Protective measures were started only two weeks later when
the local medical doctor realised that several people were exposed
to radiation. He invited radiation authorities and wide rescue
operation was started. 112 000 people were examined, of whom
249 were exposed to radiation and of them ingesting 129 per-
sons. Externally exposed persons were immediately decontami-
nated. From the persons exposed internally 50 needed treatment
and 20 of them hospitalization. About 50 houses were decontam-
inated during two months. 700 employees from radiation relat-
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ed offices and companies were involved in the rescue operation.
The radioactive waste was stored in an area near the town of
Abadia, a suburb of Goiania about 30 kilometers from the epi-
center in Goiania. (Collins et al., 1993; Rosenthal et al., 1991.)
As a consequence of the accident 11 seriously ill persons were
transported to the local hospital in a separate room where the
ordinary personnel of the hospital was too afraid to go. The per-
sons who were ill had been given no information of their symp-
toms. Treatment was made even more difficult by a strike taking
place at the same time. The situation was extremely difficult when
radiation specialists arrived a few days later. The patients had
serious symptoms and they did not know what caused them.
More seriously ill patients were sent to Rio de Janeiro to a hospi-
tal with better treatment facilities. During the following six
months 20 victims of the accident – ages varying from 6 years to
60 – were treated in these two hospitals. The patients were poor
inhabitants of the local slum, most of them living on collecting
junk paper.
The personnel was in the beginning wearing radiation pro-
tection which made contact with patients more difficult. Often
the patients refused to follow their instructions. Two of the pa-
tients escaped the hospital, but returned back themselves. 14 of
the 20 patients became depressive and started to recover only in
December. The transfer to Rio de Janeiro caused anxiety and led
to serious depression in 6 patients. One of the patients said after
hearing of the transfer, that he knew he would die and wanted to
die in Goiania. After arrival in Rio de Janeiro he was extremely
depressed and died from an infection after a few weeks. Two
patients with prior psychiatric history were aggressive in the
amount that they had to be isolated. (Brandao-Mello et al., 1991.)
During the acute phase of the disease the patients were very
anxious and frightened of the developing disease. The second
phase lasted till the end of November when the survived pa-
tients returned from Rio de Janeiro. At that time the patients were
depressed and anxious about continuing their life, their ability
to work or their lost homes. In the third phase that lasted till
January the patients wanted to leave the hospital. This caused
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sometimes aggressive behavior. Especially patients having chil-
dren were worried and wanted to leave the hospital. Psycholog-
ical reactions and symptoms were treated with medication, psy-
chotherapy and  discussing their feelings. (Brandao-Mello et al.,
1991.)
The rescue operation was very demanding to the personnel
involved in it. The victims of the accident were people who had
no knowledge of the consequences of radiation. Workers wear-
ing protective suits aroused fear and suspiciosness in local peo-
ple. A worker was hit when he was measuring radiation in the
street and another one was threatened with a gun. All the per-
sons working in the rescue operation had technical education
and no experience of rescue in an environment like that. They
had no idea of the scope of the accident before arriving on the
spot. The workers could not understand the hostility showed
towards them when they were helping the local people. Confer-
ences organised for information delivery were especially frus-
trating. The inhabitants were upset and it was almost impossible
to convince them about their false beliefs. They insisted that eve-
rything had to be ”totally clean from radiation”. They demand-
ed the workers to drink or eat food before using it themselves.
Most of the time was spent in explaining the situation to the lo-
cal people. The hospital personnel had conflicts with the rest of
the hospital personnel. It was found to be especially important
to provide psychological support to the rescue personnel, too.
Mental health workers working with population need to have
basic knowledge of radiation. (Carvalho et al. 1991.)
Ten percent of the inhabitants came to the stadium during the
two weeks to have their radiation dose measured. 5000 from the
first 60 000 showed symptoms of stress and allergic reactions.
Some people came there daily. Over 8000 people demanded to
get an official certificate of the examination to avoid discrimina-
tion outside the town. The amount of products from Goiania that
were sold  outside the town decreased 50 %. Prices of agricultur-
al products dropped by 90 %. 70 % of people reported having
been discriminated outside Goiania after the accident. (Curado
et al. 1991.)
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The residents felt strong mistrust of authorities after the acci-
dent. Other people discriminated against those living in contam-
inated area, but on the other hand associations were founded to
assist the victims. The whole community was first uncertain about
their future. The 10 000 persons who experienced closely the ac-
cident, were frightened and wanted to separate from other peo-
ple but at the same time discriminated against the primary vic-
tims. Only after three years of the accident the psychologists no-
ticed some decrease in symptoms of depression, aggression and
fantasies. (Curado et al. 1991.)
Collins et al. (1993) studied long-term psychological conse-
quences after three years with a design similar to that used by
Baum et al. (1982) after TMI. Here three groups were compared:
one group of persons (n=23) exposed to radiation (0,5 – 1 Sv),
another group (n=23) living one and a half kilometers from radi-
oactive waste storage in Abadia. They were not exposed to radi-
ation which was also confirmed by examination. The control
group consisted of 21 persons from an area not exposed to radi-
ation who did not believe themselves to have been exposed. Psy-
chological consequences were measured with questionnaires,
tests of levels of adrenalin, noradrenalin and blood pressure. The
main result was that persons exposed to radiation and persons
who were only afraid of exposure to radiation had similar stress
symptoms three years after the accident. Both groups had diffi-
culties in decision- making, had psychosomatic symptoms and
increased levels of adrenalin and blood pressure compared to
the control group. Persons exposed to radiation experienced their
health to be poor and were worried of possible future health ef-
fects. Persons living near the waste site felt more helpless than
those exposed as they were still living near the radioactive waste
and perceived it as a risk to their health which they could not
affect. (Collins and Carvalho, 1993.)
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5 The incident at Sosnovyi Bor nuclear
power plant
On March 24, 1992, there was an incident at a nuclear power plant
in Sosnovyi Bor near St. Petersburg. The malfunctioning of the
block and control valves of a fuel element flow channel resulted
in damage to the fuel element of unit 3 in the power plant. This
power plant is situated about 100 km from the Finnish border.
Damage at the power plant was quite small: according to the
Finnish authorities on radiation and nuclear safety, this incident
did not cause any dangerous radiation in Finland. However, this
incident aroused much interest in the Finnish mass media and
there was much discussion of the consequences for Finland in
the case of a serious accident at the Sosnovyi Bor power plant.
The Chernobyl accident was still in people’s minds and there
were speculations and scenarios about the consequences if an
accident, like the one in Chernobyl, had happened at the Sos-
novyi Bor plant. Concern about the poor conditions at Russian
nuclear power plants in general was aroused, as this increases
the risk of a serious accident happening at some of these plants
in future. It seems that in this case people reacted more to the
failure of the control system than to the threat of radiation, and
to some extent there was overlap of these two concerns. Certain
representatives of the mass media accused Finnish authorities of
delaying the information and underestimating the incident. Some
representatives of the general public also accused the media to
have been too late in informing about the incident. These accu-
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sations were similar to those that took place in Finland after the
Chernobyl accident, which was also characterised as an infor-
mation crisis (Sjöberg et al. 1998). Considering the actual situa-
tion, the reactions in Finland were quite strong. At some schools
and kindergartens, children were not allowed to go out during
the day and some places were sold out of iodine tablets. The threat
was taken seriously at least by some people.
Among the Finnish public, the Swedish-speaking minority
were probably the first to learn of the incident, as they often watch
Swedish television. Rumors spread that the Swedish morning
news reported a serious accident had occured and ‘had caused
contamination’ of the southern Finnish coast.
The nine o’clock news on  Finnish radio, however, reported a
minor incident with no serious consequences. Radio talk shows
ruminated about the incident and the consequences of a possible
serious accident. So, from the earliest news reports information
was inconsistent. The public discussion suggested that reactions
were strong and it was decided by the Department of Social Psy-
chology to take a closer look at the concern the Sosnovyi Bor
incident evoked in the Finnish people.
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6 Sample and methods
6.1 Research questions and hypotheses
The purpose of the study was to find out which factors affect the
interpretation of a situation as dangerous or non-dangerous.
Another aim was to study if the activity a person is involved in
when hearing a warning, has an effect on his/her willingness to
interrupt that activity to take necessary protective measures.
The first hypothesis was that subjects living closer to the power
plant would interpret the incident as more serious and threaten-
ing than those living further away. It  was expected that subjects
living closer to the nuclear power plant would express more con-
cern and fear about an accident.
The second hypothesis was that perceived quality of infor-
mation delivery was related to the interpretation of the situa-
tion. It was expected that those who perceived information as
unclear would interpret the incident as more serious and also
express more fear. Third, it was expected that subjects interpret-
ing the situation as more serious would have more stress symp-
toms than those interpreting the situation less serious. Fourth,
commitment to an activity was expected to be related to less will-
ingness to take protective measures.
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6.2 Description of the sample
The populations to be studied were chosen from communities in
southern Finland at varying distances from the Sosnovyi Bor
plant. Kotka is situated on the southern coast of Finland, 134 km
from Sosnovyi Bor. Hämeenlinna (274 km) and Varkaus (280 km)
in the interior of the country are clearly farther away from the
power plant. The three communities chosen for the sample are
middle size Finnish towns and, by their social structure, compa-
rable to each other. The fourth, Helsinki (229 km) was included
in the study because it is the capital of the country and located
on the southern coast of Finland like Kotka, although in terms of
population size Helsinki is not comparable with the other com-
munities. For this study twelve hundred and eighty (1280) peo-
ple were randomly chosen from the population registry. The sam-
ple includes an equal number of males and females whose ages
vary between fifteen and seventy. There were no significant dif-
ferences between the sample towns in response rate or in sex,
age, marital status or other demographic variables of the respond-
ents. The number and distribution of participants from sample
towns is presented in Table 1.
A questionnaire was sent by mail to the subjects about one
and a half months after the incident. The return rate of the ques-
tionnaires was 55 %, which is comparable to that in other similar
studies in Finland. The size of the sample is large enough for
statistical analyses. The low return rate is understandable due to
the long intervening time, and the length of the questionnaire.
One reason possibly affecting the willingness to participate in
the study, is that for financial reasons envelopes stamped with
the name of the Ministry of Interior were used in the mailing.
This may have had a negative effect on some participants as this
is the same authority responsible for information delivery in dis-
asters and nuclear accidents. In an earlier study some partici-
pants gave negative comments on this connection.
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54,8 % of the respondents are female and 45,2 % male. The number
of subjects in different age-groups is presented in Table 2.







One third of the respondents were single, 46 %  were married
and the rest (24 %) were either in common law marriages, wid-
owed or divorced (see Table 3).
Table 2. Number of subjects in different age-groups.
Age % N
15 - 25 21,9 146
26 – 40 24,2 161
41 – 55 24,8 165
56 - 70 29,1 194
Total 100 666









As there was available information about the age and marital
status for the initial sample, the differences between those who
returned their questionnaires and those who did not, were ana-
lysed. There are slightly more married persons among respond-
ents than among non-respondents, and consequently more sin-
gle and divorced persons among non-respondents (χ2 = 22.11;
df = 3,1191; p <.001). This comparison was made excluding those
living in common law marriages as the population register that
was used here as source of information does not include that in-
formation. Respondents and non-respondents do not differ
according to sample town or according to their age group.
The percentage of respondents having children under 7 years
was 10, 5 %, 14,9 % had children between 7 - 15 years and 38,6 %
had children over 15 years.
The distribution of respondents according to their social-eco-
nomic status are presented in Table 4. The distribution of respond-
ents compares to that of the general population in Finland.




Upper middle class 18,2 121







6.3. Measures used in the study
The survey consisted of questions designed for this survey con-
cerning different aspects of the incident, The nuclear accident
appraisal questionnaire:
· what information the subject received on the Sosnovyi Bor
incident
· what the subject did after learning about the incident
· subject’s opinion of the official information delivery of
Finnish authorities concerning the incident
· subject’s opinion of information delivery after
the Chernobyl accident
· on what kind of issues the subject expects the authorities
to inform the general public
· subject’s own evacuation plans
· subject’s own perceived risk caused to him by Russian
nuclear power plants (see appendix 1)
The questionnaire also included several standardized measures.
There are many scales that have been developed to measure
the stress caused by different life events. One of the best known
of them is the Holmes & Rahe (1967) Schedule of Recent Experi-
ences. This has previously been used in Finland. Sarason & al.
(1978) wanted to differentiate in their Life Event Scale between
the effects of positive and negative life events, as the level of stress
may be heavily based on negative or positive event experience.
In the questionnaire used in this study mainly negative life events
experienced by the subject during the past year are assessed as
well as his/her evaluation of the effect these events have had on
his life. Life events assessed in the questionnaire include own
and significant others illnesses, death of a significant other, eco-
nomic difficulties, change of job or place of living. The items cre-
ating the composite variable have a reliability of Cronbach alpha
.65. The reliability of the composite variable is rather low, but it
is still used in some analyses.
The Sense of Coherence scale developed by Antonovsky (1979)
was also utilised within the survey. Sense of coherence is defined
as “a global orientation that expresses the extent to which one
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has a pervasive, enduring though dynamic feeling of confidence
that one’s internal and external environments are predictable and
that there is a high probability that things will work out as well
as can reasonably be expected” (Antonovsky, 1979).
Sense of coherence has a central position in an individual’s
personality structure. An experience or a certain situation may
produce a temporary, small change in the sense of coherence,
but these changes, however, take place along a the continuum. A
strong sense of coherence includes seeing the internal and exter-
nal environment as predictable and understandable. (An-
tonovsky, 1979.) The scale produced in this sample a reliability
coefficient of  .82.
The self-esteem measure used in this study is the one devel-
oped by Rosenberg. It measures the extent to which a person has
an experience of him/herself as a valuable person and respects
him/herself. (Robinson and Shaver, 1980.) This measure pro-
duced a Cronbach’s alpha .75.
The General Health Questionnaire by Goldberg was devel-
oped to be a general mental health screening inventory measur-
ing non-specific stress reaction. The questions are activity ori-
ented, assessing different aspects of everyday life. The scale that
originally consisted of 60 items was later revised. A shorter ver-
sion of  36 items was used in the Mini-Suomi project in Finland
(Lehtinen et al., 1985.) Shorter versions have also been widely
used in disaster studies, e.g. in Norway and Australia (Raphael
et al., 1989.) The 28 item version was used here. The items of the
scale represent different areas of psychological symptomatology
and activity, such as concentration, energy level, affective state,
sleeping habits and anxiety. Problems in these areas during the
last couple of weeks were assessed. A reliability coefficient of  .93
was found for this sample.
The Symptom Check List (SCL-90R) is one of the most widely
used scales to assess psychological and psychosomatic symptoms
(Derogatis et al. 1976.) This scale has been used in Finland, but
later versions of it are also known in connection with trauma
and disaster studies. The questionnaire used in this survey in-
cluded the somatization and anxiety sub-scales. The reliability
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of the anxiety scale was .89; the reliability of  the somatization
sub-scale was .85 and the reliability of the composite scale was
.92.
The symptoms of radiation disease are ambiguous and this
disease only develops as a consequence of  very strong radioac-
tivity. Some people have a tendency to worry of their health which
naturally could be enhanced and cause stress symptoms in a sit-
uation where there is a fear of health consequences caused by
radioactivity. Therefore the Whiteley-index, designed to assess
hypocondria, was included in the survey (Pilowsky, 1967.) It has
been used in the Mini-Suomi project although the scale has been
validated on a relatively small sample (Lehtinen et al., 1985.) The
Cronbach alpha for this scale in this study was .86.
Social support has repeatedly proved to have a buffering ef-
fect in stressful situations. The Social Provision Scale developed
by Cutrona (1986) was used in this survey. It measures different
dimensions of social support, like attachment, social integration
and alliance. The reliability of this scale was .93.
A tendency to answer questions according to social norms may
affect research results. On the other hand socially desirable be-
havior has been shown to be related with unwillingness to start
protective actions in an alarm situation (Breznitz, 1984). To meas-
ure these effects, the questionnaire included Balanced Inventory
of Desirable Responding by Paulhus (1990). It consists of two
sub-scales, one measuring an inclination to self-deception, the
other inclination to impression management. The reliability of
the self-deception scale was .69 and the reliability of the impres-
sion management sub-scale was .80.
According to Folkman (1984) coping strategies are cognitive
and behavioral attempts to control, diminish or tolerate outer
and/or inner demands caused by stressful situations. The at-
tempts may take very different forms. Usually a distinction is
made between problem-focused and emotion-focused coping
strategies. Here, subjects’ coping strategies were measured by a
scale developed by Dewe and Guest (1990) on the basis of the
inventory developed by Folkman and Lazarus. As the scale is
work oriented, a shortened version was used in this study, and
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the least appropriate items were left out. A principal component
analysis did not yield five factors as in the study of Dewe and
Guest, but followed the pattern found by Folkman and Lazarus
of problem-focused and emotion-focused coping strategies. The
reliability of all items was .71, the reliability of the items creating
emotion-focused strategies was .73 and the reliability of items
creating problem-focused coping was .62. (appendix 2).
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7 Results
7.1 Interpretation of the situation
Most of the respondents learned about the incident through mass
media (71,6 %), whereas 28,4 % heard about it from their social
network. There was a significant difference between the sample
towns: the proportion of those who heard about the incident from
their social network increases the closer the power plant is (Ta-
ble 5). This may show that this information is more important to
those living closer to the power plant, which increases the will-
ingness to talk about it with significant others.
Table 5. The first source of information in sample towns (%).
Sample towns
First source Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus
of  information
Social network 39,1 32,7 28,7 12,8
Mass media 60,9 67,3 71,3 87,2
Total % 100 100 100 100
N 169 165 164 164
χ2 =30.57; df=3,662; p <.001
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One fifth of the respondents received the information on the
incident the morning it occurred, almost half of them had heard
it by the afternoon. One third only heard of it on the next day
(Table 6). There is a significant difference in the time of first in-
formation between the sample towns; in towns closer to the power
plant respondents heard of the incident in the morning signifi-
cantly more often than in towns farther away from the power
plant.
Table 6. The time of first information in sample towns.
Time Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus Total
Morning 34,9 29,3 14,9 8,9 22,2
Afternoon 41,0 43,9 46,6 43,0 43,6
Next day 21,7 25,0 34,2 39,9 30,0
Later 2,4 1,8 4,3 8,2 4,2
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N 170 165 166 165 666
χ2 =53.87; DF= 9, 666;  p <.001
One third of the respondents indicated that they had heard
about an incident, one third had heard about an accident. Al-
most ten per cent reported they had heard a serious accident had
taken place. Consequently, almost half of the sample interpreted
the situation to be quite serious.






Total 100,0  (N=658)
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When a situation is insecure or information delivery is un-
clear, there is more room for own interpretations of the situation.
In most insecure situations people have been found to interpret
the situation as undangerous. The result found here, however,
confirms the conclusion made by Nigg (1987) that in the face of a
nuclear power plant accident the insecurity of the situation leads
people to interpret the situation as more dangerous than it objec-
tively is.
A comparison of the sample towns shows (Table 8) that in
Helsinki and Kotka, located psychologically closer to the Sos-
novyi Bor power plant, the proportion of those who reported
hearing of an accident was significantly higher than in the towns
located farther away from the power plant. It is not probable that
these towns really had delivered different information, but the
result can be explained by the different interpretations made by
respondents. In Helsinki and Kotka the respondents reported
greater fear of Russian nuclear power plants. The level of fear
provided the basis for respondents interpretation of the situa-
tion. Half of the sample is afraid of the risk caused to them by the
Russian nuclear power plants, but in Helsinki and Kotka one third
of the respondents is very afraid of it. This result confirms the
earlier results showing that the same message can be interpreted
in different ways by different groups (Nigg, 1987; Perry, 1985).
Even though the risk of radioactivity in a certain place is depend-
ent on the weather conditions, people seem to experience the risk
related to geographic distance.
Table 8. Interpretation of the situation in sample towns, %.
Interpretation Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus
Incident 26,5 27,8 37,4 35,0
Serious incident 12,4 13,6 14,7 17,8
Accident 37,6 32,1 31,9 30,1
Threatening accident 11,8 9,9 12,3 12,9
Serious accident 11,8 16,7 3,7 4,3
Total 100 100 100 100
N 170 162 163 163
χ2 =29.55; df=12,658; p <.01
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The respondents interpretation of the situation, as an incident
or an accident, was related to the first source of information: those
who had heard of it from a friend or co-worker found the situa-
tion more serious than those who first heard of it from the mass
media. (Table 9.) Social interaction, interaction with significant
others, has been found to be an important process in the confir-
mation of a warning. According to Nigg (ibid.) mass media de-
liver facts, but only social interaction  transforms the facts to an
evaluation of the seriousness of the situation and of the necessity
of protective measures. It seems that when there is no real dan-
ger of radioactivity, social interaction enhances believing in dan-
ger.
Table 9. Interpretation of the situation according to the source and time of
information, %.
When heard of the incident
Morning Afternoon
     Source of information
Interpretation Social Mass Social Mass
network media network media
Incident 7,5 39,0 15,9 36,4
Serious incident 4,5 19,5 9,8 21,2
Accident 58,2 24,7 47,6 26,3
Threatening accident 13,4 9,1 14,6 11,1
Serious accident 16,4 7,8 12,2 5,1
Total % 100 100 100 100
N (424) 67 77 82 198
           χ2 =33,94; df=4,424; p <.001          χ2 =25,12; df=4,424; p <.001
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Respondents in Helsinki and Kotka had significantly more
often heard of the incident from their social network and also
earlier than respondents in other towns. They were more often
at their workplace when hearing of the incident, which also was
related to interpreting the incident as more serious than it objec-
tively was. (Table 10.)
More respondents of those who heard of the incident in the
morning than of those who heard of it later had interpreted the
situation to be an incident. However, the difference is not signif-
icant. Those who heard of the incident in the morning learned
more often than others about it from their social network
(χ2 =27,58; df=1,648; p <.001).
Table 10. Interpretation of the situation/where subject was when heard of
the incident, %.
Interpretation At home At On the way At school Other
workplace
Incident 38,4 22,6 25,9 20,5 25,9
Serious incident 16,1 12,3 40,7 2,6 3,7
Accident 27,0 40,0 14,8 64,1 37,0
Threatening 10,1 13,8 18,5 2,6 25,9
accident
Serious accident 8,4 11,3 - 10,2 7,4
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
N 367 195 27 39 27
χ2 =67.49; df= 16,655, p <.001
After controlling for other variables the significant difference
in interpretation of the situation between sample towns remained
only in the group who heard of the incident in the morning. This
means that only those who heard of the incident in the morning
interpreted the situation to be more serious the closer to the power
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plant they were (χ2 =25.66; df=12, 144; p <.01; see Table 11). On
subjects who heard of the incident later, the distance from the
power plant did not have an effect. Mack and Baker (1961) found
that people took more seriously an alarm sent out late at night
than an alarm sent out in morning or afternoon. They expected
the reason to be, at least partly, that alarms are usually tested in
daytime and the exceptional timing of alarm scared people. In
this study those subjects who heard of the incident in the morn-
ing were the ones who evaluated the situation as most serious.
An explanation for this may be that the incident happened at
night time and so the situation in the morning was much more
insecure and unclear than it was in the afternoon. In the after-
noon it was already known that the situation caused no harm to
environment.
It seems that in this data two factors are significantly related
to the interpretation of the situation: the source of information
and subject’s home town. Among those who heard of the inci-
dent in the morning interpretation of the situation varied accord-
ing to the hypothesis: subjects in Kotka, living closest to Sosnovyi
Bor, interpreted the situation to be most serious, next were sub-
jects living in Helsinki and Hämeenlinna; of subjects living in
Varkaus over 50 % interpreted the situation to be a nondanger-
ous incident.
Table 11. Interpretation of situation among those who heard of it in
the morning in sample towns, %.
Interpretation Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus
Incident or 25,9 37,5 33,3 85,7
serious incident
Accident 44,8 35,4 54,2 14,3
Serious accident 29,3 27,1 12,5 -
Total 100 100 100 100
N (144) 58 48 24 14
χ2 =20.89; df=6, 144; p <.01
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Regression models examined the predictive influence of  var-
iables on the interpretation of the situation. Different models
based on theoretical considerations and hypotheses were tested.
In a stepwise multiple regression analysis including all sample
towns the largest significances were found for variables measur-
ing the distance from the power plant and the fear and percep-
tion of risk from Russian nuclear power plants (βDistance from power plant
.153; p <.001; βFear and risk perception .117; p < .01; R2 =.04). However, the
variability explained by this model was quite small. New regres-
sion models were run with data selected from one town at a time.
These analyses showed that in the sample towns, slightly differ-
ent variables predicted the variance of the interpretation of the
situation. In Kotka, located closest to the power plant, 19 % of
variance was explained by two variables: the source of informa-
tion and the fear and perception of risk from Russian nuclear
power plants (βSource of information  .264; p < .001; β Fear and risk perception   -.377;
p < .001; R2 =.19). In Helsinki, also located close to the power
plant, 19 % of variance was explained by source of information,
fear and risk perception, perceived timing of information and
having children (βSource of information  -.285; p <.001; β Fear and risk perception
.175; p < .05; βTiming of information  -.257; p < .01; βChildren  .166; p < .05; R2
=.19). In Hämeenlinna and Varkaus smaller percentages of vari-
ance were explained and by different variables: in Hämeenlinna
negative life events, source of information and perceived risk from
Russian nuclear power plants explained 9 % of variance (βNegative
life events -.171; p < .05; βSource of information   -.175; p < .05; β Risk perception  .200;
p < .01; R2 =.09). In Varkaus, 10 % of variance was explained by
source of information, but negative life events and fear and risk
perception did not reach statistical significance (βSource of information
-.328; p < .001; R2 =.10). Source of information seems to be a gen-
eral factor predicting interpretation of the situation, but fear of
nuclear accidents seems to decrease in importance when getting
further away from the power plant, where the importance of other
negative life events increase their effect on the interpretation in-
stead. Further away from the power plant other factors not ex-
plained by this data, have stronger effect than in towns closer to
the power plant.
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The relationships of psychological factors to interpretation of
situation were also analysed, but no significant relations were
found. Interpretation of situation seems clearly to be connected
to the perceived risk based on geographical distance and the
source of information. Although there may be an irrational ele-
ment in the fear felt for nuclear power, it seems not to have an
effect on the interpretation of the situation.
7.2. First activities after hearing about the incident
Interpreting the situation to be an accident did, however, in most
cases not lead to any activities: 72,5 % of the respondents contin-
ued whatever activity they were involved at the time, 25,2 %
sought more information and 2,4 % took protective measures.
This confirms the conclusion made by Canter (1980) that people
are usually reluctant to interrupt their activities to start protec-
tion, if they are not totally convinced that the danger is real. When
they are insecure about the seriousness of the situation, they try
to confirm the warning they have heard (Perry, 1985; Janis &
Mann, 1977; McLuckie, 1970). The perceived seriousness, how-
ever, was related to what a subject did after hearing about the
incident: subjects that interpreted the incident more serious, also
more often tried to find more information about it (Table 12).
The relationship is not linear, however, so some other, unknown
factors also affect the chosen activities.
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Table 12. What subject did after hearing about the incident/interpretation of
situation, %.
What subject did after hearing about incident
Interpretation of Continued Sought Protective
situation activity information measures
Incident 35,9 20,4 33,3
Serious incident 15,6 10,8 26,7
Accident 30,3 39,5 40,0
Threatening accident 11,1 13,4 -
Serious accident 7,1 15,9 -
Total 100 100 100
N (621) 449 157 15
χ2=28.78; df=7, 621; p <.001
Taking protective measures was not related to what a subject
was doing when he/she heard about the incident. This means
that the second hypothesis was not supported: commitment to
an activity did not decrease willingness to start protective meas-
ures.
To the question where they looked for more information about
the incident,  35 % answered that they sought it from their own
social network, 5 % sought it from authorities and 63 % (N=419)
did not answer the question. It is possible that discussions with
significant others are not considered as information seeking, but
as part of normal social interaction. On the other hand, 49,6 % of
subjects had themselves informed other people about the inci-
dent. Only 2 % of the subjects (5 % of those who answered the
question) had sought more information from authorities. People
seem to trust more their significant others and want to confirm
their knowledge from them rather than from authorities.
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An equal proportion of men and women learned about the
incident at home and at their workplace, there was no difference
between genders. Neither were there differences in interpreta-
tions of the situation between men and women. This is some-
what against expectations as in most studies the result has been
that women evaluate a threat as more serious than men. It can be
concluded that contrary to common beliefs, women do not exag-
gerate threats more than men. In the contrary, it seems that men
in other types of threats belittle the danger. A threat caused by
radioactivity is impossible to control and it is possible that in the
face of other dangers men more than women think that they can
control the danger. Even though there was no gender difference
in interpretation, there was a significant difference in what was
done after hearing of the incident. More men than women con-
tinued what they were doing, women instead tried to get more
information (Table 13).
Table 13. What men and women did after hearing about the incident, %.
Activity chosen Women Men
Continued what was doing 68,4 77,2
Sought information 28,9 20,8
Protective measures 2,7 2,1
Total 100 100
N 339 289
χ2 =5.97; df=2,628; p <.05
Age was related to the evaluated seriousness of the situation:
young persons evaluated the situation to be more serious than
did older persons (Table 14). There was a nonsignificant tenden-
cy of younger subjects to take protective measures more often
than older subjects. (Table 15).
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Table 14. Interpretation of situation by age groups.
Interpretation 15 - 25 26 - 40 41 - 55 56 - 70
of situation
Incident or 31,0 39,4 49,1 61,2
serious incident
Accident 50,3 39,4 25,5 20,7
Serious accident 18,6 21,3 25,5 18,1
Total 100 100 100 100
N 145 160 165 188
χ2 =47,59; df=6, 658; p <.001
Table 15. First activity/interpretation of situation by age-group, %.
           Age groups
Interpretation of 15 - 25 26 - 40 41 -55 56 - 70
situation activity taken activity taken activity taken activity taken
cont info prot cont info prot cont info prot cont info prot
inue rm. ect. inue rm. ect. inue rm. ect. inue rm. ect
Incident 27,6 11,8 33,3 31,4 24,4 16,7 34,0 22,9 33,3 46,4 20,6 66,7
Serious
incident 7,1 5,9 - 12,4 9,8 16,7 19,8 10,4 66,7 20,7 17,6 33,3
Accident 46,9 61,8 66,7 37,1 36,6 66,7 24,5 33,3 - 17,9 29,4 -
Threatening
accident 9,2 2,9 - 12,4 14,6 - 17,0 14,6 - 7,1 20,6 -
Serious
accident 9,2 17,6 - 6,7 14,6 - 4,7 18,8 - 7,9 11,8 -
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 98 34 3 105 41 6 106 48 3 140 34 3
                   χ2 =7,79;       χ2 =6,08; χ2 =17,00; χ2 =13,84;
                        df= 7,666; ns.         df= 7,666; ns. df=7,666; p <.05 df=7,666; p <.08
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Subjects living in Kotka and Helsinki were more often at their
workplace than other subjects when they heard of the incident.
Those who were at the workplace, tried more often to find more
information than those who were at home (χ2 =19.56; df=2,537;
p <.001). The result is different from earlier ones that usually have
shown that when alone, people get more easily upset and also
start protective meausures or information seeking more
easily.(Mack & Baker, 1961).  Here the company of other people
clearly increased the seriousness of the interpretation of the situ-
ation and also need for more information of it. Half of those who
tried to get more information were in the company of co-work-
ers or friends; 81 % of those who were alone continued their on-
going activity (χ2 =29.76; df=4,616; p <.001).
There was a significant difference between the sample towns
in what subjects did after hearing of the incident (χ2 =28.39;
df=6,628; p <.001): subjects in Kotka most often tried to get more
information or took protective measures when subjects in Var-
kaus did it least. This difference between sample towns remains
significant even after controlling the place where subject was
when she/he heard of the incident. First activities after hearing
a warning or information of a nuclear incident is clearly connect-
ed to the geographical distance to the power plant and to the
risk experienced to be connected to it. Considering the very small
real danger caused by this incident at Sosnovyi Bor, quite large a
proportion of those living on the coast started some activities
because of it (Table 16). The percentage of those that took protec-
tive activities is quite high in Hämeenlinna, too, but the reason
for this is not possible to be explained by the data.
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Table 16. First activities after hearing of the incident in sample towns, %.
Activity taken Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus
by subject
Continued 61,8 67,7 73,9 86,5
ongoing
activity
Sought more 35,0 30,3 22,4 12,9
Information
Protective 3,2 1,9 3,7 0,6
activities
Total 100 100 100 100
N (628) 157 155 161 155
χ2 =28.39; df=6,628; p <.001
Almost half of the subjects informed someone else about the
incident. 20 % told about it to a family member, 3 % to a close
relative, 20 % to a friend or co-worker. 5 % of subjects told about
the incident to more than one person.
Some kind of protective activities were taken by less than half
of the subjects: when asked in detail about actions taken, it came
out that listening to radio was the most common action, taken by
38 % of subjects. 6 % of them stayed inside or kept children in-
side because of the feared radioactivity, almost 2 % bought or ate
iodine tablets.
The most important reason for not taking any protective meas-
ures was an assessment of the situation as undangerous or un-
certainty about that. 12 % of subjects waited for more informa-
tion and a few % evaluated that protection was too late. Howev-
er, it is important to remember that e.g. in studies done after the
Three Miles Island nuclear accident showed that uncertainty of
the dangerousness of the situation was given as a reason for tak-
ing protective measures as often as it was for not taking protec-
tive measures (Cutter & Barnes, 1982; Lindell & Perry, 1983.)
Uncertainty as such can lead to opposite interpretations and de-
cisions.
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A new composite variable was created based on interpreta-
tion of situation and activity taken after hearing of the incident.
The variable describes the consistency of interpretation and ac-
tion, the categories being: interpretation as an incident - no in-
formation sought; interpretetation as an accident -  no informa-
tion sought; and interpretation as an accident - information
sought. Those taking protective actions were separated to a group
to be analysed separately.
An ANOVA test showed that there was a significant differ-
ence in consistency depending on what an individual was doing
when hearing of the incident (F=15,81 df=2, 550; p <. 001), but
not in the direction expected on the basis of the second hypothe-
sis: of the inconsistent group those who were not committed in
doing anything special were the largest group. Their lack of in-
formation seeking was not based on the involvement but on some
other factor. In a regression model 26 % of the variance of the
consistency was explained by fear and risk perception from Rus-
sian nuclear power plants, the source of information, having no
evacuation plan and by informing someone else of the incident
(β Fear and risk perception  .234; p < .001; βSource of information  -.352; p < .001;
βNo evacuation plan  -.143; p <. 01; βInformed someone else .196; p <.01; R2 =.26).
Belief that evacuation would be necessary and reliability and clar-
ity of information lost their significance when not having own
evacuation plan was added to the model.
The small group (N=15) that took some protective measures
was analysed separately, but very few significant differences were
found. As a group, they did not differ from other subjects: they
had high self-esteem, they were symptomless on psychological
symptomatology scales; on scales measuring perceptions of in-
formation delivery, they varied evenly. In a regression model,
48 % of variance of protective measures in this group was ex-
plained by the interpretation of the situation (βInterpretation of situation
-.692; p < . 01; R2 =.47), of which in turn 49 % was explained by
negative life events (βNegative life events -.706; p < .01; R2 =.49).
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7.3 Perceptions of  information delivery
One criterion in evaluating information delivery in emergencies
is the correspondence of information to the actual situation; that
is, how good a mirror-image of reality does the information rep-
resent. When trying to reflect a mirror-image of reality one tries
to answer the question “what happened”. In danger, the ques-
tion “what should be done”, is, however, more important. When
an event is reproduced in the mass media, how it is reproduced
becomes most important. Action is possible only when the event
has been symbolically transferred from an uncontrollable situa-
tion to one that is under control. (De Marchi & Ungaro, 1987.)
When mass media want to appear comprehensive or objective,
they will seek controversial information.  Then people get con-
tradictory messages that all can come from a reliable source. The
image of the situation may be incoherent and disordered, and
thus confirm an interpretation of the situation as uncontrolloble.
At such times people can not appraise what has happened and
know what should be done. (Eränen, 1992.)
The subjects followed many news broadcastings and infor-
mation about the situation. Over 50 % of subjects received infor-
mation from radio, television and newspapers. Over one third
followed all news broadcasts. (Tables 17 and 18).
In the oldest age-group 53 % of subjects followed all news
broadcasts, in the other age-groups that amount was lower. The
youngest age-group included the most of those who didn’t fol-
low news broadcasts at all. Other age-groups usually followed
1 - 3 broadcastings a day. (χ2 =99.71;df=9,656; p <.001.)
Fifty percent of those who have only completed primary
school followed all news broadcastings, in other education lev-
els usually 1 - 3 a day were followed (χ2=39.52; df=9,647; p <.001).
There were also differences between professional groups. House-
wives and retired persons followed the most of news broadcast-
ings, next those working in health care and social services. Stu-
dents were the group to follow the least news broadcastings
(χ2=64.61; df=24, 656; p <.001).
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Life event changes were related to news watching: those who
had experienced unemployment, lay-off or worsening of their
economic situation followed news broadcastings more than oth-
ers (lay-off F=3.42; df=3,656; p <.05; unemployment F=3.50;
df=3,656; p <.01 and economic difficulties F=3.84; df=3,656;
p <.01).
In a regression analysis 16 % of the variance in news follow-
ing was explained by source of first information, perception of
timing of information delivery and age (βPerception of timing of information
.113; p < .001; βSource of information  -.120; p < .001; βAge -.298; p < p.001;
R2 =.16).
Of course, some of these differences may only reflect differ-
ences in amount of leisure time: groups of people who spend
more time at home, also spend more time on watching tv or lis-
tening to radio.




Radio + television 17,5
Radio + television + newspapers 52,3
Radio + television + newspapers+ eveningpapers 26,3
Total 100 (N=662)
Table 18. How often did you watch the mass media?
Number of broadcasts %
All broadcastings 31,1
At least three broadcastings a day 19,5
1 - 3 broadcastings a day 44,5
I did not follow news broadscastings 4,9
Total 100 (N=656)
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Subjects who perceived Russian nuclear power plants to be a
serious risk and who were very afraid of consequences of poten-
tial accident, followed more news broadcastings than did those
who found the risk smaller and were less afraid. However, also
those who answered “I don’t know” followed many news broad-
castings. (Tables 19 and 20.)
Table 19. Relationship between perceiving high risk from Russian nuclear
power plants and following news broadcastings.
Number of Perceived Perceived Perceived I don’t know
daily high risk moderate risk small or very
News small risk
broadcastings
All news 34,9 28,1 22,2 44,0
At least 3 21,7 20,9 13,1 14,0
news broadcastings
1 - 3 news 38,8 47,0 59,6 32,0
Not at all 4,7 4,0 5,1 10,0
Total 100 100 100 100
N 258 249 99 50
χ2=23.00: df=9,656; p <.01
Table 20. Relationship between being afraid of consequences of an accident
at Russian nuclear power plants and following news broadcastings.
Number of Very afraid Somewhat Little Not at all I don’t know
daily news afraid afraid afraid
broadcastings
All news daily 39,4 27,7 24,2 25,0 41,2
At least 3 news 22,9 20,6 16,2 12,5 5,9
1 – 3 broadcastings 33,5 48,2 52,5 54,2 41,2
No at all 4,3 3,5 7,1 8,3 11,8
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N 188 311 99 24 34
χ2=28.15; df=12,656; p <.01
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There was a significant difference in perceptions of official
information delivery between sample towns: subjects in Kotka
were more critical of authorities than other subjects; they were
most likely to view the officials as too late in releasing adequate
information. The other sample towns had levels of criticism sim-
ilar to each other (χ2=28.15: df=12,656; p <.001) (Fig.3). The same
view was expressed about the mass media (χ2=11.51; df=3,646;
p <.01) (Fig. 4). This presumably reflects the short distance be-
tween Kotka and Sosnovyi Bor, and also earlier information to
these citizens regarding correct behavior in case of radiation ex-
posure that probably pre-conditioned the residents for greater
awareness of the threat. Also, the fire chief in Kotka publicly crit-





















Figure 3. Opinion on timing of official information in sample towns.
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Figure 4. Opinion on timing of mass media information in sample towns.
Table 21. What was the timing of information like?
Timing was Official information Media information
Too late 57,4 44,2
Early enough 42,5 55,0
Too early 0,2 0,8
Total 100 (N=650) 100 (N=651)
Perception of information delivery was critical: over 50 % of sub-
jects believed information delivered by officials to have been too
late. The doubt, that officials would belittle the seriousness of
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Table 22. How was the incident described?




Total 100 (N=652) 199 (N=641)
The amount of information given was not perceived to be
enough. Dissatisfaction was partly directed toward mass media,
but clearly more towards the authorities. Examining subjects’
perceptions of information clarity, we see that a majority of them
considered the information delivery to be contradictory. It is pos-
sible that dissatisfaction in the amount of information partly re-
flects dissatisfaction in its clarity: it is difficult to create a clear
image of a sitution based on unclear information. More informa-
tion is asked to relieve this problem. In reality, the amount of
information does not guarantee its clarity, on the contrary too
much information may make decision making even more diffi-
cult. (Eränen, 1992.)
Table 23. Were you satisfied with the amount of information?
The amount of information Official information Media information
Too much 0,8 6,0
Right amount 53,5 67,2
Too little 45,7 26,7
Total 100 (N=654) 100 (N=647)
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Table 24. Was the information clear and understandable?
Level of clarity Official information Media information
Very clear 2,2 1,5
Clear 24,9 29,6
Quite clear 32,2 35,9
Contradictory 40,8 32,9
Total 100 (N=650) 100 (N=659)
Differences between sample towns in level of reliance on au-
thorities were small (χ2=23.77; df=12,655: p <.05). The majority
of subjects partly relies on officials and mass media; only a small
minority does not rely on them at all or only very little. Although
social interaction has important role in interpreting a situation
and confirming a warning, however, as a source of facts and in-
formation about the incident mass media and authorities are more
reliable. (Tables 25 and 26.)
Table 25. Did you rely on information about the incident?
Level of reliance Official information, % Media information, %
Totally 11,3 8,5
Almost totally 34,4 6,4
Partly 43,4 47,3
Little 7,5 6,5
Not at all 3,5 1,2
Total 100 (N=655) 100 (N=659)
108







Most satisfied with the amount of instructions given by au-
thorities were subjects in Kotka and Varkaus. The most signifi-
cant difference emerged, however, in the amount of insecure an-
swers: subjects in Kotka had a clear opinion on this issue,  more
subjects in the other towns were unsure if there were too few
instructions or enough of them. The increased information de-
livery in Kotka is clearly visible in the results, they had instruc-
tions for radioactivity delivered to their homes. Satisfaction with
instructions by subjects in Varkaus is partly explained by the fact
that a larger proportion of subjects in Varkaus interpreted the
situation as undangerous and did not expect to get any instruc-
tions. The large amount of insecure answers, however, shows that
subjects in Varkaus do not really know what kind of instructions
to expect.
Table 27. Satisfaction with official instructions in sample towns, %.
Amount of Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus Total
instructions
Enough 29,8 18,2 20,6 28,8 24,3
Too little 47,8 47,9 40,6 40,5 44,2
I don’t know 22,4 33,9 38,8 30,7 31,4
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N 161 165 160 163 649
χ2=16.07; df=6,649; p <.05
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Question “on what kind of nuclear incidents should popula-
tion be informed”  received clear answer. About half of the sub-
jects perceive that also officials should deliver information on
even small incidents.  For authorities the situation is problemat-
ic: if information on small incidents is not delivered, it may in-
crease distrust on authorities. On the other hand, it may be diffi-
cult to make a clear distinction between small incidents and real
accidents that demand protection. This distinction is very im-
portant to make in information delivery, though it does not guar-
antee a correct interpretation of the situation.
Women said significantly more often than men that informa-
tion on even small incidents should be delivered. Men expect
information delivery only on serious incident or on an accident
(χ2=20.69; df=3,660; p <.001).
Table 28.  On what kind of situations should population be informed on?
Level of threat Authorities should inform Mass media should inform
Small incident 48,8 52,9
Serious incident 29,5 29,8
Threat of accident 20,3 16,3
Serious accident 1,4 1,1
Total 100 100
N 660 662
It may be a relief to Finnish authorities that most subjects con-
sidered the reason to unsatisfactory information to be circum-
stances in Russia or activities of Russian authorities. Even though
Finnish authorities are not totally trusted, the real reason  for
lack of information is in Russia.
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Variables concerning information delivery were factor ana-
lysed. In Varimax rotation four factors were found (see appendix
2). New composite variables were constructed of these factors.
The first composite variable consists of  variables on reliability
and clarity of  information from authorities and mass media.
Reliability coefficient for this variable was .78. Another compos-
ite variable was made of variables describing the amount and
level of truthfulness of the information from authorities and mass
media. Cronbach alpha for this variable was .74. The third factor
consists of variables describing on what kind of incidents should
population be informed. The reliability coefficient for this varia-
ble was .84. The fourth composite variable describes opinions of
timing of information from authorities and mass media. Cron-
bach alpha for this variable was .76. The factor analysis showed
that subjects did not make a distinction between information
delivery from officials and mass media. Official information is
usually delivered through mass media, so making a distinction
between them may be difficult.
Relations between these composite variables, as well as their
relations to other variables, were analysed by ANOVA.
How often a subject was watching news was related to his/
her evaluation of information delivery. Subjects who followed
all news broadcastings found more often than others both offi-
cial and mass media information too late (F=4.09; df=3, 636;
p <.01) and belittling (F=4.60; df=3, 626; p <.01).
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Table 30. Relation between following news and being afraid of
Russian nuclear power plants.
How often followed news broadcasts? %
How afraid of All Three daily One to Did not follow
nuclear plants three daily
Not at all 2,9 2,3 4,5 6,3
A little 11,8 12,5 17,8 21,9
Somewhat 42,2 50,0 51,4 34,4
Very much 36,3 33,6 21,6 25,0
Does not know 6,9 1,6 4,8 12,5
Total N=656 100 (N=204) 100 (N=128) 100 (N=292) 100 (N=32)
χ2=28.15; df=12, 656; p <.01
Those following news more than others perceived Russian
nuclear power plants to be larger risk (Table 31)  and were more
afraid of the consequences of  a potential nuclear power plant
accident (Table 30). 44 % of  subjects following news more than
three times/a day, found Russian nuclear power plants a serious
risk and 36 % of them was very afraid of consequences of a po-
tential accident. Of  subjects following news less often, 34 % found
Russian plants to be a serious risk and 21 % was very afraid of
the consequences. It seems that watching news often increased
evaluation of  accident risk and  fear for consequences of an acci-
dent. Slovic et al. (1982) have found that topics having a lot of
publicity are evaluated as having greater risk than those having
less media coverage. On the other hand, people who are very
afraid of  consequences of an accident may expect more of infor-
mation delivery than others.
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Table 31. Relation between following news and perception of risk
from Russian  nuclear power plants.
How often followed news broadcasts? %
Risk perceived All Three daily One to Did not follow
three daily
Very small 2,5 1,6 2,7 6,3
Small 8,3 9,6 17,5 9,4
Serious 34,3 40,6 40,1 31,3
Very serious 44,1 43,8 34,2 37,5
Does not know 10,8 5,5 5,5 15,6
Total 100 (N=204) 100 (N=128) 100 (N=292) 100 (N=32)
χ2=25.97; df=12, 656; p <.01
Finding the Russian nuclear power plants a high risk and be-
ing very afraid of the consequences of an accident at the Russian
nuclear power plants were related to dissatisfaction with infor-
mation delivered. Subjects who were dissatisfied with the infor-
mation considered the risk of Russian nuclear power plants higher
and were more afraid of consequences of a nuclear accident than
those who were contented with the information (Tables 47, 48, 49
in appendices).
Those subjects who considered Russian nuclear power plants
a high risk and were very afraid of the consequences of a nuclear
accident, were more uncontented with the information. Subjects,
who are less afraid, trust the authorities more (χ2=47.91; df=12,654;
p <.001). The same is true with the mass media (χ2=28.39; df=12,
658; p <.01). Subjects, who after the incident believed that evacu-
ation might take place, were more uncontented with the timing
of information delivery (t=-2.99; df=641; p<.01).
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In Figure 5 are shown the relations between different factors,
leading to an interpretation of the situation and to fear of nucle-
ar accident. A short distance from the nuclear power plant in-
creased  the level of seriousness interpreted to the situation and
also fear of the consequences of  an accident. Being uncontented
with information delivery was related both to being afraid of the
consequences and to the perception of risk of an accident. Dis-
trust on authorities was related to fear of the consequences of  an
accident, but not to risk perception. Amount of information was
related to uncontentedness with information delivery and risk
perception.
However, amount of information received was related to a
positive evaluation of the amount of instructions given by au-
thorities (χ2=20.13; df=6, 641; p <. 01). Those, whose answer was
‘I don’t know’ when asked for evaluation of instructions, received
less information. It seems, that only with a large amount of in-
formation a subject was able to really perceive the instructions















Figure 5. Nuclear accident risk perception and fear of an accidents
consequences.
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should be increased. De Marchi’s and Ungaro’s (1987) conclu-
sion, that answer to the question ‘what should be done’ is equal-
ly important in information delivery than answer to the ques-
tion ‘what has happened’, is supported by this result.
Finding the information delivered contradictory, was not re-
lated to the amount of information. The amount of information
was not related to the level of trust felt on authorities or mass
media. Thus it seems that an evaluation of the clarity and relia-
bility of information is made already on the basis of smaller
amount of information.
Of the demographic variables age, gender and having chil-
dren were related to the perception of information: however, each
variable to different aspects of information delivery.
The oldest age-group was more often  satisfied with the tim-
ing of information, when the middle-aged group was more often
dissatisfied with it (χ2=13.70; df=6, 644; p < .05). The satisfaction
with timing of information was not related to the time when the
subject first heard of the incident.
Women more often than men found the information to be be-
littling and to have too little of it. Men were more happy than
women and also more often found the information to be exag-
gerating or to have too much of it (χ2=10.65; df=2, 633; p < .01).
Those subjects who have children were more dissatisfied with
the clarity of information than subjects not having children
(χ2=9.64; df=2, 579; p < .01).
Psychological variables were related to the perception of in-
formation delivery. Being satisfied with the clarity and reliabili-
ty of information was related to the lack of anxiety and to a strong
sense of coherence (Table 47, see appendix). The subjects who
were satisfied with the amount, quality and timing of informa-
tion, used less psychological coping strategies (Tables 48 and 49,
appendix). Even though subjects who were dissatisfied with the
information used more psychological coping strategies, the strat-
egies seemed to be unsatisfactory, as they found the Russian nu-
clear power plants to be a greater risk and were more afraid of
the consequences of an accident than those who were satisfied
with the information.
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Looking closer at the dissatisfaction with different aspects of
information, it can be seen that the dissatisfaction is a continu-
um, where dissatisfaction with timing and amount of informa-
tion is related to factors of the situation, but dissatisfaction with
reliability is related to psychological factors (figure 6). It can be
concluded, that psychologically the reliability of information is
more important than the amount or timing of information, and it
is also the area that is more difficult to affect.
Figure 6. Factors related to dissatisfaction with information delivery.
7.4 Evacuation in connection of the incident
Twelve percent of all respondents thought at some point during
the Sosnovyi Bor incident that it  might be necessary for them to
evacuate. This shows that, even though the majority did not think
this way, a relatively large subgroup found the sitution really
worrying. 11,8 % of respondents had an own evacuation plan in
case evacuation would take place. In addition, 8,2 % of those who
did not have an evacuation plan, made one after the incident. At
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the time of the survey, 20 % of the respondents had an own evac-
uation plan.
The respondents were asked where they would have gone in
case of evacuation. Answers to open-ended question were later
categorised. 3 % of the respondents answered that they would
have stayed at home even in case of a general evacuation order.
The amount of uncertain subjects was high, as well as the amount
of those whose goal was just to leave the area of danger without
any definite goal. To an agreed meeting center or following au-
thorities’ instructions would go only 16,5 % of  the respondents,
which in a real danger is such a small amount of the population,
that the situation would be out of control if the group uncertain
would not decide to follow instructions. Those subjects who had
an own evacuation plan, knew better where to go in case of evac-
uation (χ2=18.10; df=1, 605; p < .001).
Table 32. The goal of evacuation in sample towns, %.
Goal Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus Total %
Don’t know 14,2 21,7 17,9 27,5 20,3
Gathering 34,2 7,2 11,3 12,8 16,5
Cent./follow
instruct.
Shelter/own 15,5 22,4 35,1 18,1 22,7
Shelter
Relatives/ 16,1 28,3 15,9 10,1 17,6
Summer
cottage
Out of 18,1 16,4 16,6 24,8 18,9
danger/north
Stay at home 0,6 3,3 2,6 5,4 3,0
Emergency 1,3 0,7 0,7 1,3 1,0
Professional
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N 155 152 151 149 607
χ2=88.89; df=18, 607; p < .001
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There were significant differences in choices of goal in case of
evacuation: most respondents in Helsinki would go to their sum-
mer cottage, to relatives or some other definite place. Most re-
spondents in Hämeenlinna would go to a shelter or to own cel-
lar. Respondents in Kotka, however, would follow authorities’
instructions, which in this case reflects the clear instructions giv-
en to them by local authorities. In Varkaus, the amount of those
who didn’t know or who would just try to escape, was largest.
Partly these differences are understandable on the basis of the
concrete situation: respondents in Helsinki have relatives or sum-
mer cottages in north, as the inhabitants from inner land already
live in the area where most summer cottages are located. For them,
going to summer cottage, would not mean more safety, as it would
for respondents in Helsinki. Delivery of detailed, concrete instruc-
tions in Kotka is easy to perceive in the data: respondents in Ko-
tka have much clearer image of what they should do in case of
threat of radioactivity.
There were differences between sample towns in perception
of evacuation: in Kotka, located closest to the nuclear power plant,
respondents believed more often that evacuation might have been
necessary for them. In Helsinki the amount of those believing so
was smaller, but still larger than in the other two towns (Table
33).
Table 33. Belief in the possibility of evacuation in sample towns, %.
Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus Total %
Evacuation 23,1 12,2 7,2 6,1 12,2
possible
Evacuation 76,9 87,8 92,8 93,9 87,8
not possible
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N 169 164 166 165 664
χ2=28.30; df=3, 664; p <. 001
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Those who believed in the possibility of evacuation and those
who did not believe, were compared to each other (Table 34).
Those who believed in the possibility of evacuation sought more
information, followed more news broadcasts, found the infor-
mation delivery too late, and believed that there were too few
instructions for radiation protection. However, there was no dif-
ference between these two groups on whether they found the
information true or belittling.
Those who believed in the possibility of evacuation had an
own evacuation plan more often, and if they did not have one,
they made it in connection of the Sosnovyi Bor incident. Those,
who now have made an evacuation plan, know where they would
have gone in case of evacuation (χ2=14.20; df=1, 553; p < .001).
90 % of those who believed in the evacuation were still wor-
ried about the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear accident,
of the other respondents 77 % were still worried. They more of-
ten found the Russian nuclear power plants to be a serious risk
and were more afraid of the danger these plants caused to them-
selves. Of those who believed in the possibility of evacuation,
one fourth did not know what to do in a real situation, but half of
those who did not believe in the evacuation, did not know that.
More respondents of those who believed in the evacuation had a
first-aid training.
As a total, those who believed evacuation might have been
possible during the Sosnovyi Bor incident, found the risk of nu-
clear power plant accident more serious, tried to get more infor-
mation about it and were more prepared for it than other respond-
ents.
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Table 34. A comparison between those who believed in the evacuation and
 those who did not.
Evacuation Evac.not χ2 df p <
possible, % possible, %
Continued 46,6 75,9 28.18 2, 626 .001
on-going activity
Followed all news 45,7 29,1 16.59 3, 655 .001
broadcasts
Had own plan 34,6 8,6 46.10 1, 663 .001
Made now a plan 23,7 6,5 20.88 1, 609 .001
Found information late 58,2 38,8 10.79 2, 643 .01
Too little instructions 61,7 41,8 12.68 2, 648 .01
Worried about 90,1 77,5 6.80 1, 660 .01
Chernobyl
Found nuclear 59,3 36,6 15.88 4, 663 .01
power a serious risk
Afraid of power plants 53,1 25,4 26.94 4, 663 .001
Doesn’t know what to do 27,0 46,8 10.31 1, 619 .01
First-aid trained 63,3 41,3 13.68 1, 658 .001
The choice of means of traveling seemed to be clear for most:
they would go by own car, only those living in Helsinki would
also use public transportation in greater amount. There were
many missing answers to this question (17 %), but it is self-
evindent that most people would choose to go by their own car.
Only those who would go to a gathering center or a nearby shel-
ter would walk.
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Table 35. By what means would you have evacuated?
Vehicle chosen %






The company chosen for evacuation reflects the demograph-
ics of the sample towns: most respondents would evacuate with
their family (75,2 %). There are more of those who would evacu-
ate alone or with friends in Helsinki (χ2=20.80; df=9, 552;
p <. 05). Single persons would evacuate with friends, divorced
persons alone.  In 1992, 44,7 % of families in Helsinki were per-
sons living alone, when the average in whole Finland was 32,5 %
(Helsinki statistical yearbook 1992).
Slightly more than a third of respondents (40,4 %) would have
taken with them only personal necessities, but 31 % would also
have taken food and drinks and an extra 15 % also a radio,
iodine tablets and valuables.
If an evacuation order would have been issued during the
working hours and there would have been only one hour to pre-
pare, over half (54,2 %) of the respondents would have gone home
and tried to gather the whole family before leaving. Only 7,8 %
would have left immediately: however, this was not related to
marital status. In thinking of practical instructions this is very
important: the authorities should remember to give time for fam-
ilies to gather before evacuation. Pets are considered to be family
members and that should be taken into account also in plans.
Especially nowadays, when animal rights and animal protection
are hot issues, it sounds impossible to expect families to leave
their pets behind without care.
Differences between sample towns in case of own evacuation
plan, form a pattern similar to the case of belief in the possibility
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of own evacuation. In Kotka, 24,6 % had an own evacuation plan;
some respondents in Helsinki (12,9 %) and Hämeenlinna
(16,4 %) had a plan, too, when in Varkaus 90 % of respondents
had no plan (χ2=13.35; df=3, 598; p < .01).
There was no difference between men and women in the
amount of own evacuation plans, however, there was a differ-
ence between age groups. Older people more often than young-
er (χ2=9.18; df=3, 598; p <. 05) had an evacuation plan, of those
over 56 years, 20,3 % had an own plan. There was no difference
between those having and not having children.
Those having and not having an evacuation plan were com-
pared to each other. After controlling for age, the only psycho-
logical variable remaining significant, was problem-focused cop-
ing. Those respondents who had an evacuation plan used more
problem-focused coping than did those not having a plan
(χ2=4.93; df= 1, 493; p <. 05). This relation was significant only in
Kotka and Helsinki, in the other towns the difference was in a
non-significant level.
Having an evacuation plan was not related to perception of
information delivery, risk or fear of nuclear power plant acci-
dents or social status. Those who had an evacuation plan found
emergency preparedness important and less seldom replied ‘I
don’t know’ than those who did not have a plan  (χ2=18.56; df=3,
579; p < .001). They believed more than others that protection
would decrease harmful consequences of an accident (χ2=9.78;
df=4, 597; p < .05) and they felt they had received enough infor-
mation on disasters (χ2=11.50; df=1, 558; p < .001). Those having
a plan knew what they would do in case of a disaster (78 % vs.
47 %, χ2=27.76; df=1, 564; p < .001) and they knew where the
closest shelter is (90 % vs. 57 %, χ2=37.10; df=1, 595; p < .001).
Problem-focused coping seemed to be the only  psychologi-
cal variable to explain having an evacuation plan. Those indi-
viduals who usually pursue problem solving, have made an evac-
uation plan. They have a positive attitude towards emergency
planning and they trust that protection decreases negative con-
sequences of an accident. Those having a plan have received in-
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formation on disasters and they know the location of nearest shel-
ter. It can be concluded that delivery of information and instruc-
tions based on local situation that was done in Kotka clearly in-
creased reasonable preparedness for disasters. This information
delivery does not show in increased anxiety or fear, but it serves
rational preparedness, which is best to be seen in individuals who
usually have problem-focused coping strategies.
7.5 The Chernobyl accident, perceived risk and fear of Russian
nuclear power plants
16 % of respondents could not remember what the information
delivery was like after the Chernobyl accident. One quarter of
respondents thought that information delivery was as it should
be and 65 % found it too little. 76,3 % of subjects found the infor-
mation delivery too late, only 6,6 % thought it happened in time,
15 % cannot remember. Most critical in this respect were again
subjects living in Kotka, 66 % of them said the information was
too late.
Information delivered after the Chernobyl accident was found
contradictory or confusing by 77 %, it was found clear by 9 % of
respondents. 17 % said that they trusted totally or almost totally
the information delivered then, it was partly trusted by 50 % and
only little or not at all trusted by 27 %. 24 % thought there was
enough of instructions for protection, it was too little said 55 %
and the rest cannot remember. 58 % thought the instructions were
given too late, 10 % thought the timing was good, the rest cannot
remember. Guilty for poor information delivery was found the
Soviet Union authorities (37 %) or both Soviet Union and Finn-
ish authorities (40 %). 42 % of respondents took some protective
measures after the Chernobyl accident, 53 % did not protect at
all. 79 % of respondents were still worried because of the Cher-
nobyl accident.
Those respondents who are still worried about the Chernob-
yl accident, find the risk of Russian nuclear power plants higher
than those who are not worried (χ2=26.30; df=4, 660; p < .001).
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Among those who are not worried because of the Chernobyl ac-
cident, are more respondents who are only little afraid of Rus-
sian nuclear power plants (χ2=48.75; df=4, 660; p < .001). The re-
spondents who protected after the Chernobyl accident, are still
more worried than those who did not (χ2=8.05; df=2, 651;
p < .05).
Almost half of the respondents were somewhat afraid of the
danger caused to themselves by the Russian nuclear power plant
accidents. However, one third of respondents living in Kotka and
Helsinki were very much afraid of it. (Tables 36 and 37.)
Table 36. Perception of risk from Russian nuclear power plants in sample
towns, %.
Perceived risk Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus Total
Serious 50,9 41,5 37,3 27,3 39,3
Quite serious 38,5 38,4 34,3 41,2 38,1
Small 7,1 12,8 16,9 13,3 12,5
Very small - 3,0 3,0 4,2 2,6
I don’t know 3,6 4,3 8,4 13,9 7,5
Total 100 100 100 100 100
N 169 164 166 165 664
χ2=41.31; df=12, 664; p <. 001
Risk perception and fear were related to age: subjects in age
group 26 - 55 found nuclear power plants more often to be a risk
than did younger or older subjects. The amount of those finding
them risky was greatest in the age group 41 - 55 years and small-
est in the age group 15 - 26 years (χ2=35.42; df=12, 664; p < .001).
The evaluations that young persons would be more worried be-
cause of nuclear power than older people is not supported by
this result. The oldest age group was more afraid of the conse-
quences of an accident than younger subjects; the trend was in-
creasing from youngest to oldest age group (χ2=31.79; df=12, 664;
p < .01). The result is interesting compared to the interpretation
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of the situation: young subjects interpreted the situation to be an
accident more often than older subjects. It seems that older peo-
ple make a clearer distinction between a small incident and a
serious accident than young persons.
Table 37. Are you afraid of the danger caused to yourself by accidents
possibly happening in Russian nuclear power plants?
Level of fear Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus Total
Not at all 1,8 2,0 6,0 4,8 3,8
A little 11,8 15,2 15,7 18,2 15,2
Somewhat 47,9 46,3 48,8 45,5 47,1
Much 36,7 32,3 22,9 23,0 28,8
I don’t know 1,8 3,7 6,6 8,5 5,1
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
N 169 164 166 165 664
χ2 =24.84; df=12, 664; p < .05
Although 70 % of all respondents think that they have received
too little information on disasters and 23 % think that they have
had it enough, the difference between Kotka and other towns is
again significant. In Kotka, information delivery on disasters has
been enhanced and 40 % of respondents in Kotka think that they
have received enough information (Table 38). Contentedness with
information on disasters increased with age, the oldest age group
found most often that they had received enough of information
(χ2=21.70; df=6, 660; p < .01).
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Table 38. Have you received enough of information to be prepared for
disasters?
Amount of Kotka Helsinki Hämeenlinna Varkaus Total
information
Too little 57,4 79,3 72,3 72,6 70,3
Enough 38,5 15,2 21,1 17,7 23,2
Too much - - 0,6 1,2 0,5
I don’t know 4,1 5,5 6,0 8,5 6,0
Total % 100 100 100 100 100
N 169 164 166 164 663
χ2 =36.49; df=9, 663; p < .001
Almost one quarter of respondents in Kotka believed, that
preparedness for disasters in their community has been satisfac-
tory. In other towns almost 80 % of  respondents thought that it
should be increased. In Helsinki and Hämeenlinna almost half
of the respondents did not know where to find more informa-
tion on disasters when needed, in Varkaus and in Kotka the
amount of  those not knowing is much smaller. In Kotka 70 % of
respondents trusted the local authorities, more than in other
towns, where information was sought also from other sources.
Young subjects were less sure of the importance of emergency
planning in their town than were older subjects (χ2 =34.74; df=9,
664; p < .001).
In Kotka the amount of those who do not know what to do in
case of a disaster is much smaller (35 %) than in other towns. In
Helsinki and Hämeenlinna the proportion of ignorant subjects is
45 %, in Varkaus it is 53 % (χ2 =19.82; df=9, 620; p < .05). Although
29 % of the respondents would follow instructions given by au-
thorities, that is, stay inside and listen to the radio for instruc-
tions, a remarkable proportion, 16 % of respondents, would im-
mediately go to a shelter and a few percent of them would even
take iodine tablets. In Hämeenlinna and Kotka three quarters of
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respondents know the location of nearest shelter, in Helsinki and
Varkaus only half of respondents know it.
There is a significant difference also in what kind of risks are
found dangerous in the sample towns. In Helsinki and Hämeen-
linna one fifth of the respondents did not know any local threats.
In Helsinki and Kotka nuclear power was found threatening in
greater respect than in other towns, where subjects were more
afraid of local risks (χ2=20.84: df=18, 549; p < .001).
7.6 Stress symptoms
General Health Questionnaire 28 measuring general psycholog-
ical well-being and anxiety and somatization sub-scales of the
SCL-90R all have cutpoints that were used here, too. The level of
stress symptoms in the total data was quite low. On all used scales
70 - 80 % of respondents had values in the range of normal lev-
els. The stress symptoms found were not related to the interpre-
tation of the situation or perception of information delivery. Some
of the respondents had interpreted the situation to be an acci-
dent, but it seems that still the situation was not experienced so
threatful that it would have caused stress symptoms.
The Whiteley-index measuring hypochondriasis has not been
given any cutpoints and in this study the variable has been devi-
ded into three categories on the basis of the variation of the data.
Being worried about one’s health seems to be related to the wor-
ry felt for the consequences of a nuclear accident. The highest
levels of hypochondriasis in this data were found from the re-
spondents who are very afraid of the Russian nuclear power
plants (χ2=3.49; df=4, 653; p <. 01). The subjects who are still
worried because of the Chernobyl accident have higher levels of
hypochondriasis than those who are not worried of it (t=2.46;
df=647; p < .05).
The respondents who do not have a first-aid training are more
anxious (t=-2.17; df=646; p < .05) and have more hypochondria-
sis (t=-1.91; df=646; p < .05) than those who have first-aid train-
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ing. It is possible that first-aid training enhances a person’s sense
of control over own health and thus decreases the amount of
worry felt for it. Those having first-aid training have more prob-
lem-focused and less emotion-focused coping than those who
have not first aid training (t=-3.35; df=564; p < .01 and t=2.80;
df=634; p < .01).
Personal experiences of an accident were quite rare in this
data. 66,3 % had no experience of an accident, 18.8 % had experi-
enced a minor accident, 10,4 % had experienced quite serious
accident and 4,5 % had experienced a serious accident. Personal
experience was not related to any of the factors studied here.
However, stress symptom levels were related to other nega-
tive life events so that the respondents who have had many neg-
ative life events during the last year had higher levels of symp-
toms on all scales used here, than those who had only had a few
negative life events (Table 39).
Table 39. The mean levels of stress symptoms in groups having different
amounts of negative life events.
Symptoms Few neg. Some neg. Many neg. F df p <
measured Life events Life events Life events
GHQ 2.58 3.56 5.62 15.17 2, 567 .001
Somatization 4.77 6.14 8.71 21.12 2, 567 .001
Anxiety 3.90 4.72 7.28 16.47 2, 567 .001
Hypochondria 8.46 9.37 11.42 10.84 2, 567 .001
In this data the stress symptoms seem to be related to other
negative events in the subjects life than the Sosnovyi Bor nuclear
incident, the effect of which is low in this level of study.
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Table 40. Correlation Coefficients of the life event scale and stress symptom
measures.
LIFESC GHQ HSCLAHD HSCLSOM HYPO
LIFESC 1.0000 .1428*** .2129*** .2178***  .1882***
GHQ .1428*** 1.0000 .5289*** .4107***  .3756***
HSCLAHD .2129***  .5289*** 1.0000*** .5839*** .5251***
HSCLSOM .2178***  .4107*** .5839** 1.0000 .5701***
HYPO .1882*** .3756*** .5251*** .5701*** 1.0000
*** p < .001
Stress symptoms are related to low self-esteem, weak sense
of coherence, low self-deception and impression management and
low level of social support (Tables 41 - 46). High self-esteem, good
sense of coherence and social support seem to prevent or buffer
stress symptoms.
The relation of self-deception and impression management
to lack of stress symptoms refer to a tendency to give a good
impression and to belittle own symptoms. Also the significant
relation between self-esteem and self-deception (χ2=28.32; df=2,
650; p < .001) refers to the possibility that the subjects’ self-es-
teem may not be as high as they want to believe themselves. Shel-
ley Taylor e.g. (1989) has concluded that a positively skewed self-
image is typical for “normal” people. Actually only depressed
persons have a totally realistic self-image. Positive illusions pro-
tect a person from uncomfortable realities. Self-deception seems
also to protect from stress symptoms.
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Table 41. Stress symptoms and self-esteem, group means.
Symptoms Low self- Moderate High self- F df p
esteem self-esteem esteem
General 8.59 5.39 2.72 40.86 2,639 .001
psych.health
Somatization 9.95 8.97 5.50 24.69 2,639 .001
Anxiety 10.29 7.23 3.99 41.87 2, 639 .001
Hypochondr. 14.14 11.42 8.78 22.39 2, 639 .001
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Table 42. Stress symptoms and sense of coherence, group means.
Symptoms Weak Moderate Strong
sense of sense of sense of
coherence coherence coherence F df p
General 6.92 2.94 1.94 53.64 2, 634 .001
psych.health
Somatization 9.64 6.06 4.64 41.64 2, 634 .001
Anxiety 8.92 4.21 3.04 62.99 2, 634 .001
Hypochondr. 12.89 8.79 8.20 39.93 2, 634 .001
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Table 43. Stress symptoms and social support, group means.
Symptoms Weak Moderate Strong
social social social
support support support F df p
General 5.15 3.80 2.95 9.44 2, 636 .001
psych.health
Somatization 8.76 6.59 5.25 12.74 2, 636 .001
Anxiety 7.07 5.42 3.85 16.89 2, 636 .001
Hypochondr. 11.21 9.86 8.88 4.25 2, 636 .001

























Table 44. Stress symptoms and impression management, group means.
Symptoms Low impr. Moderate High impr.
mgment impr. mgmt. mgmt. F df  p
General 4.73 4.09 3.11 5.83 2, 636 .01
psych. Health
Somatization 7.17 7.12 6.29 5.60 2, 636 .01
Anxiety 6.42 6.19 3.95 12.89 2, 636 .001
Hypochondr. 10.60 10.05 9.30 8.01 2, 636 .001

























Table 45. Stress symptoms and self-deception, group means.
Symptoms Low self- Moder. self- High self-
deception deception deception F df p
General 5.33 3.70 2.92 11.97 2, 638 .001
psych.health
Somatization 8.35 6.84 5.47 16.33 2, 638 .001
Anxiety 7.45 5.16 3.80 23.16 2, 638 .001
Hypochondr. 10.96 10.39 8.84 9.23 2, 638 .001
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The relations between stress symptoms and other variables
are shown in figures 13, 14, 15 and 16 in the appendices.
The scales measuring psychological symptoms were put into
regression analyses. In a regression model 33 % of the variance
of the somatization scale was explained by life event scale, sense
of coherence, social support, age and general psychological well-
being (βLife event scale . 148; p < .001; β Sense of  Coherence  -.224; p < .001;
βSocial support  -.09; p < .05; βAge .229; p < .001; βGeneral psychological well-being
. 309 p < .001; R2 =.33), self-esteem was not significant in explain-
ing somatization. As physical illnesses were not assessed in this
survey, it is possible that the relation between age and somatic
symptoms is explained by the simple fact that older people usu-
ally have more physical illnesses than younger persons. From
individual factors sense of coherence and general psychological
well-being are to be seen as lower level of somatic symptoms.
From situational or environmental factors, once again negative
life events, but also lack of social support on the other hand in-
crease the amount of somatic complaints.
In a regression model explaining anxiety symptoms,  55 % of
anxiety was explained by negative life events, sense of coher-
ence, social support, age, general psychological well-being and
hypochondriasis (βLife event scale . 055; p < .001; βSense of  Coherence  -.166;
p < .001; βSocial support  -.083; p < .01;  βAge -.072; p < .01; βGeneral psychological
well-being  . 288; p < .001; βHypochondria  .425; p < 001; R2 =.55). In a regres-
sion analysis explaining hypochondria 27 % of variance was ex-
plained by sense of coherence, age and general psychological
well-being (βSense of  Coherence  -.249; p < .001; βAge .223; p <  .001; βGeneral
psychological well-being  . 244; p < .001; R
2 =.33), social support and self-
esteem were not significant in this model. Again, the correlation
of age with worry of health may be explained by the greater inci-
dence of physical illnesses in old age. Still, sense of coherence
and general psychological well-being are individual factors ex-
plaining lower level of  stress symptoms on all scales used in this
survey. Negative life events and social support are related to
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somatic and anxiety symptoms but not to hypochondria. When
explaining  general psychological well-being 15 % of variance
was explained by sense of coherence and self-esteem (βSense of
Coherence  -.264; p < .001; (βSelf-esteem  -.162; p < .001; R2 =.15). Thus sense
of coherence seems to have a direct effect on somatic and anxiety
symptoms, but self-esteem seems to function by supporting gen-
eral psychological well-being that is related to the lack of symp-
toms on other scales used here.
The relations between coping strategies and sense of coher-
ence, self-deception and impression management were studied.
Subjects with strong sense of coherence and self-esteem had less
of emotion-centered coping than did those subjects who had low-
er sense of coherence and self-esteem. The problem-focused cop-
ing strategy was the other way round: those with strong sense of
coherence, self-deception and impression management had also
more of problem-focused coping (Table 46).
In regression analyses the variance of coping strategies was
explained. In a regression model 15 % of the variance of prob-
lem-focused coping was explained by sense of coherence, self-
deception and self-esteem (βSense of  Coherence  -.139; p < .05; βSelf-deception
-.165; p <.01; βSelf-esteem  -.127; p < .05; R2 =.15), impression manage-
ment was non-significant in this model. 9 % of the variance of
the emotion-centered coping was explained by self-deception,
hypochondria and worry for Chernobyl accident (βSelf-deception  -.096;
p < .01; βWorry for Chernobyl  .103; p < .01; βHypochondria  -.157; p < .001),
anxiety and sense of coherence were non-significant in this mod-
el.
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Table 46. The relations between coping strategies, sense of coherence,
self-deception and impression management, group means.
Mode of Weak sense Moderate Strong sense
coping of coher. sense of coh. of coher. F df p
Emotion-foc. 16.78 16.92 18.01 9.46 2, 548 .001
Problem-foc. 11.02 10.17 9.53 11.39 2, 548 .001
Mode of Low self- Moderate High self-
coping deception self-decept. deception F df p
Emotion-foc. 16.88 16.84 17.68 5.06 2, 546 .01
Problem-foc. 11.28 9.69 9.71 18.40 2, 546 .001
Mode of Low Moderate High
coping impression impression impression
management management management F df p
Emotion-foc. 17.28 17.04 17.19 1.72 2, 546 ns.
Problem-foc. 10.93 10.24 9.54 7.75 2, 546 .001
Lower mean=more coping
7.6.1 “Healthy” subjects
The respondents were divided into three groups on the basis of
their health and general well-being: healthy subjects, sick sub-
jects and others. Variables used were General Health Question-
naire, SCL-90R-somatization, SCL-90R-anxiety, hypochondria
and self-esteem. In the group of healthy none of the subjects have
symptoms on any of the four symptom scales and they have high-
est value on the three- class self-esteem variable. In the group of
sick all subjects have symptoms on all symptom scales and they
have low or moderate self-esteem. The group others remain be-
tween these two groups: the respondents have symptoms on some
scale and their self-esteem may be low, moderate or high. The
frequencies of the respondents were following: healthy 146 sub-
jects, sick 49 subjects and others 471 subjects.
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19 % of women belong to the healthy group, 25 % of men are
healthy. Only 13 % of the oldest age group are healthy, in other
age groups the proportion of healthy subjects is 25 % each.
These three groups were compared to each other and an al-
most significant difference was found in the interpretation of the
situation. Healthy subjects had more often interpreted the situa-
tion to be an accident, the group others interpreted the situation
more often to be a threatening accident (χ2=17.01; df=8, 658;
p < .05). More of the healthy subjects (71 %) than of sick (53 %) or
others (68 %) believed that protection can decrease a lot or in
some amount negative consequences of a nuclear accident
(χ2=16.47; df=8, 664; p < .05).
Healthy subjects had smallest number of negative life events,
sick had the highest number of them (F=12.29; df=2, 491;
p < .001). Healthy subjects had the largest amount of social sup-
port, sick subjects had least of it (F=21.78; df=2, 650; p < .001).
Healthy subjects also had highest level of self-deception (F=20.26;
df=2, 652; p < .001) and of impression management (F=9.08;
df=2, 652; p < .001), sick subjects had least of them. This result is
consistent with Shelley Taylors (1989) finding that some amount
of self-deception is typical of healthy people.  Self-deception
seems to protect from stress symptoms. It seems that the general
resistance resources that Antonovsky (1979) describes in his mod-
el of salutogenesis include in this data in addition of more com-
monly known self-esteem, sense of coherence, problem-focused
coping and social support also some amount of self-deception
that helps to maintain positive illusions about oneself and com-




The sample for the empirical study here was collected three
months after the incident at the Sosnovyi Bor nuclear power plant.
The incident was small and caused no danger, but aroused wor-
ry in Finnish people. Because of the clearly non-traumatic quali-
ty of the incident the delay in the data collection can be criti-
sized. It is possible that after three months the subjects did not
have clear memories of their reactions at the time of the incident.
However, this is one of the main problems in disaster studies in
general. A disaster or an accident happens accidentally, with no
warning or a short time of warning giving not enough time for
planning and preparing a study of it in advance.
The return rate in this study was 55 %, of the usual level of
mailed questionnaire studies in Finland. Here, as in other stud-
ies, the return rate makes the researcher wonder if the propor-
tion of non-respondents causes a bias in the results. In the present
sample single and divorced persons were slightly overrepresent-
ed among the non-respondents. No other significant differences
were found between respondents and non-respondents and the
sample as such represents well the Finnish population.
The questions measuring levels of worry and interpretation
of situation were subjective and thus give room for different in-
terpretations of the concepts and terms used. A difference in in-
terpretations of the situation between young and elderly people
may as well be a difference in their use of the terms ”incident”
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and ”accident” as in their different interpretation of the level of
seriousness of the situation. The same criticism can, however,  be
directed to all subjective measures which are the main tools in
social psychological research. The problem of subjectivity is al-
ways present and has to be kept in mind when evaluating the
results.
The differences found in the results between the sample towns
arouses the question of the generalizability of the results in Finn-
ish population. Helsinki is the largest town in Finland and as the
capital may be slightly different from other towns in Finland.
Kotka is a typical small town on the coast the Gulf of Finland. It
is different from other towns in the level of preparedness for ra-
diation accidents.  Subjects in Kotka are probably more aware of
the risks and proper protection in case of a radiation accident.
The risks related to Russian nuclear power plants have however
been under discussion in mass media since the 1990’s.  Hämeen-
linna and Varkaus can be described to be typical Finnish small
towns and while some caution may be in order regarding con-
clusions drawn from results from Helsinki and Kotka, this does
not apply to Hämeenlinna and Varkaus. It can quite safely be
said that the results received from these two towns can be ap-
plied to the rest of Finland. Finland‘s original history and cul-
ture as a neighbour of Russia and Soviet Union makes it unique
among European countries which limits the generalisation of the
results to other countries.
8.1 Interpretation of the situation
When studying the perception and interpretation of the incident
at nuclear power plant in Sosnovyi Bor it has to be done consid-
ering the different factors affecting it. In figure 12 psychosocial
model of processing of traumatic stress developed by Green, Wil-
son and Lindy is modified to better fit this situation.
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Figure 12. The psychosocial model of cognitive processing of a nuclear threat.
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In the case of a nuclear accident where nothing concrete seems
to happen, the importance of psychological and social factors
increases. In 1992 six years had gone from the Chernobyl acci-
dent. During these years Soviet Union had dissolved its exist-
ence. The economic situation in Russia was difficult and there
had been articles and discussions in mass media also on the se-
curity and circumstances of nuclear power plants in Russia.  There
can be said to be an atmosphere of concern about this issue in
Finland.
From the history of nuclear images (see ch. 2) we know that
an image of doomsday has been connected to nuclear energy al-
most since the discovery of radioactivity. The characteristics lay
people use in evaluating riskiness of different activities are such
that nuclear power is located in the high risk end of the continu-
um. It has a great dread element, it includes an opportunity for
catastrophic concequences and the health effects can reach out to
future generations. As nuclear energy is invented and used by
man, it should be controlled by man, too. An accident or an inci-
dent at a nuclear power plant thus means a failure in the system.
(Baum et al., 1991.) The Chernobyl disaster was serious and it is
easily available as an example to come to mind in connection of
problems in nuclear power plants: it may have signal value in
confirming the likelihood of future mishaps. If Finnish people
have a mental model of nuclear accidents it is very probably based
on the Chernobyl accident which is then used as a model with
which to compare future incidents. According to research results
an accident arouses less fear when the agent of the accident is
inside the community (Fitchen, 1987). In this case the agent of
the hazard is outside the Finnish community, geographically not
very far but psychologically and culturally distant. Trust is said
to diminish with increasing distance. The benefits of Russian
nuclear power plants don’t seem to come to Finland and the haz-
ard caused by them is not voluntary for us.
What about trust in authorities? Because of impossibility of
own perceptions people are totally dependent on information
delivered by mass media and authorities. Trust has become a
central issue. According to Giddens the change from modern
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society to risk society means a shift in trust-relations: in risk soci-
ety the matter is trust in expert systems (Beck, Giddens and Lash,
1994). The threat of nuclear accident is a crystallization of risk
society. There exists a worry that maybe the Finnish  authorities
don’t tell us the truth about the seriousness of the situation. Con-
cerning the Russian authorities there is the belief coming from
Soviet times that they do not tell the truth about accidents. As a
last societal characteristic, the distance from Finnish south coast
to Sosnovyi Bor is short.
In considering the research results found here on the inter-
pretation of the situation, the hypothesis of the effect of geograph-
ical distance was confirmed. Respondents from sample towns
located closer to the power plant interpreted the situation to be
more serious than respondents in towns with greater distance.
This confirms earlier results found from TMI accident by several
authors and results from risk perception of dam break in Portu-
gal by Lima (1997). In Lima’s study dam break risk was seen as
more dreadful in areas close to the dam. At the same time in these
areas the risk was seen  as more controllable, however. In both
cases the perceived threat was connected to the geographical dis-
tance from the threat.  Objectively, the risk in nuclear accident is
very much influenced by weather conditions, but subjectively
people perceive the risk according to the geographical distance
that is easier to perceive and understand than varying weather
conditions. The geographical distance is also the only factor pos-
sible to perceive and evaluate by a person himself, maybe giving
a minimal sense of control and predictability that are so impor-
tant for the well-being of a person. According to Lazarus (Monat
and Lazarus, 1991) one part of the primary appraisal process is
the evaluation of  personal relevance of the threat that here seems
to be very much based on the geographical distance from the
power plant.
Another factor significantly affecting the interpretation of the
situation is the source of information. The main sources of infor-
mation in the case of the Sosnovyi Bor nuclear incident were the
mass media on the one hand and the respondent’s own social
network on the other hand. The information received from the
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mass media was ambiguous at least in the morning. Nigg’s (1987)
conclusion is confirmed that in connection of nuclear accidents
an insecure situation will be interpreted as more serious than it
is, in contrary to other kinds of accidents that usually are inter-
preted as less serious than they are. Nigg’s finding on the proc-
ess of  interpreting the situation gets confirmation in this study
as well. The mass media was the information source that was
trusted most, but the interaction with own social network seems
to have had an important part in the process. Nigg concluded
that the mass media provide the facts but social interaction chang-
es them to behavioral alternatives. Here it seems that the mass
media provided the facts but the interpretation of the serious-
ness of the situation was defined in discussions with social net-
work. Social network seemed here to confirm an interpretation
of the situation as more serious compared to an interpretation
made by a person himself. This finding is contrary to earlier re-
search results: in most studies on accidents the result found has
been that when alone a person usually reacts more quickly and
takes the situation to be more serious than in the company of
other people.
In regression models predictive values of different variables
in explaining the variance were studied. They showed that in
sample towns slightly different factors explained the variation
in the interpretation of the situation (i.e. seriousness). In Kotka,
located closest to the power plant, most of the variance explained
by the regression model was explained by source of information
and fear and risk perceived from Russian nuclear power plants
in general. Located in south coast and near the border with Rus-
sia, people in Kotka evaluate their personal  risk from these power
plants as being high. In Helsinki, in addition to the source of
information and perceived risk from the Russian power plants,
also the time when a person received the information and if he/
she had a family, affected the interpretation. It is probable that in
the morning there was more inclarity and ambiguity in the infor-
mation than in the afternoon, when it was more certain that no
radioactive release had taken place. The importance of family
for the interpretation is understandable, there probably is a very
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general schema of  ”family in danger” that dictates the primacy
of one’s family’s security over most other things. In Helsinki the
number of inhabitants with no family is larger than in other parts
of Finland which may explain that the difference between these
groups grew significant. According to schema theory in an am-
biguous situation a person’s needs and expectations determine
which schemas are accessible. Some schemas are more accessible
to particular individuals and for persons with a family the need
for security is probably stronger than for single persons only re-
sponsible for themselves.
In Hämeenlinna and Varkaus, located in inner country and
farther away from the power plant, only 9 % of variance was
explained by the regression model. The source of information
and perception of risk from Russian nuclear power plants were
among variables explaining the interpretation, but in addition of
them a third variable emerged as significant. Other negative life
events explained some of the variation in interpretation of the
situation. A question arises if  several negative life events have
shattered a persons’ feeling of invulnerability thus making them
feel world as an unsafe place and increasing the tendency to in-
terpret future incidents according to this feeling of vulnerabili-
ty? Recent experience affects selection of schema for interpreting
new information and could thus explain this relation.
Maybe most important in these results is what was not found.
Although not a hypothesis in this study, a theme arising under
discussion from time to time is if  it is ”rational” to be afraid of a
nuclear incident like the one in Sosnovyi Bor or if the persons
being afraid of them are hysterical, hypochondriacs or otherwise
anxious persons being worried of almost anything. No signifi-
cant differences were found in the interpretation of the situation
on the basis of any psychological factors. Contrary to commonly
held beliefs it seems that persons who are more worried of these
incidents are not psychologically different from persons being
less worried. The difference in interpretations is based on the
evaluated risk that is based on geographical distance from the
power plant. Discussion with own social network seems to con-
firm the perceived seriousness of the incident and the importance
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of social discussions is greater in towns located closer to the power
plant. It is not the psychological constellation of these people but
the social and psychological situation where they found them-
selves: in a very ambiguous situation receiving contradictory in-
formation and including potentially very threatful consequenc-
es. The rationality of this fear can be discussed but it depends
heavily on the definition of rationality. Classical decision mak-
ing theories are not helpful here as they mainly deal with the
problem of choice between alternative options wheras here the
main problem is if the situation really is dangerous or not. Clas-
sical decision theories could help in a situation where the level
of threat is confirmed, different alternative protective measures
have been listed together with their consequences and the prob-
lem would be to make a rational choice between the known al-
ternatives. In nuclear accidents that kind of situation seldom
emerges: the primary appraisal is always difficult as it was here.
8.2 Coping with the threat
Most respondents in this study did not change their behavior
even when they interpreted the situation to be serious. The per-
ceived seriousness was, however,  related to information seek-
ing. Almost two thirds continued whatever they were doing and
one quarter started to seek more information. A low percentage
initiated protection. The research hypothesis on the role of sche-
matic activity in threatful situation was disconfirmed. Being in-
volved in an activity was not related to lack of protective activi-
ties. However, the question may not be relevant in a situation
that does not demand quick responses like a house fire, for ex-
ample. There was time enough for people to finish whatever they
were doing and still seek information and discuss the situation
with others. This question still needs more research in a relevant
context.
How did the respondents cope with the threat then? The typ-
ical response was seeking more information from own social net-
work. An earlier research result was  disconfirmed: the differ-
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ence between men and women in interpreting the situation. In
house fires women usually interpret first cues of the fire as more
serious than men do e.g. (Canter, 1980). It seems possible that in
connection of ”ordinary” accidents men believe in being able to
control the situation more than women do. In this incident, how-
ever, there were no differences between genders, neither of them
has sense of control over the situation. There was a difference in
behavior, however. Women tried more than men to find more
information on the situation thus showing more worry even
though their definitions of the situation did not differ. In dis-
cussing coping strategies Lazarus (Smith and Lazarus, 1993) has
classified information seeking as problem-focused coping which
seemed to be the most typical response here. Almost half of the
respondents used problem-focused coping at least in a passive
way, by listening to radio. It is difficult to evaluate to what extent
discussion with other people had an element of  emotion-focused
coping by relieving the anxiety possibly caused by the threat.
Almost half of the respondents informed someone else about the
accident and almost half of them took some kind of actions be-
cause of it, six percent kept children inside.
The reasons given for action/non-action showed results sim-
ilar to TMI studies. The most important reason for not protecting
was an evaluation of the situation as not dangerous. Over ten
percent were waiting for more information when few believed
that protection was already too late. This shows again how the
ambiguity and uncertainty of the danger can lead to different
behaviour: it may be reason for acting as well as for not acting.
The main difference was once again found between the sample
towns. According to the hypothesis in the towns located closer
to the plant more respondents started protective activities than
in towns farther away from the plant. Those who started protec-
tive actions were analysed separately but no differences were
found that could explain the difference of their behaviour from
other respondents. An important precondition for action is be-
lief in control and in possibility to affect the threat (De Marchi
and Ungaro, 1987).
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Respondents’ reactions to a possible evacuation were asked.
Over ten percent believed at some point that evacuation might
have been necessary for them during the Sosnovyi Bor incident.
A significant difference was found between sample towns in the
goal of evacuation. In Kotka the proportion of insecure persons
was smallest and the amount of those who would follow author-
ities’ instructions was largest. Those who believed in the possi-
bility of their own evacuation sought more information than oth-
ers and had an own evacuation plan more often. In Varkaus the
percentage of ”don’t know” answers was largest together with
an ambiguous ”towards north”.  Some of the differences are un-
derstandable on the basis of different geographical locations, but
the importance of detailed, concrete instructions in Kotka is easy
to perceive here, too: in Kotka people trust their local authorities
and know what they should do in case of a nuclear accident. For
them a succesful secondary appraisal was possible.
Persons having an evacuation plan were compared to those
who didn’t have one. The only significant difference in psycho-
logical factors found between them was in the amount of prob-
lem-focused coping. It seems that those who were worried of the
incident were usually able to cope with their fear: they had an
evacuation plan and if they did’nt they prepared one after the
Sosnovyi Bor incident. This difference was significant in Kotka
and Helsinki where this issue seemed to be more salient. Per-
sons having an evacuation plan also found emergency prepar-
edness important, believed that protection would decrease the
harmful consequences of disaster and felt that they had enough
information on disasters. According to Horowitz (1997) healing,
working through or functional coping with an event can happen
through introduction of a modulating element into preexisting
internal model. Prince-Embury and Rooney (1995) considered a
cognition of emergency preparedness to be such an element in
connection of TMI accident. It sounds likely that here too, emer-
gency preparedness gives a sense of control assisting in success-
ful coping with the incident.
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A few persons informed that they would have stayed at home
even in case of a general  evacuation order. More important, how-
ever, is the fact that over half of respondents  answered that they
would first go home and gather the family and then leave to-
gether by own car. This is consistent with the assumption of a
”family in danger” schema that would predict that taking care of
own family is the first priority. Etzioni (1992) states that most
choices people make are based on normative affective consider-
ations. Here the principle of exclusion of logical-empirical con-
siderations seems to work: leaving the family is not even consid-
ered because that is morally and emotionally unthinkable.
The use of own car in evacuation probably increases one’s
sense of control and predictability by making possible to decide
the time of leaving and the goal of evacuation in addition to the
company chosen. There are evacuation goals named by authori-
ties for Finns. However, we don’t know if the orders would be
followed or if people would choose to go to relatives or summer
cottages as they did in TMI and as they said they would do in
this study. It seems that mainly young, single persons would use
public transport and shelters provided by authorities.
8.3 Information delivery
A central aspect of  the process of defining the situation in nucle-
ar accidents is information delivery and trust on authorities. Peo-
ple always evaluate both the contents of a message and the source
of a message. If no information is delivered or it is delivered late,
the information sources are still evaluated. If officials are late or
do not give information, this will arouse or strengthen the belief
that they are unreliable. This belief is soon projected to the fu-
ture and to the past, and it becomes difficult to modify. Reliabil-
ity results from former positive experiences. (De Marchi & Un-
garo, 1987.)
Discontent with information found consisted of three distinct
factor dimensions in this data. They were discontent with timing
of information, discontent with the amount or belittling quality
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of information and discontent with clarity and reliability of in-
formation. There was no significant difference between informa-
tion from authorities and from mass media, but these were load-
ed on same factors. Lack of reliability and clarity of information
was connected with stress symptoms, showing that a succesful
primary appraisal is the fundamental question in nuclear acci-
dents. Negative correlation of psychological coping and discon-
tent with timing and amount of information indicates that the
use of psychological coping strategies may help to cope succes-
fully with the delay of information, but not with the unclarity of
information. (Eränen, 1997.)
It seems clear that the delivery of information is crucial to
coping within the context of nuclear power plant accidents. Re-
spondents indicate that they want to have more information on
smaller incidents as well as during major accidents. It is possible
that the reliability of information may be doubted, while at the
same time, there is a desire for more information. This is what
seemed to happen in Russia after the Chernobyl accident (van
den Bout, 1995). What people in fact need, in threatening situa-
tions, is clear, understandable and reliable information. Exces-
sive information does not guarantee a clearer image of the situa-
tion, on the contrary, it may be misleading. The problem may be
to show that the information is, indeed, reliable. (Eränen, 1997.)
Stress symptom levels in the sample were within the normal
range in  70-80 % of respondents on all the scales used in this
study. This shows that even though people may be acutely
stressed in a nuclear incident, it does not have effects lasting over
a month. Elevated stress symptom levels were generally not as-
sociated with factors connected to the incident. However, the sig-
nificant difference in anxiety levels and stress symptoms between
those who were contented vs. discontented with clarity of infor-
mation confirms that an unsuccesful primary appraisal increas-
es stress. The contradictory information was found to be con-
nected with stress symptoms after the TMI accident. After the
TMI nuclear accident stress symptom levels were higher in those
subjects who lived close to the power plant, although the differ-
ence was not statistically significant in the long-term follow-up.
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In the Sosnovyi Bor incident, it was soon confirmed that there
was no real danger, and there was no difference in levels of stress
symptoms between respondents in different sample towns. The
lack of  clear information leading to unsuccesful primary apprais-
al could probably in a real danger cause elevated stress levels
that would last beyond the acute period. (Eränen, 1997.) In fol-
low-up studies of the TMI accident it was found that level of
psychological symptoms decreases sooner than physiological
indicators of stress, like elevated levels of adrenalin and noradren-
alin. As physiological measurements were not used here, we can-
not be sure if there were stress symptoms visible on physiologi-
cal level only.
Being satisfied with instructions that enabled succesful sec-
ondary appraisal had no connection with stress symptom levels
here. Advance information is important and people are more
confident with their authorities because of that, but it is possible
that its helpful effects would only show up when the primary
appraisal  has been succesful, too. (Eränen, 1997.)
8.4 Stress symptoms and resiliency
Stress symptoms in this data were mainly connected to negative
life events. Those who had experienced many negative life events
during the last year had more symptoms on all scales used here.
Several psychological or individual characteristics were con-
nected to stress symptoms. According to Antonovsky, sense of
coherence is developed by life experiences. For a strong sense of
coherence to develop, life experiences must be predictable and
rewarding, yet with some amount of frustration and punishment.
If life experiences shape a person’s sense of coherence, what then
shapes his/her life experiences? Antonovsky states that people
have a tendency to get into life experiences that confirm their
previous level of sense of coherence. As in this data, there is in
life usually variation in the amount of stressful events different
individuals experience. But according to Antonovsky, the expo-
sure to stressors does not vary from very low to very high, but
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rather from fairly serious to unbearable suffering. What is im-
portant, is that people differ in the amount they are able to con-
tain and cope with these stressors and conflicts. Antonovsky calls
general resistance resources those factors that help a person to
find specific resources needed to cope with a stressor or to avoid
a stressor.
Here, we divided the sample into three groups on the basis of
their health and general well-being and studied them separately.
In the group of ”healthy”, subjects have high self-esteem and
strong sense of coherence. They have no symptoms on any of the
scales measuring psychological well-being. They have the larg-
est amount of social support. It seems that they are the group
best prepared for stressful life events and having the best resourc-
es to cope with them. But they also have the smallest amount of
negative life events.
The group of ”sick” subjects here have low self-esteem and
they have a weak sense of coherence. They have only little of
social support, but they have a lot of symptoms on all the scales
on psychological symptoms used here. They have the least of
several kind of psychological and social resources, but they have
the largest amount of negative life events to cope with.
High self-esteem, strong sense of coherence and high level of
social support seem to prevent or buffer stress. These ”healthy”
persons also use more of problem-focused coping that in  most
studies is found to be more effective than emotion-focused cop-
ing strategies. In this data, the stress symptoms found were not
related to the Sosnovyi Bor incident that turned out not to have
caused any threat to health. However, if a more dangerous nu-
clear accident would happen, it is possible that it could generate
anxiety and stress symptoms in the population. There is a small
group that is well prepared, has several psychological and social
resources to cope with the stress. There is a group of ”normal” or
”moderate” persons who have some psychological and social
resources to cope with stressors. This group could increase their
level of preparedness through getting more instructions. They
probably would get benefit from some professional help. Then
there is the small group of ”sick” persons who have very little of
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any social and psychological resources, but have several stres-
sors in their life causing them psychological symptoms. This
group would probably suffer the most of the negative psycho-
logical effects of a nuclear accident, too.
In this study level of depression was not measured, but it has
been found to be related to the amount of self-deception that was
measured here. Low level of self-deception has usually been con-
nected to high level of depression. Taylor (1989) concludes that
some amount of  self-deception, positive illusions, are necessary
for psychological well-being. That was confirmed here, too. Self-
deception can be categorized to belong to the group of psycho-
logical resistance resources. In this data the group healthy used
most of it and the group sick had least of it, too.
It seems that a nuclear incident is to most Finnish people a
threat that is taken seriously, especially when an incident hap-
pens behind the border, in Russia. It raises worry and concern in
most people specially in areas located near the power plants and
many have prepared for a serious accident. Clear and understand-
able information from local authorities helps to prepare for an
accident and increases confidence in the authorities. Use of prob-
lem-focused coping strategies, like having first-aid training and
having an own evacuation plan seems to support and prepare
psychologically for a nuclear accident, too. Information delivery
for nuclear accidents and preparation for them does not arise
anxiety or more fear of accidents. On the contrary, those persons
who are well prepared and have enough of information and in-
structions for a nuclear accident, have less stress symptoms in
spite of their perception of high risk from nuclear power plant
accidents.
Attention should be given to the credibility of authorities. In
a nuclear threat people have to rely on their authorities, because
there is no other choice.
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Appendix 1
THE NUCLEAR ACCIDENT APPRAISAL QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer the following questions by circling the number next to the
most appropriate answer, or by placing your response in the space provided.
For example: gender: female   1 male       2,
If you are a woman circle number 1, if you are a man, circle number 2. If you
make a mistake, cross the mistaken alternative and circle the correct one.
The questionnaire results are absolutely confidential and the information you
provide is recorded only as stastistics. Individuals cannot be recognised from
the information provided.
1. YEAR OF BIRTH __________ 2. GENDER 1 Female 2 Male
3. HOMETOWN  ______________________
4. WHAT IS THE HIGHEST LEVEL OF EDUCATION YOU HAVE COMPLETED:
1 Completed primary school 5 Polytechnic qualification
2 Completed intermediate school 6 Completed occupational courses
3 Partially completed intermediate 7 University qualification
4 Graduated high school
5. WHAT IS YOUR OCCUPATION?
6. WHAT IS YOUR MARITAL STATUS
1 single 2 married 3 de facto relationship 4 divorced 5 widowed
7. WHAT IS THE NUMBER OF CHILDREN IN YOUR FAMILY:
How many? Under 7 ______________ Over  15 ___________
7 - 15   ______________ No children ________
THE INCIDENT AT THE SOSNOVYI BOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
On the 24th May there was an incident at the Sosnovyi Bor nuclear power
plant in Russia near St. Petersburg. As a consequence of the incident radioac-
tive substances were released outside the power plant.
8. WHERE DID YOU FIRST HEAR OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED?
1 from a friend 3 from a relative 5 on the radio 7 in a newspaper
2 from a coworker 4 from a family member 6 on the television
9. WHEN DID YOU FIRST HEAR OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED?
1 on the same day at ______ o’clock
2 on the next day
3 later, about ____________
10. WHERE WERE YOU WHEN YOU FIRST HEARD ABOUT THE INCIDENT AT
THE POWER PLANT?
1 at home 2 at work 3 on the way to work 4 at school
5 somewhere else, where _____________________________
11. IN WHOSE COMPANY WERE YOU WHEN YOU RECEIVED
THE INFORMATION OF THE INCIDENT?
1 alone 4 with a coworker
2 with my family 5 among unknown people (in a bus, in an office etc.)
3 with a friend
12. WHAT WERE YOU DOING WHEN YOU FIRST HEARD OF THE INCIDENT?
1 nothing special 4 talking with a friend
2 doing housework 5 working
3 eating 6 something else, what
13. WHEN YOU HEARD OF AN  INCIDENT FOR THE FIRST TIME, WHAT AND
WHERE DID YOU HEAR  IT HAD HAPPENED?
(you can also circle several alternatives)
Where What
1 it happened in Russia 1 an incident
2 near St. Petersburg has happened 2 a serious incident
3 somewhere has happened, where 3 an accident
_____________________________ 4 a threatening accident
_____________________________ 5 a serious accident
6 something else
14.  WHAT DID YOU DO IMMEDIATELY AFTER HEARING OF THE INCIDENT?
(you can also circle several alternatives)
1 I continued what I was doing 3 I tried to find more  information
2 I informed someone else of what had happened 4 I started protective  activities
15. IF YOU INFORMED SOMEONE ELSE OF THE INCIDENT, WHO WAS THIS?
(you can also circle several alternatives)
1 a family member 2 a relative 3 a friend 4 a coworker
16.  IF YOU TRIED TO FIND MORE INFORMATION  ON THE INCIDENT, WHERE
DID YOU LOOK FOR IT? ( you can also circle several alternatives)
1 a family member 6 I called 911
2 a relative 7 I called a radio station
3 a friend 8 I called authorities for radiation protection
4 coworker 9 I called the fire station
5 I called the police 10 I called the health center
11 something else, what
17. IF YOU STARTED PROTECTIVE ACTIVITIES, WHAT OF THE FOLLOWING
POSSIBILITIES DID YOU APPLY?
1  I stayed inside 4 I went to buy iodine tablets
2 I kept the children inside 5 I took iodine tablets
3 I started to listen to news on the radio 6 I went to a shelter
7 something else, what
18. WHY DID YOU DECIDE TO PRACTICE OR NOT TO PRACTICE PROTECTIVE
ACTIVITIES?
INFORMATION DELIVERY
19. THROUGH WHICH MASS MEDIA DID YOU RECIEVE INFORMATION ON THE
INCIDENT?
1 radio 2 television 3 newspapers 4 afternoonpapers
20. HOW OFTEN DID YOU FOLLOW NEWS RELEASES?
1 I watched all the news on tv
2 I listened to all the news on the radio
3 I watched the news on tv at least three times a day
4 I listened to the news on the radio at least three times a day
5 I followed news 1 -3 times a day
6 I did not follow news
INFORMATION DELIVERY BY AUTHORITIES
21. DID THE AUTHORITIES RELEASE INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENT
1 too late 2 early enough 3 too early
22. IN WHAT WAY DID THE AUTHORITIES DESCRIBE THE INCIDENT IN THEIR
INFORMATION?
1 in an exaggerating way 2 realistically 3 belittling
23. HOW MUCH DID THE AUTHORITIES RELEASE INFORMATION OF
THE INCIDENT?
1 too much 2 in the right amount 3 too little
24. DID YOU TRUST ON THE INFORMATION DELIVERED BY
THE AUTHORITIES?
1 totally 2 almost everything 3 partly 4 little 5 not at all
25. WAS THE INFORMATION RELEASED BY THE AUTHORITIES
1 very clear 3 clear 5 confusing
2 quite clear 4 contradictory 6 too ambiguous
26. DID THE AUTHORITIES GIVE ADVICE FOR PROTECTION AGAINST
RADIATION
1 too much 2 in the right amount 3 too little 4 I don’t know
27. ON WHAT KIND OF THREATS SHOULD THE AUTHORITIES DELIVER
INFORMATION?
1 even on a small incident 3 a threatening accident
2 a serious incident 4 only on a serious accident
INFORMATION DELIVERY FROM MASS MEDIA
28. DID THE MASS MEDIA DELIVER INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENT
1 too late 2 early enough 3 too early
29. WAS THE INFORMATION DELIVERED BY THE MASS MEDIA
1 exaggerating 2 realistic 3 belittling
30. DID THE MASS MEDIA DELIVER INFORMATION ON THE INCIDENT
1 too much 2 in the right amount 3 too little
31. DID YOU TRUST ON THE INFORMATION RELEASED BY THE MASS MEDIA
1 totally 2 almost everything 3 partly 4 little 5 not at all
32. WAS THE INFORMATION RELEASED  BY THE MASS MEDIA
1 very clear 3 clear 5 contradictory
2 quite clear 4 confusing 6 too ambiguous
33. ON WHAT KIND OF THREATS SHOULD THE MASS MEDIA
DELIVER INFORMATION
1 even on a small incident 3 a threatening accident
2 a serious incident 4 only on a serious accident
34. WHICH INFORMATION SOURCE DID YOU TRUST MOST AFTER
THE SOSNOVYI BOR INCIDENT
1 a family member 5 Yleisradio 9 Center for radiation protection
2 a relative 6 another radio channel 10 Ministry of Interior
3 a friend 7 television 11 local authorities
4 a coworker 8 newspapers 12 something else, like
35. IF THE INFORMATION DELIVERY WAS MISSING OR OF POOR QUALITY,
WHO  WAS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS
(you can also circle several alternatives)
1  Center for radiation protection 4 the parliament 7 television
2 Ministry of Interior 5 newspapers 8 Russian authorities
3 the government 6 radio 9 difficult situation in Russia
EVACUATION PLANS
36. DID YOU BELIEVE DURING THE SOSNOVYI BOR INCIDENT THAT IT MIGHT
BE NECESSARY FOR YOU TO EVACUATE?
1 yes 2 no
37. DO YOU HAVE AN EVACUATION PLAN OF YOUR OWN?
1 yes 2 no
38. IF YOU DID NOT HAVE AN EVACUATION PLAN, HAVE YOU MADE ONE
AFTER THE SOSNOVYI BOR INCIDENT?
1 yes 2 no
IF THE SOSNOVYI BOR INCIDENT HAD TURNED OUT TO BE SO SERIOUS THAT
EVACUATION OF YOUR HOMETOWN WOULD HAVE BEEN NECESSARY
39. WHERE WOULD YOU HAVE GONE?
40. BY WHAT VEHICLE WOULD YOU HAVE TRAVELED?
41. WITH WHOM WOULD YOU HAVE TRAVELED?
42. WHAT OBJECTS WOULD YOU HAVE TAKEN WITH YOU?
43. IF AN EVACUATION ORDER WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DURING THE
WORKING HOURS AND WITH E.G. ONE HOUR FOR PREPARATIONS,
WHAT WOULD YOU HAVE DONE
DO YOU REMEMBER CHERNOBYL?
44. A SERIOUS ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT TOOK
PLACE IN 1986. WHEN YOU THINK ABOUT WHAT HAPPENED THEN,
DO YOU THINK THAT THE INFORMATION ON THE ACCIDENT WAS
RELEASED
1 early enough 2 too late 3 I don’t remember
45. HOW MUCH INFORMATION WAS THERE ON THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
1 too much 2 enough 3 too little          4 I don’t remember
46. WAS THE INFORMATION ON THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
1 difficult to understand 2 contradictory 3 clear 4 I don’t remember
47. DID YOU TRUST THE INFORMATION RELEASED THEN
1 totally 2 almost everything 3 partly 4 little 5 not at all
6 I don’t remember
48. WAS THE AMOUNT OF INSTRUCTIONS AND PRACTICAL ADVICE FOR
PROTECTION AGAINST RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES AFTER
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
1 too much 2 in the right amount 3 too little 4 I don’t remember
49. WERE THE INSTRUCTIONS RELEASED
1 too late 2 at the right time 3 too early 4 I don’t remember
50. IF YOU FIND THE INFORMATION AFTER THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT TO
HAVE BEEN INADEQUATE, WAS IT BECAUSE OF
(you can also circle several alternatives)
1 Finnish authorities 3 mass media
2 Russian authorities 4 I don’t know
51. DID YOU START TO TAKE PROTECTIVE ACTIVITIES AFTER
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT?
1 no 4 I avoided using rain water
2 I stayed inside 5 I avoided using mushrooms, berries and vegetables
3 I kept the children inside 6 I avoided eating fish from lakes
7 I don’t remember
52. ARE YOU STILL WORRIED BECAUSE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT
1 to the health of the local people 3 to the environment
2 to the health of other people, too (Finns, e.g) 4 I am not worried
RISKS FROM CONTEMPORARY NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS
AND POSSIBLE PROTECTION
53. DO YOU THINK THAT RUSSIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ARE
       TO YOURSELF AND YOUR CLOSE ONES
1 a serious risk 3 a small risk
2 quite a serious risk 4 a very small risk 5 I don’t know
54. ARE YOU AFRAID OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACCIDENT TAKING PLACE
IN RUSSIAN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ON YOURSELF OR ON YOUR CLOSE
ONES?
1 not at all 2 a little 3 somewhat 4 very much 5 I don’t know
55. DO YOU THINK YOU HAVE HAD INFORMATION AS PREPARATION FOR A
DISASTER
1 in the right amount 2 too little 3 too much 4 I don’t know
56. DO YOU THINK THAT PROTECTION IN CASE OF A NUCLEAR ACCIDENT
WOULD DECREASE THE HARM CAUSED TO YOU?
1 not at all 2 a little 3 somewhat 4 very much 5 I don’t know
57. HOW IMPORTANT IS IT TO BE PREPARED FOR DISASTERS
IN YOUR COMMUNITY?
1 very important 2 important 3 not important 4 I don’t know
58. SHOULD THE DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IN YOUR COMMUNITY
1 be improved 2 stay as it is 3 be decreased 4 I don’t know
59. WHERE DO YOU GET INFORMATION ON  EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
IN CASE YOU NEED IT?
60. DO YOU KNOW WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF AN EMERGENCY?
1 I don’t know 2 yes, I know, to
61. DO YOU KNOW WHAT YOU YOURSELF WOULD DO IN CASE OF
AN EMERGENCY?
1 I don’t know 2 yes, I would
62. DO YOU KNOW WHERE YOUR NEAREST SHELTER IS?
1 yes 2 no
63. WHAT RISKS AND ACCIDENTS DO YOU FIND PROBABLE IN YOUR OWN
COMMUNITY?
64. WHAT OBJECTS/VALUABLES DO YOU THINK SHOULD BE EASILY ACCESSED
IN CASE OF A DISASTER?
65. DO YOU HAVE A PERSONAL PLAN IN CASE OF A DISASTER?
1 yes 2 no
66. HAVE YOU HAD A FIRST-AID TRAINING COURSE?
1 yes 2 no
67. DO YOU FIND IT IMPORTANT TO HAVE FIRST AID TRAINING?
1 yes 2 no
68. DO YOU HAVE PERSONAL EXPERIENCE OF AN ACCIDENT?
1 not at all 3 a quite serious accident
2 a serious accident 4 a small accident
Appendix 2
Rotated factor matrix of items referring to coping strategies.
Two composite variables were constructed.
Rotated Factor Matrix:










TEENRUTI .61285  .24003
HARRASTU .72430 -.02762
YRITANOL .74566 -.12093
Rotated factor matrix of items referring to information delivery by
authorities or mass media. Four composite variables were constructed.
Rotated Factor Matrix:
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4
VOTIEDOT -.26024 -.20951 .06152 .78756
KERTTOVO .34659 .64753 -.15493 -.00579
ANTOIVO .39050 .54923 -.09715 -.23889
LUOTVO .69374 .36411 -.06411 .03747
OLIVAT .73550 .18504 -.08570 -.08010
VOANTOHJ .21809 .18425 .17907 -.01189
MILLAIVO -.05076 -.08807 .91906 .05976
KERTOTV -.15458 -.28465 .06937 .79279
TVANTAMA .02868 .84205 -.04493 .02370
KERTOITV .14101 .68224 .00355 -.18565
LUOTITTV .75520 .12769 .11026 .01105
TANTTIE .72822 .01517 .03920 -.13340
MILVAATV .02719 -.10674 .92371 -.00739
TIETOLA -.07189 -.20839 .05622 -.34583
HUONOT .31227 .06535 -.03260 -.17615
Appendix 3
Table  47. The relations between psychological variables and satisfaction with
reliability and clarity of information  delivery, mean values.
Satisfied Quite Dissatisfied
satisfied df F p <
Life events 4,05 4,23 6,40 2,553 10.57 .001
Sense of
Coherence 49,14 50,12 46,88 2,553 7.07 .01
Psychological
symptoms 3,58 3,50 5,39 2,553 5.70 .01
Anxiety 5,38 4,85 6,76 2,627 5.83 .01
Hypochondria 8,96 9,33 11,62 2,627 5.83 .01
Fear of
consequences





plants** 1,98 1,80 1,58 2,592 7.50 .01
Table  48. The relations between psychological variables and satisfaction with
the amount and quality of information delivery, mean values.
Too much Right Too little
amount df F p<
Life events 3,79 4,12 5,75 2,479 6.78 .01
Problem-*
focused










plants ** 2,04 1,85 1,62 2,585 4.38 .01
Table  49. The relations between psychological variables and satisfaction with
timing of information delivery
Satisfied Quite Dissatisfied
satisfied df F p <
Problem- *
focused









plants ** 1,95 1,69 1,64 2,594 10.91 .001
*    smaller number = more use of coping





















































Figure 13. Factors related to hypochondria.





































Figure 16. Factors related to psychological symptoms.
